On the Eve of our Founder-Chancellor's Birthday 2024

Global

DIASPORA

A BIRD'S -EYE VIEW



Department of English

Dr. M.G.R.
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University with Graded Autonomy Status
(An ISO 21001 : 2018 Certified Institution)
Periyar E.V.R. High Road, Maduravoyal, Chennai-95. Tamilnadu, India.

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High Commission of India, Accra
invites all Indians and Friends of India to the
launch of
Chalo India
Global Diaspora Campaign
on Thursday, 7 March 2024 at 9 AM
at High Commission of India, Accra

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Dedication

Mahatma Gandhi

02 Oct 1869 ‹‹::›› 30 Jan 1948

Gandhi

RISE OF A MAHATMA AND DIASPORA

Editors
Dr. Ruchi Verma
Narayan Kumar
Amb. Anup K. Mudgal

The year 2019-2020 marked the 150th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi that was widely commemorated in India and in many parts of the world remembering Gandhiji's philosophy and teachings. During his education of law in the UK, Gandhiji developed firm faith in the principles and merits of the rule of law. Ironically, this faith was severely challenged when he moved as a lawyer to assist some Indian origin businessmen in South Africa. There, Gandhiji came face to face not only with violations of the sacrosanct principles of the rule of law but also the discrimination built in the laws themselves. This shock laid the foundation of barrister Gandhi's journey in the process of making of a mahatma. Though Gandhiji's commitment to Swaraj through Satyagraha has a much wider global appeal, his path to sainthood was inseparably intertwined with his experiences with the Indian diaspora. In keeping with Antar Rashtriya Sahayog Parishad (ARSP's) pioneering work with Indian diaspora, Diaspora Research and Resource Centre of ARSP, in collaboration with Gandhi Smriti and Darshan Samiti, New Delhi organised a series of conferences on the theme 'Gandhi and diaspora', which were attended by over 100 experts from India and abroad. This book is a compilation of the proceedings, presentations and the outcomes of these important events. We hope, this publication would be useful to academics and scholars dealing with Gandhian teachings, ideology and diaspora studies.

Some important Web Links on Indian Diaspora

01] https://www.cfr.org/blog/indias-rise-role-diaspora

02]http://gandhismriti.gov.in/gsdsprogram/international-conference-%E2%80%9Cmahatma-gandhi-and-diaspora%E2%80%9D

03]https://grfdt.com/PublicationDetails.aspx?Type=Articles&TabId=11

04]https://www.india.gov.in/spotlight/remembering-mahatma-gandhi-protagonist-peace

05]https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-09-24/secretary-generals-remarks-the-event-leadership-matters-relevance-of-mahatma-gandhi-the-contemporary-world-delivered

06]https://sputniknews.in/20231002/world-needs-gandhi-now-more-than-ever-experts--4483223.html

07]https://www.drishtiias.com/blog/honouring-the-global-indian-diaspora-and-their-contributions-to-india-s-growth

FOREWORD

"First they ignore you, then they laugh at you,
then they fight you, then you win."

Over the past decades, the engagement of diasporas in development issues such as poverty reduction or economic growth, humanitarian response or post-crisis recovery have generated an increasing interest among a variety of stakeholders and governments in particular. Accordingly, IOM organized in 2013 the first ever International Diaspora Ministerial Conference bringing together high-level government officials as well as representatives of academia, diaspora organizations, civil society, media, and private sector from around the world.

The study of international migration is broader in scope and partially subsumes diaspora studies. Diasporas arise from international migration. Constant interaction between diasporic communities in several sovereign jurisdictions and often with a homeland is a defining feature. Nonetheless, not all events in, processes concerning, and aspects of the diasporic life of, say, Jews or Armenians would necessarily interest students of international migration. What are termed Jewish or Armenian studies are more central to the study of diasporas than to the study of international migration.
Normally, diasporas are characterized by most, (if not all), of the following features:

- Migration, which may be forced or voluntary, from a country of origin in search of work, trade, or to escape conflict or persecution;
- An idealized, collective memory and/or myth about the ancestral home;
- A continuing connection to a country of origin;
- A strong group consciousness sustained over time; and'
- A sense of kindship with diaspora members in other countries.

Clearly, not all international migration gives rise to diasporas. There are nine common features of a diaspora, which serve to demarcate the scope of his inquiry. There is a certain mode of typology to classify diasporas according to their prevalent nature — "victims," such as the Armenians; "labor," such as Indian contract workers; "trade," such as Lebanese merchants in West Africa; "imperial," such as British population movements to overseas dominions; and "cultural," such as Caribbeans living abroad.

Members of diasporas may engage in development in their home countries directly or indirectly. There are five different levels of diasporas involvement in development, ranked here from lowest participation to highest:

- *Receiving information*: Members of diasporas passively receive information on development- related initiatives in their home countries.
- *Passive information gathering*: Members of diasporas provide information to interested parties, often governments in their home countries.
- *Consultation*: Development actors, including governments, consult members of diasporas to inform policy or practice.
- *Collaboration*: Members of diasporas share responsibilities, either by delegating tasks to other actors, or by jointly designing and/or implementing development interventions.
- *Self-mobilization*: Members of diasporas retain full ownership and responsibility for development initiatives.

This book – ***"GLOBAL DIASPORA: A Bird's-eye View"*** – organised and released by the Department of English of our University is seriously attempting to portray the 'Brief-View' of the diaspora originated and spread across the globe for the last few centuries. Books has 22 chapters running into 275 pages with several web links provided then and there to enable the readers to reach/seek further information about the relevant topics.

Six chapters – Chapter 2 to Chapter 7 – elaborately present several historical events/developments in Indian diaspora with the help of articles written by international specialists on Diaspora. Also, several pictures/photos and web links provided therein offer a variety of interesting episodes and other statistical data. Three chapters (8 to 10) emphasize the role of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa and his important political share in several events there and his performance as a great India diaspora.

Chapters 11 to 16 cover the role of Indian in global diaspora – American, African, Middle East, European, Australian & South American – featuring many intricate technical/non-technical details about the importance of the role of Indians over the centuries in these continents. Chapters 17, 18 & 19 offer the many aspects inter-continental diaspora, viz, European American, African American and African European. Chapter 20 provides a glimpse of 'Diasporic Literature'.

The informative details containing in the book would be very useful to all the stakeholders and, especially the research scholars interested in global diaspora. I do appreciate the Department of English and the authors in bringing this book.

Dr V Cyril Raj
Additional Registrar (Admn)
Dr MGR Educational and Research Institute

Currently, research on diasporas-related institutions consists mostly of single-country case studies, with limited comparative analysis and even less quantitative research. This means that the determinants that lead to the development of diasporas outreach policies, as well as any potential best practices in diasporas-related policies, can be further explored.

An interesting issue is that research on diasporas-related issues focuses overwhelmingly on South-North migration. The lack of attention given to South-South migration means that conceptions of diasporas engagement and 'brain drain' focus on highly skilled and -educated professionals from the global South that have migrated to the Northern hemisphere. This is especially problematic considering that international migrants in the global South outnumber those in the North. The benefits of diasporas engagement are often viewed as a one-way flow of assets from developed countries in the North to the less-developed South, which clearly does not fit the reality of South-South migration. Though many assume that diasporas engagement compensates for brain drain, there is not enough evidence to establish if this holds true for the global South.

The study of global migration is broader in scope and partially subsumes diaspora studies. Diasporas arise from international migration. Constant interaction between diasporic communities in several sovereign jurisdictions and often with a homeland is a defining feature. Nonetheless, not all events in, processes concerning, and aspects of the diasporic life of, say, Jews or Armenians would necessarily interest students of international migration. What are termed Jewish or Armenian studies are more central to the study of diasporas than to the study of international migration.

The terms "brain drain", "brain gain", "brain bank" and "brain circulation" are often mentioned in the context of understanding and studying diasporas. It may be defined that "brain drain" as the "emigration of trained and talented individuals from the country of origin to another country resulting in a depletion of skills/resources in the former." "Brain gain", also called "reverse brain drain" refers to the benefits gained from the immigration of skilled individuals into a

country. It has long been understood that when highly skilled or educated individuals emigrate *en masse*, it can pose problems for their country of origin.

Clearly, not all international migration gives rise to diasporas. Global Diasporas may enlarge the scope to include populations that, unlike the Jews and Armenians, have not suffered catastrophic traumas. There are nine common features of a diaspora, which serve to demarcate the scope of the inquiry. A newly generated typology may classify diasporas according to their prevalent nature — "victims," such as the Armenians; "labour," such as Indian contract workers; "trade," such as Lebanese merchants in West Africa; "imperial," such as British population movements to overseas dominions; and "cultural," such as Caribbeans living abroad. It may be noted that conditions surrounding diaspora communities evolve through time, so that groups like the Jews comprise several types.

This book – "*GLOBAL DIASPORA – A Bird's-eye View*" – makes an attempt to provide a global picture of the history of Diaspora in 22 chapters running into 275 pages. All the chapter has been provided with web links to enable the readers to reach/know/learn/seek more interesting details/information.

Indian Diasporas across six continents – American, African, European, Middle East, South American and Australian - have been narrated well with the relevant examples/pictures. Also, three inter-continental diasporas (European American, African American & African European) are explained well in the appropriate contexts.

Though there are three chapters on 'Mahatma Gandhi' treating him as a greatest Indian diaspora, the book is aptly dedicated to him.

It is hoped that the contents of the book would be found more useful and informative by the stakeholders who are interested in the global diaspora.

Dr S Devipriya
Prof Dr S Ramalingam

DIASPORA

Introduction

Why in News?

Recently, the Prime Minister **inaugurated the 17th Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas convention** in Madhya Pradesh on the occasion of Pravasi Bhartiya Diwas (PBD).

- Over the years, the convention, which began in 2003, **has grown in size and scope,** particularly **since 2015, when the yearly convention became a biennial affair.**

What is Diaspora?

- **Origin:**
  - The term diaspora **traces its roots to the Greek diaspeiro, which means dispersion.** The **Indian diaspora** has grown manifold since the first batch of Indians **were taken to counties in the eastern pacific and the Caribbean islands under the 'Girmitiya' arrangement** as indentured labourers.
- **Classifications:**
  - **Non-Resident Indians (NRI)**: NRIs are Indians who are residents of foreign countries. A person is considered NRI if:
    - She/he is **not in India for 182 days or more** during the financial year Or;
    - If he/she is **in India for less than 365 days** during the 4 years preceding that year and less than 60 days in that year.
  - **Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs):** PIO refers to a foreign citizen (except a national of Pakistan, Afghanistan Bangladesh, China, Iran, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Nepal) who:
    - At any time held an Indian passport, or who or either of their parents/ grandparents/great grandparents **was born and permanently resided in India** as defined in **the Government of India Act, 1935 or who is a spouse of a citizen of India or a PIO.**

- The PIO category **was abolished in 2015 and merged with the OCI category.**
  - **Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs):** A separate category of OCI was **carved out in 2005**. An OCI card was given to a foreign national:
- Who was eligible to be a citizen of India on January 26, 1950
- Was a citizen of India on or at any time after January 26, 1950 or belonged to a territory that became part of India after August 15, 1947.
- Minor children of such individuals, **except those who were a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh,** were also eligible for OCI cards.

- **Geographical Spread:**



- According to the **World Migration Report, 2022, India has the largest emigrant population in the world in 2020**, making it the top origin country globally, **followed by Mexico, Russian and China.**
- The data shared by the government in Parliament in 2022 showed that the **geographical spread of the Indian diaspora is vast. The countries with over 10 lakh overseas Indians include:**
  - United States of America, the United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar, Malaysia, Kuwait and Canada.

- **Remittances:**
  - According to the **World Bank Migration and Development Brief, released in 2022, for the first time a single country, India, is on track to receive more than USD 100 billion in yearly remittances.**
  - The World Migration Report notes that India, China, Mexico, the Philippines and Egypt are (in descending order) **among the top five remittance recipient countries.**

What is the Significance of the Indian Diaspora?

- **Enhancing India's Soft Power:** Indian diaspora is one of the richest minorities in many developed countries. Their advantage is evident in **"diaspora diplomacy",** whereby **they act as "bridge-builders" between their home and adopted countries.**
  - The Indian diaspora is not just a part of India's soft power, **but a fully transferable political vote bank as well.**
  - Also, many people of Indian origin hold **top political positions in many countries,** which enhances India's political clout at multilateral institutions like the United Nations.
- **Economic Contribution:** Remittances sent by the Indian diaspora have positive systemic **effects on the Balance of Payments (BOP)**, which help to bridge a wider trade deficit.
  - The migration of less-skilled labor (especially to West Asia) has **helped in bringing down disguised unemployment in India.**
  - Further, the **migrant workers facilitated the flow of tacit information,** commercial and business ideas, and technologies into India.

Visit the following Web Page

https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/the-indian-diaspora

A Conceptual Framework of Indian Diaspora

Source

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Shri Rana Inter College, India

A Conceptual Framework of Indian Diaspora

The Creative Launcher, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 66-74, 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53032/tcl.2022.7.6.07

Abstract:
The term Indian diaspora refers to the overseas Indians officially known as Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) or the Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) or the people of India by birth or descendants from Indian subcontinents, living outside of Indian Republic. Overseas Indians are concerned as the people of India or the ethnic groups of people associated with Indian sensibility, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship or having other co-relation of Indian life style abroad overseas. The conceptual analyses on migration have explained the social criteria of Indian diasporic sensibility just as assimilation and integration, the organized associations, cultural crisis, emergence of identity crisis, ethnicity and the globalization etc.

Keywords:
Migration, Assimilation, Integration, Cultural crisis or emergence, Identity crisis, ethnicity, Globalization.

In the historical growth of Diaspora, India is known as one of the largest Diasporic population conserving countries in all over the world. According to the report of United Nations, India is the largest country which originates for expatriates and immigrant communities. It is recorded as the country of 17.5 million diaspora across the world while the latest survey of Ministry of External Affairs of India makes its observers clear that there are 32 million NRI's and PIO's recorded as Indian Diaspora living out of India for the sake of their better growth willingly or unwillingly. According to a survey of News 18 on 19th September 2021, nearly 2.5 million Indian people migrate from

India every year and it's enough to narrate the latest report of Indian Diaspora. Describing the terms differently, NRIs are defined as the people who are recognized among the tax payers, under the section 6 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, has not resided in India for a considerable period of the Income Tax Act for their fulfilling records. The act explains that any Indian who is not recognized as the 'resident of India' but is known for his common ancestral identity as non-resident of India. Such people are treated as NRIs in the consideration of the government of India for paying income tax. Another term, PIOs means for the citizen of India, living abroad after the nation of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iran, Sri Lanka or Nepal, who were holding an Indian passport for their Indian Identity, in the relation of their ancestors who were living permanently as the resident of India and fulfilling the criteria of Indian citizenship as it is defined in the Act 1935 of Indian Constitution. In the same way the other territories that became part of India or the spouse of a citizen of India, all of such people are known as PIOs. Further, the OCI or Overseas Citizenship of India convinces a scheme of pseudo-citizenship of India which does not allow for full time dual citizenship. It is defined as a long-term visa or card providing scheme of the government with the certain rights for their votes in Election and seeking job opportunities.

The historical development of Indian diaspora has a long record of migration into the different countries of the world, particularly to the Central Asia, United States of America and Russia. Such history of migration in India is being told to be begun from the very beginning of the reign of Emperor Kanishka around the first century AD. At that time, they were known as 'gypsies' and most of them settled from what today is called Rajasthan (the place of King) in India. They emigrated to the north and the west of Europe and settled there in the hope of betterment. Another movement of people is recorded in the reign of Cholas which started in around 500 AD to the Southeast Asia which is known today as Indonesia and Malaysia. The influence of such migration can strongly be seen in the Southeast Asia among the Brahmin Kings of Thailand, Kingdoms of Cambodia, Indonesia, Central Sumatra and Bali. Nevertheless, all of these migrants can't be labeled as Indian Diaspora in the real perspective

because most of them intermingled into the local country and culture, leaving all traces of Indian identity yet they could be called Old Diaspora of ancient India.

The historical emigration of Indian diaspora can also be traced back to the time of Emperor Ashoka also who attacked Kalinga and followed the progressive steps of Samudragupta towards Southeast Asia for the development of his Indian kingdom in which mission a large number of Brahmins migrated to the Southeast Asia for their willing purposes of the cultural growth. They were called as Cholas, known for their naval power. The historical approaches of these Cholas Kings and subjects tells us that they won Sumatra and Malay Peninsula and established themselves with an identity of culture in the Brahman families, known presently as Rakru of Thailand in the Southeast Asia. Another example of Ancient Diaspora is recorded as 'Indian Shendu' which is looking verifying with the annex of Yunan by the Han Dynasty in the very first century by the Chinese authority. No more knowledge about the dispersion of such diaspora is recorded under our little knowledge but the modern spirit of Indian diaspora is recorded in the history of 'Indian Merchant Diaspora' emerging in the mid 16th century in the Central Asia and Arabian countries, working well for over four hundred years as the Astrakhan people establishing their colony in the 1610s at the mouth of Volga in the Tsardom of Russia, having the entitle of the first Indian merchant colony. It has not been the report of Indian perception but Russian literate society also reported that the presence of Hindu traders in Moscow and St. Petersburg since the 18th century has been an historical identity in the various places of Russia. Further it is also reported that the Indians, Hindus or Muslims from the different part of India were found working as bankers and merchants and living with Jews and Armenians in Safavid Persia which is also mentioned by a number of scholars in their manuscripts and chronicles. The murder of a number of Hindus in Hamadan by Ottomans due to Ottoman and Afghan wars in Iran during 1722-27, is also reported under the Hindu Diaspora in Iran. In 1815, Elphinstones reported that 350 stores of great buildings, owned by the Hindu merchants, especially of Sikhs in Kandahar were found as the evidence of Hindu Diaspora. After this, there starts a survey to have knowledge about the Hindu Diaspora in Kandahar and it was found that there were a number of houses dealing with textiles and other precious metals historically

recognized for the assignments of Sikhs community in India. The present survey reports that the historical records of such community living in Kabul during 1800 to 1886 could be read clearly. They were found using Sindhi and Punjabi language to converse their thoughts and their business was recognized as Usury while they were also found having local citizenship of Afghanistan. Many of the usurers and merchants of Hindu backgrounds were targeted and killed by the gangs of Kashgaris while the remaining of them took shelter under the British Consul General who made them assure to protect from any such gangs or rioters. Furthermore, the study of Hindu Diaspora is found with a piece of evidence of two killings of Hindus at the hands of Uighurs in the Shamba Bazar and many hindus killings were found in Khotan at the hands of Bughra Amirs. The brutal incident of Posgam evidenced on March 25, 1933 can't be forgotten easily from the memory of the scholars, in which many British Indian Hindus were crushed out and were looted by the Muslims in Karghalik. In this connection Raj Sahib, Dip Chand, the old and the wise member of community or Caucasus in the Central Asia was spoiled brutally. Such brutality of human beings in Khotan came to be called as Karghalik Outrage. Accordingly, the great loss of humanity in Khotan was going by the Islamic Turkic rebel declaring Sharia against many more. In this way a great community of Hindu Diaspora was reported to be spoiled and looted by the enemy of humanity in Afghanistan.

All the above examples are the exploration of exploitation of ancient Indian diaspora but the present Indian diaspora is considered as Modern Indian Diaspora which is recorded for over the past two centuries. It varies to such an extent that it can be explored under the three sub-categories: The Old, The New and The Gulf Diasporas. Old Indian Diaspora is consisted in the movement of people from the early 19th century to the independent period of India. Abolishing the slavery system of India in 1833, English people established the new system of "Indentured Labour Migration", adjoining people from Indian subcontinent due to the lack of manpower for their unknowingly yet precious power of work in the sugar and rubber plantation. In 1834, Britain exported a large number of bonded Indians as the labourers to the Dutch and Mauritius. Further, the French also followed the system, exporting Indian workers to their colonies in the competition of black Africans to the Southern United States. The

absolute poverty of Indian people makes them compel to sell themselves on the bonded labourers sources and in a decade, the small scale of migration converted into the mass movement of people to provide cheap labour class to these colonies but their journeys were too much risky. Their mortality was seen high on the boats of British, Dutch and France from the sub continents to these colonies. In this way, most of the bonded labourers for the plantations in the countries like Mauritius, Trinidad, Suriname and Fiji are explored to have a connection with the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, presently. Some other countries like Guyana and East Africa are indebted to the bonded labourers of Punjab and Gujarat while Tamil Nadu is the state of India to provide much more labourers to the French colonies in the form of Indian Diaspora. The majority of this bonded labour was from male society which not only developed these colonies with their hard works but also weakens India on the economic backgrounds. This brutal system of "Indentured Labour Migration" was going on till the end of World War I. When in 1916, the British Colonies were criticized severely on international level, they abolished the indentured labour system and by that time, more than 1.5 million Indian people were sailed on the colonies of Caribbean, Africa and Asia. The misfortune of Indentured Labour Migration was over with the new start of contract base labour of Tamil people to the British masters of coffee, tea and rubber plantations in Burma, Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Near about five million poor Tamil or Southern Indian people migrated to these only three countries of the world. Such new designed labour migration came to an end with the conflicted era of World War II. Around that time not only Tamil but the merchants and traders from Gujarat and Sindh migrated to the Middle East, South and East African colonies ruled by the Britishers.

It is reported that by the time of World War II, approximately 6.0 million Indian migrants were living outside India and interestingly only six thousand Indians were reported to be in the United States at that time. The current study explains that the Old Indian Diaspora constitutes a phenomenon of Pre- World War II. In this connection 60% of Indian Diaspora constitutes under the Old Indian Diaspora which is numbered 18 million Indian PIOs. The New Indian Diaspora consists of a large population of PIOs from the mid 1960s onwards, in which a number of Indian people migrated to the developed countries like UK, US, Canada, Australia and other Western European

countries. In UK Indians were known as the unskilled workers and they worked for a very low wages while in US, many more Sikhs were found working as the agricultural people in California. To prevent the migration of people into US, it has passed many acts and also has to particularize the number of not only Indian migration but of others too. When the US Department of State was asked for its explanation, it reported that the aim of this act was 'to preserve the American homogeneity'. Canada also very cleverly checked immigrants by the new law which intended to calculate the Canadian immigrants, has made an uninterrupted journey from their countries to the present responsibility of these Indian immigrants which stopped many Indians to be survived in their countries in the place of migration to its local area.

During the time from 1947 to 1962, Indians were unrestricted Commonwealth people to enter, live, work, vote and hold public offices in the United Kingdoms under the postcolonial ties. Consequently, many of them settled in the industrial cities like Leicester and Birmingham for their personal as well as industrial growth. After the independence of India in 1947, many people like Multanis, Shikarpuris and Banias known as 'Indian Merchant Diaspora' from the various states of India emigrated to the many parts of the world especially to England and other European countries for the sake of their higher education or learning the industrial criteria of interest. They did not wish to stay there but if they stayed for a considerable time they have maintained their relation with the local contacts of their originated area of India and its people as the case with South Europeans and North African countries are evidenced. But in 1962 and also 1968, British Commonwealth Immigration Acts comminuted Indians to enjoy the previous ties. It could not have a considerable time because after twenty years, British Commonwealth needed highly skilled labourers so they reversed the law and many more Indians started to migrate for the British Colonies or Commonwealth Countries. After the growth of 1990s software and uprising economy of the US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many other countries attracted many more Indians to be migrated from India and settled into these countries for the growth of their social, economic and educational status. The US Immigration Act of 1990 and H-IB visas policy gave many chances for Indians to experience US immigration very closely. The US Census Bureau estimates 75% of all ethnic Indians working there with

at least a bachelor degree and among these near about 69% of this population is working in management and professional occupations. The census data of 2010 in the US, UK and Canada presents an estimation of near about 3 million Indians in US, 1.5 millions in the United Kingdom and more than one million Indians in Canada. Today, Indians are recognized as the 4th largest group of immigrants in the United States of America after Chinese, Mexicans and Filipinos.

After the 1970s, one can see the latest kind of Indian Diaspora which was categorized as the form of Gulf Diaspora. It started when Oil industry boom in the Middle East and came to an end with the prompting significant number of Indian migration to the Persian Gulfs. Under this booming exploration, a number of skilled, unskilled and semi-skilled labourers from the Southern States of India have migrated to these countries on the terms and conditions of temporary schemes for serving in oil industries or in some other related services of construction for the sake of their enhancing economy. These countries have practiced common norms of refusing these non- Arabian people from the concept of naturalization, even if they were born in those Gulf Countries. Their traumas can't be explained easily yet one can perceive around five million Gulf Diasporas, suffering from the segment of humanity.

Though, the above-mentioned groups of the Indian Diaspora differ in many ways, yet all of these migrants have to suffer with the same plight and sensibility of dispersion. In the context of the present migration, one can read about the more recent skilled and highly- skilled Indian labourers who are reported to be migrated to the developed countries and formulated the concept of new Diaspora in the context of Indian origins. The other historical incident of Indian migration is reported to be occurred during mid-19th century until the World War 1st when a number of Girmitiyas emigrated to the different parts of the world. These Girmitiya workers are mostly related to the language of Awadhi and Bhojpuri, the common languages of U. P. and Bihar, respectively or the other British colony under the system of indentured labourers. These Girmitiyas emigrated to the countries like Guyana, Mauritius, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and many other Caribbean parts like Jamaica, Barbados, Grenada, Belize, Fiji Reunion, Seychelles Malaysia, Singapore, some parts of East Africa e. g. Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and many parts of South Africa.

These workers or traders are reported to be settled in Oman, Aden, Arabian Peninsula, Dubai, Bahrain, South Africa and some other eastern countries of Africa. Most of these workers or traders were ruled over by the British imperialism. Even Indian currency was evidenced legal tender in some of these countries of Arabian Peninsula in those days. Also many Punjabis, Rajasthanis, Sindis, Baloches, and Kashmiris were found visiting and engaging themselves in the Camel Service of Australia. So, over all the experiences of such exploration came to be viewed as the number of 30 million Indians is surviving in the dispersed immigration of Diaspora in all over the world. They are well settled in more than 75 countries all over the world. Near about 44.6 million Indians are found in the United States of America while more than 31.0 million Indians are surviving in United Arab Emirates as the immigrant Indians. Malaysia has more than 29.8 million Indians and Saudi Arabia has more than 28.1 million Indian origin people working under the authority of the local administration. More than 8.9 million of Indian diaspora are living in Mauritius while more than 5.56 million Indian diaspora can be found in Trinidad and Tobago as the present study surveys. The same list has given us clue that many more Indian diasporas are living in the other countries of the world like more than 18.25 million in the United Kingdom, 16.14 million in Sri Lanka, 15.60 million in Africa, 9.2 million in Kuwait, 6.9 million in Qatar, 6.8 million in Oman, 6.5 million in Singapore, 6.0 million in Nepal, 4.96 million in Australia, 3.16 million in Bahrain, 3.15 million in Fiji, 2.97 million in Guyana, 2.80 million in Reunion, 2.35 million in Netherlands. 2.0 million in New Zealand, 1.97 million in Italy, 1.95 million Thailand, 1.54 million in Suriname, 1.46 million in Germany, 1.20 million in Philippines, 1.09 million in France and 1.07 million in Indonesia. All these records are given under the study of Population of Overseas Indians recorded by the Ministry of External Affairs of India in December 2018. It has also been indicated that the number of Indian diaspora would be increased in the coming days of the next years.

Through all of these explorations, Indian Diaspora has been studied with various backgrounds of its frameworks. The present research work has tried to view in short the description of Indian diasporic sensibilities suffered in many parts of the world but no doubt there are many more countries to be studied in the context of Diaspora. The conceptual framework of Indian Diaspora made the way limelight for the diasporic

sensibilities used by these migrant communities in their literal as well as social works with the backgrounds of their origins into the various countries because every literature mirrors the society and society is known with the upgraded feelings of people, living in the particular area. In such relations of exploration, it is found that all the diasporans would have the different context of plight for the expression of their social as well as literal sensibilities. These diasporas have not only suffered but also gave way to the various sects of Indian ancestry by contributing their huge responsibilities in the growth of their residential countries. It can be exemplified with full ethnic Indian heads of the countries and the governments like Basedeo Panday (a Trinadadian and Tobagonian lawyer and politician, served as the fifth Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago), Kamla Persad-Bissessar (Trinadadian and Tobagonian lawyer and Politicain and the Political leader of the Oppsitiona Congress Party) Noor Hassanali (a retired High court Judge of Trinidad and Tobago), Cheddi Jaggan (first elected Chief minister of Guyana in 1953 and later Primier of British Guyana from 1961 to 1964), Donald Ramotar (President of Guyana from 2011 to 2015), Bharat Jagdeo (Vice President of Guyana since 2020), Moses Nagamootoo (Prime Minister of Guyana from 2015 to 2020), Irfan Ali (present President of Guyana since 2020), Chan Santokhi (9th President of Suriname since 2020), Mahendra Chaudhury (first Indo Fiji Prime Minister of Fiji) , Pravind Jugnauth (Prime Minister of Mauritius since 2017), and the most concerned personality currently, Rishi Sunak of U. K. Some other mixed heritage can be quoted herewith such as Antonio Costa of Portugal, Leo Vradkar of Ireland and Wavel Ramkalawan of Seychelles.

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



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The diaspora and India's growth story

This brief sketches the role that the diaspora will play in India's development process and in the promotion of its foreign policy goals. The brief gives an overview of the policies that the present government has rolled out and examines the benefits from, and pitfalls of an increased focus on the diaspora.

Introduction

If Atal Bihari Vajpayee, during his 1998-2004 tenure, is credited for having promoted serious engagement with the Indian diaspora to develop mutually beneficial linkages, current Prime Minister Narendra Modi is getting known for his enthusiasm in expanding those earlier efforts. The prime minister's vigour in this arena has been evident since the day he took office in May 2014, and it begins with his public pronouncements. In foreign trips and outreach activities with India's expatriate communities, he persuades them to "contribute to India's growth story".

Unlike the Indian National Congress which tends to disassociate with the diaspora and views them as largely burdensome, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) perceives the Indian diaspora as an asset. In 1964 in Burma (now Myanmar), when General Ne Win nationalised all businesses in the country, the large Indian trading community was greatly affected. They lost their livelihoods, were denied compensation, and as many as 300,000 of them were expelled from the country. The Indian Government at the time did not extend help to the diaspora,

maintaining that those events were "strictly a matter of domestic jurisdiction". Similarly, in 1972, when 70,000 Indians suffered persecution in Idi Amin's Uganda and were expelled from the country, many were forced to take asylum in England after the Indian government "turned a blind eye" on their plight.

Today, a close look at the two parties' manifestos in the run-up to the 2014 election reveals a gap in their outlook towards India's expatriate communities. The BJP in its 2014 election manifesto made it clear that it will work with Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), by adopting a proactive diplomacy strategy, to develop what it referred to as "Brand India". It stated that "the NRIs, PIOs and professionals settled abroad are a vast reservoir to articulate the national interests and affairs globally. This resource will be harnessed for strengthening Brand India". In contrast, the Congress' manifesto highlighted the "protective" role it sees itself playing towards the diaspora. It said, "Protecting Indians overseas from exploitation or threats will remain a paramount concern". As part of this larger strategy, it envisioned playing a role in safeguarding Tamilians in Sri Lanka, and in establishing exchange centres for youth in India. As can be gleaned from its 2014 manifesto, the Congress party does not view the diaspora as a tool to leverage its foreign policy goals or in the development of India.

The Congress' outlook towards the diaspora, as shaped over the years, was influenced by non-alignment and the Cold War, which was characterised by suspicion – the Indian government had no trust for the West, which only reciprocated the sentiment – thereby creating a hostile environment for any diaspora policy. In this backdrop it was not logical for them to focus on the diaspora. Recently, however, it appears from its leaders' public statements that the Congress party is employing a new approach. When party leader Rahul Gandhi visited the United States in September 2017, he told a gathering of Indian-Americans to "get involved" and help in "transforming India". During his visit to Bahrain in 2018, Gandhi also told the diaspora that they are "important".

Ram Madhav, BJP general secretary, at the launch of the 2015 Indian Diaspora Investment Initiative made his party's policy clear when he said, "They (Indian diaspora) can be India's voice even while being loyal citizens in those countries. That is the long-term goal behind the diaspora diplomacy. It is like the way the Jewish community looks out for Israel's interests in the United States". It is hard to imagine Modi repeating the mistakes of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when Indians were expelled from Uganda in 1972. In general, the Congress has been happy to cut its ties with those who have left the country; the BJP tends to nurture those very ties. This brief examines the growing significance of the diaspora in Indian foreign policy, and the challenges and opportunities that follow.

Defining 'Diaspora'

Who comprises the Indian diaspora? The term "diaspora" is derived from the Greek word *diaspeirein*, which means "dispersion". Over time, the term evolved, and now loosely refers to any person/s belonging to a particular country with a common origin or culture, but residing outside their homeland for various reasons.

The Government of India does not follow a specific definition, although it attempted to define the term in 2004 as "a generic term to describe the people who migrated from territories that are currently within the borders of the Republic of India. It also refers to their descendants." Today, 'diaspora' is commonly understood to include Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI), of which PIO and OCI card holders were merged under one category — OCI — in 2015. Broadly speaking, for the Indian government, the diaspora encompasses a group of people who can either trace their origins to India or who are Indian citizens living abroad, either temporarily or permanently.

Diaspora is not homogenous since migration involves human mobility over multiple time periods, encompassing a whole spectrum and types of movements. The Indian example of migration began in large numbers during the British rule as indentured labourers to former colonies like Fiji, Kenya and Malaysia. It continued in the post-independence period with Indians from different social strata moving to countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, and Gulf countries. Today as there are numerous, heterogeneous diaspora, they have different demands of the Indian Government. The diaspora from the Gulf, for example, look to India for support on welfare issues, while those from wealthier nations such as the US look to India for investment opportunities. The Indian communities in countries such as Fiji and Mauritius, meanwhile, desire to reconnect with the country on cultural grounds.

As of December 2016, the Indian diaspora comprised approximately 31 million people, of which PIOs were 17 million and NRIs were 13 million, spread across 146 countries in the world. The US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Myanmar, the UK, Sri Lanka, South Africa and Canada host an Indian diasporic population of at least one million each.

Generally, the Indian diaspora is looked at as a "model minority" and comprises many accomplished individuals. This is especially true of Indians in more developed countries like Australia, the UK and US. As they gain prominence, both in terms of their sheer size and through their economic contributions, the host country finds that it must pay more attention to the Indian expatriate communities. They

are becoming increasingly visible in electoral politics, though still in relatively small numbers. US President Donald Trump, for one, has appointed some individual Indians to key positions within his administration, including the following: Nikki Haley as US Ambassador to the UN; Raj Shah as his Deputy Assistant and Research Director; Krishna Urs as the Ambassador to Peru; Neil Chatterjee to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; and Vishal Amin as Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator. In Europe, Ireland witnessed the rise of Leo Varadkar and Portugal has Antonio Costa, both of whom serve as prime ministers in their respective countries. Interestingly, both Varadkar and Costa are second-generation migrants whose fathers uprooted from India— the former is from Maharashtra while the latter migrated from Goa. There is also Ashwin Adhin, a Grimitiya, and the vice president of Suriname who traces his roots to Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh.

Modi has effectively played to the diaspora's emotions – they see in him a man of action, someone who can bring about change in corruption-ridden, bureaucratic India; the same India they left many years ago. It is clear that Modi sees tremendous potential in the diaspora, and is eager to see them contribute to India's growth story. At the 2017 Pravasi Bharatiya Divas in Bengaluru, Modi announced that India is moving from "brain drain to brain gain", making his vision clear — that "there is only one dream (within all of us): *Bharatiyata*".

Recent Policies

The government's initiatives towards the diaspora are two-pronged. For one, they cater to the needs of NRIs and OCIs by providing them with consular services, protection and conduct outreach activities to engage with them. At the same time, they create policies to encourage the diaspora to contribute to India's growth through philanthropy, knowledge transfers, investments in innovation and assistance in other development projects.

With this in mind, the Modi government has launched a string of initiatives and repackaged old schemes such as the 'Know India Program' (KIP). The last three years saw the launch of Head Post Offices as passport centres enabling thousands more to apply for a passport. For those looking to go abroad, training centres and orientation programmes are provided to train future employees on relevant skills and minimise culture shock.

A number of policies were announced keeping in mind the protection of welfare and interest of Indians abroad. For example, the 2014 Minimum Referral Wages (MRW), applicable only to Emigration Check Required (ECR) countries, increased the minimum wage of Indian workers employed as industrial workers, domestic

servants, cleaners and labourers. To partially reduce the risk of vulnerability from fraudulent contracts, nurses for example can now only be recruited through one of the six state government placement agencies. Furthermore, in 2015, the Ministry of External Affairs launched the e-migrate system that requires all foreign employers to register in the database. These policies are a step in the right direction but have faced criticism from countries like the UAE who claim it is a "breach of our sovereignty".

The successful KIP, launched in 2003 by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has been refashioned to include more participants and sessions every year. If in 2006 India hosted 55 participants across two sessions, in 2017 it hosted 160 participants across four sessions. The incumbent government also launched a website that enables participants to apply online. The programme is aimed mostly at Girmitiya youth and provides an opportunity for them "to better understand and appreciate contemporary India, foster closer ties with the land of their ancestors and enhance their engagement with India". Homeland visits or diaspora tourism is viewed by some scholars as a prerequisite to contribute constructively to the home country. In view of the above, focusing on Girmitiya youth is effective as most participants visit India for the first time through the programme. Eventually, the idea is to mould them into unofficial ambassadors of India.

Other youth-centric outreach programmes include scholarships to pursue undergraduate courses in recognised University Grants Commission universities in India, as well as *Bharat Ko Jano* online quizzes that test the participants' knowledge of India's heritage, history and culture. The inaugural quiz in 2016 saw the participation of some 5,000 diaspora youth.

Indeed, Prime Minister Modi is trying to realise Vajpayee's dream of a strong *Pravasi,* but on a larger scale. In the many Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) that have been organised since he became PM, Modi has been keen on wooing the diaspora. Yet it can be argued that the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas have almost become a show where he entices well-off diaspora, often neglecting those who really contribute to India. The relevance and productivity of such a celebration is thus questionable. But not for Modi, who continues to view PBD as an opportunity. To further emphasise the importance of their contributions, he has dedicated a building in New Delhi to them—called the Pravasi Bhartiya Kendra. These soft tactics create an impact for a diaspora that has often felt neglected. Yet, an increased focus on the diaspora comes with its own challenges.

Opportunities and Challenges

Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of engaging with the 30-million-strong Indian diaspora has been in terms of remittances. India was the world's largest recipient of remittances in 2016, receiving US$ 62.7 billion. Remittances aid in socio-economic development as it is used for the recipient family's personal use (accounting for 50 percent of household expenditure in rural areas), in temple building, and for donations to schools. These remittances have played a role in poverty reduction while changing consumption behaviour in rural areas. In an Indian Economic Review survey using National Sample Survey Organisation data, the researchers point to the fact that remittance-receiving households were not only better-off than non-remittance-receiving households, but also that the remittance was mostly used to purchase food items, other consumer goods, and healthcare. Spending on healthcare has an important labour market implication as it increases labour productivity. Interestingly, the same survey reported that least money was spent on education, which also has implications on the labour market.

Another tangible long-term advantage in nurturing ties with an active diaspora is an accelerated technological sector and increased socio-economic development. Some examples to illustrate this phenomenon are Bengaluru, Gurugram and Hyderabad as thriving Information Technology hubs that not only house multinational companies (MNCs) like Amazon, Google, Facebook and Uber, but also multiple Indian start-ups like Flipkart, Ola, Swiggy and Zoho. The government can further tap this transnational entrepreneurship, including support for entrepreneurs and small businesses in India in the form of technical knowledge transfers and finances from the diaspora. Authorities have done well to ease Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittance norms. Perhaps the most mutually beneficial policy is the government's 2015 move to treat NRI/OCI holders' investment as domestic investment and not FDI. This makes it easier for the diaspora to invest in India; the country, in turn, benefits as the money earned cannot be easily repatriated overseas. The measure is also expected to result in increased investment and a rise in inflow of foreign exchange remittance, both of which will aid in the growth of the economy.

If the government continues to focus on this aspect of the diaspora-homeland relationship, they are bound to benefit from its synergistic advantages. They act as important intermediaries linking traditional development actors and local communities. Diaspora's motives to invest in India are in contrast to non-diaspora FDI. Their investment decisions are not entirely profit-driven as many of them wish to establish a long-term base in India. They are also better informed of market conditions, the domestic labour and economic policies and consequently

have more realistic expectations of time frames for project completions and investment returns. Yet, it is important to note that their decision to invest may be negatively influenced by their reasons for migrating. Moreover, their capacity to invest will be lower than traditional sources of FDI.

A less tangible but important advantage in having a large emigrant group is "diaspora diplomacy". Vinay Lal (2008) argues that the diaspora has realised the value of advocacy and says that as the diaspora gain affluence abroad, they become more "anxious" to showcase their influence. For long, he says, their ability to make their presence acknowledged corresponded to the "visibility of India itself on the world stage". Moreover, for diaspora diplomacy to work effectively, India needs to share good relations with that country. It is here that Prime Minister Modi is viewed with enthusiasm.

For the prime minister's supporters, he stands to the right of development. He is lionised by the middle class, from which many of the Indian diaspora emerge. No other Indian prime minister can boast of a welcome similar to what he received in New York (2014), Sydney (2014), London (2015), Kuala Lumpur (2015) and South Africa (2016). In each of his speeches he calls on them to become ambassadors of India, reminds them that "our common heritage makes sure we remain connected in hearts and minds", that they are a part of a flourishing global Indian family, that they have done extremely well for themselves, and at the same time, reassures them that India has not forgotten her children. This sentiment resonates with a bulk of the diaspora.

India has enjoyed being viewed more favourably by the world since 2014, and the diaspora can further these perceptions. From being a largely inconsequential country after Independence, in part due to its active Non-Alignment Policy, India is today seen as a strong nation headed by a strong leader. With foreign publications writing about Modi as "dynamic", the "most powerful leader since Indira Gandhi", and a man who is "restoring" India's image – it is a ripe environment for exploiting diaspora diplomacy. Opinions can be channelled through the media, think-tanks and the press to increase the diaspora's bargaining strength. While they certainly do not determine policy, they can effectively shape it and act as "bridge-builders" between their home and adopted countries.

India's permanent membership to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can become a reality with support from the diaspora. According to Article 108 of the Charter, for a UN reform an affirmative vote from two-thirds of its members and support from the five permanent members is required. India has demonstrated its diplomatic influence with the reappointment of Justice Dalveer

Bhandari to the International Court of Justice in November 2017, when it secured two-thirds of the votes at the UN. Apart from political pressures and ministerial and diplomatic level lobbying, India can leverage its diaspora to influence states such as Canada and Mexico to support India's membership. India's negotiations hit a roadblock when there was a "change in the chief negotiator under US pressure". The diaspora could give a new impetus for India to secure its seat at the UNSC. Moreover, it is believed that India can protect its diaspora better once it attains a permanent seat in the UNSC, especially in situations where it can exercise its veto rights.

India is also a rising power and a key stakeholder in the security dynamics of South Asia and Southeast Asia. Its role in East Asia is taking shape and although not yet an economic power, its military capabilities, common interests and willingness to go beyond rhetoric have raised expectations of its capabilities and the role it can play in the region. The large populations of Indian expatriates in countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore present an opportunity to nurture a growing, mutual relationship.

Yet an increased focus on the diaspora comes with its own challenges. First, support of the diaspora is neither automatic nor continuous, and their interests need not be India's priorities. For example, the Indian community in the US was not vocal enough in criticising President Donald Trump's proposal to restrict the H-1B visa programme that has benefited many Indians. Another challenge is that remittances may not always be used for beneficial purposes. For instance, India faced problems due to foreign funding for extremist movements like the Khalistan movement. Moreover, the diaspora is unfair in expecting India to stand by them at all times of need. This contradictory attitude of the diaspora and the Indian government will need to be worked out.

In the last three years, India had to spend millions of rupees in rescuing Indians from crisis situations from Iraq and Libya. Sankat Mochan, the rescue mission in South Sudan, for example proved to be costly, but necessary for India. Similarly, the announcement that the Indian mission in Bali, Indonesia has set up a helpdesk at the Bali airport to aid the diaspora during the volcanic eruption will be expensive both in terms of money, time and personnel. Moreover, with the economic downturn in some countries in the Middle East, many Indians found their contracts being terminated—these posed difficulties for the Indian missions in these countries as the affected workers had to return to India. Rescuing these workers is costly, but India rescued 4,600 workers from Saudi Oger and Saad Group companies alone.

Second, reports suggest that the e-Migrate system and the Minimum Referral Wages policy have been detrimental to India as companies now find it easier to hire labour from countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan. It was found that in 2016 the number of Indian workers who went to work fell by half in Saudi Arabia and by 33 percent in other Gulf countries, while the number of expats in the regional actually increased by 12.17 percent. These statistics hint at heavily reduced remittances for India and perhaps even a need to establish rehabilitation centres for returning workers.

Finally, there are other problems such as the wealthier diaspora from the US, Canada and the UK wanting dual citizenship and voting rights. Meanwhile, those who contribute more in terms of remittances to India from Gulf countries are wanting more support and security.

Conclusion

Over the years, the diasporic populations have become an increasingly important factor in international politics. The Jewish, Chinese and British diasporas have recorded various successes in their second home. The Indian diaspora, for their part, have many of the elements required for success — they are a "model minority", they are affluent, and they are growing in number. Many of them are willing to exert their influence in electoral politics and are engaged in multinational businesses, and are thus highly visible. This makes for a ripe environment for India to aggressively tap on their potential.

Historically, India has benefitted from its diaspora. Two instances stand out: lobbying for the US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement Bill in 2008, and their remittance inflow. Today, while there is more potential for the diaspora to contribute to India's growth story, their success will also be a reflection of the Indian government's schemes, policies and outreach activities toward them. Poor schemes coupled with ineffectual implementation will hinder the diaspora's contribution towards the growth of India. In the past, policies towards the diaspora have been inconsistent and often followed by poor implementation. Today, the government's foreign-policy strategy of a strong outreach to the Indian diaspora stands out.

Yet it must be remembered that having a strong diaspora does not always translate to benefits for the home country. India has had problems with negative campaigning and foreign funding, coming from abroad, for separatist movements like the Khalistan movement. In the backdrop of Canada Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's visit to India in February 2018, multiple media outlets carried articles on the strongest support for the Khalistan movement coming from the Sikh

diaspora in countries such as Canada and the UK. The Indian government, while continuing to engage with the diaspora as a part of its foreign policy, will have to be cautious of these sensitive issues that may impact the security of the state. The government will also have to ask itself how much it should pamper the diaspora – how much is too much?

As much of India's foreign policy aims to translate partnerships to benefits for key projects like Swachh Bharat, Clean Ganga, Make in India, Digital India, and Skill India, the diaspora has plenty of scope to contribute. Projecting the changes underway in India has been a focal point of the Ministry of External Affairs' policy. The diaspora can step up and act as Indian 'ambassadors', as it is insufficient and ineffective for a country or its missions abroad to rely only on press releases to change public opinion. The diaspora can provide the requisite strategic impulse, which makes it all the more important to unlock their potential. The present government is right in their focus on the diaspora as they are a strategic asset to India.

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

Indian Diaspora

The Indian diaspora is quite a heterogeneous group and comprises people from different economic and social classes, speaking a diversity of languages, professing a multitude of cultural practices, and can also be divided along the lines of the time of their migration into foreign lands. Read on for an insight into the Indian diaspora for the IAS mains exam.

This article talks about the Indian diaspora and its significance today. It is a topic that is featured in the news quite frequently and hence, important for the civil services exam.

Indian Diaspora Meaning and Important Points

A UN Report – 'International Migration 2020 Highlights' by UNDESA (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs) said that the Indian Diaspora (18 million residing outside India in 2020) is the largest in the world.

What is the meaning of Indian Diaspora – Originally, the term 'Diaspora' has Greek origins (loosely it means – scattering of seeds) and is used to refer to the mass movement of Jews away from the homeland. In contemporary times, Diaspora refers to the people living away from their homeland due to various reasons. Hence, the meaning of Indian Diaspora is the group of people who are currently living outside India (temporary or permanent) and those who can trace their origin to India.

Countries with Largest Diaspora - 2020

- India – 18 million
- Mexico – 11 million
- Russia – 11 million
- China – 10 million
- Syria – 8 million

Countries Hosting Indian Diaspora -2020

- United Arab Emirates (UAE) – 3.5 million
- United States of America (USA) – 2.7 million
- Saudi Arabia – 2.5 million

Diaspora increased most in 2000-2020 period from the following countries:

- India (almost 10 million increase in the number of people living outside)
- Syria
- Venezuela
- China
- Philippines

Destination of International Migrants – 2020:

- USA – 51 million (approx 18 percent of the world's total migrants choose to reside in the United States)
- Germany – 16 million
- Saudi Arabia – 13 million
- Russia – 12 million
- UK – 9 million

Introduction

In the theatre of development, the competitiveness and growth of an economy are determined by its capacity to acquire and apply new knowledge. In a rapidly globalizing world, learning new ways of doing things depends in no small measure on the ability to integrate with the larger world outside. We live in a world in which the free movement of goods and capital across borders is seen as a virtue. Arguably, it is seen to reinforce the principle of competitive advantage and help spur savings, investment, and demand. What is less recognized is that international migration of human capital: the movement of knowledge, talent, and skills across borders is central to learning and development.

The rise of significant Diasporas has in the past few years, brought into the limelight a couple of key facts. First, there is a huge expatriate population of skilled people from developing countries in developed nations. Second, overseas communities can form a major resource for the development of the countries of their origin. The movement of high and low skilled workers from less to more developed economies and back brings about a great many new opportunities for development. Talking about diaspora only in terms of remittances and financial flows is a narrow approach and needs to

change. It is not necessary for all expatriates to be investors, and their contributions to their countries of origin need not be solely financial.

An overseas community serves as an important 'bridge' to access expertise, knowledge, markets, and resources for the development of the home country. The success of this bridge often depends upon 2 conditions: the ability of the Diaspora to develop and showcase a coherent, intrinsically motivated, and progressive identity and the capacity of the home country to develop conditions and institutions for a maintainable, tenable, symbiotic, and mutually rewarding engagement. Home countries are now beginning to recognize the need to pursue and promote the dynamic of Diaspora and development.

India, Diaspora and Migration: An Overview

- India is one of the pioneers in recognizing the importance of its overseas population and establishing an institutional framework for sustainable and mutually beneficial engagement with its Diaspora.
- By creating an independent and effective **Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs**, India has given mainstream attention to its estimated 25 million-strong Overseas Indian community.
- This experience too has helped us develop appropriate and well-calibrated institutional responses, through bilateral and multilateral engagements, to meet the challenges of capacity-building for better migration management.

India and its Diaspora

The Indian Diaspora is a diverse, heterogeneous and eclectic international community, representing a diversity of types, forms, geographies and formation periods. Hence, it requires diverse and distinct approaches to engage them and connect with India. The common thread that binds them together is the idea of India and its intrinsic values. Overseas Indians — comprising People of Indian Origin and Non-Resident Indians, stretching across all oceans and continents — have considerably added to knowledge, innovation and development across the globe by making significant contributions to their countries of residence.

Historically, the dispersion of people from India and the formation of Indian Diaspora communities is the result of different waves of migration over

hundreds of years driven by a variety of reasons: slavery under mercantilism, indentured labour under colonisation, and guest work programmes post-colonialism. This transnational engagement of people, riding on the processes of globalisation has been reinforced through global networks of families, friends and businesses, which are symbiotic and which enable the exchange of shared ideas of cultural, social and economic interests.

In retrospect, the formation of the Indian Diaspora makes up an engaging saga of trials, tribulations and the eventual triumph of determination and hard work. It pleases all Indians when the Overseas Indian community is respected for its work culture, discipline, and successful integration with the local community as much as being counted for its outstanding contributions in their countries of residence. This community having overcome considerable adversity represents an eminently successful Diaspora in the host countries with several of its representatives occupying leadership positions there. We look at them as a significant strategic resource for India.

Contemporary flows from India are of two kinds:

- The first is the emigration of the highly skilled professionals, workers and students with tertiary and higher educational qualifications migrating to the most advanced OECD countries, particularly to the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This flow started after Indian independence, in pursuit of better career prospects and living, and gathered momentum with the emigration of IT professional in the 1990s.
- The second was the flow of unskilled and semi-skilled workers going mostly to the Gulf countries and Malaysia—following the oil boom in the Gulf countries, mainly from Kerala and other south Indian states. Of late, northern states in India like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have emerged as the leading states of origin.

Put together, these migratory flows have resulted in diverse communities of people of Indian origin in various parts of the world: East Asia, Middle-East Asia, South and Eastern Africa, Europe, North America, Australia, the northern part of South America and the Caribbean Islands. These distinct communities of people of Indian origin, as well as Indian nationals living

abroad, constitute the vast Indian Diaspora. There is no single homogeneous Overseas Indian community; there exist diversities within them as well as in the level and degree of their engagement with India, defined by the lapse of time, generations and distance that separate them from their country of origin.

The Diasporas provide important links and contact points between home and host societies by building transnational networks which transact not only emotional and familial bonds but also cultural, social and economic interests. With advances in information technology and cheaper transport services, the Diasporas, as compared to situations prevailing earlier, are able to maintain connections with people and networks back home more effectively.

Such Diaspora associations in host countries impact and influence local businesses, even political decisions, thereby ensuring a friendlier environment and outcomes for the existing and prospective migrants. At the same time, these Diaspora associations also help to channel remittances, capital and investments to benefit not only home communities but also by developing partnerships with the host-country counterpart, benefit both. The same can be said of the exchange of skills, cuisines, ideas, knowledge and technology.

As such, such exchanges between a host and home countries, leveraged through the Diaspora, are never unidirectional or temporary or limited in scope. What remains a work in progress, however, is the formation of mechanisms or patterns to engage the Diasporas to its full potential. Engaging with the Diaspora in a sustainable and mutually rewarding manner across the economic, social and cultural space is at the heart of the policy of the Ministry. The officers in MOIA, continually seek to create conditions, partnerships and institutions that will best enable India to connect with its Diaspora comprehensively.

Such engagement has to take into account the fact that the Indian Diaspora, like India itself, is not a homogeneous group of people. And for this reason, it needs diverse and distinct approaches to engage them and

connect with India. It is not necessary for all Overseas Indians to be a part of the development process. Not all of them need to make financial contributions, nor do they need to relocate to India.

These 'Global Indians' can serve as bridges by providing access to markets, sources of investment, expertise, knowledge and technology; they can shape, by their informed participation, the discourse on migration and development, and help articulate the need for policy coherence in the countries of destination and origin.

All of this requires not only the home country to establish conditions and institutions for a sustainable, symbiotic and mutually rewarding engagement with the Diaspora—which are central to our programmes and activities; but for the Diaspora to project itself as an intrinsically motivated and progressive community.

https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/india-and-its-diaspora/

The Indian Diaspora

Past - Present – Future [Part - I]

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Houston, Texas – Our diaspora's past and present have been thoroughly documented and analyzed, and our future? Our future is an area where we have many prognosticators and expert opinions. Our view of our diaspora very much depends on one's own personal perspective, socioeconomic status, and host country – in other words, one's own, somewhat blinkered view of our diaspora.

What does the word "diaspora" actually mean, and what is its source? Simply put, the source of any diaspora is migration. Migration, a fundamentally essential ingredient of global social change, is a phenomenon that has been taking place for thousands of years and continues all over the world. It happens when people can no longer sustain themselves within their own milieus and they migrate to places where resources are more easily available. In earlier periods, people migrated from one place to another in search of food, shelter, and safety from persecution. Today, people tend to migrate in search of better career opportunities and a better quality of life.

Migrants not only take with them their skills and expertise to their new locales, but also their culture, living styles and collective memories. Over the ages, this has been a common thread, irrespective of nationality or ethnicity. Over the past two millennia, three broad patterns of migration have occurred: ancient and medieval migration to colonial powers; migration to the industrial nations immediately after World War II; and recent migration to developed countries for better career opportunities and living conditions, where the internet, affordable airfare, and cheap communications help to maintain close ties with one's homeland.

The phenomenon that is human migration is best captured by the term we have all come to know as "diaspora". The term diaspora is derived from the Greek words, "dia", which means "through," and "speiro" which means, "to scatter." Literally, "diaspora" means scattering or dispersion. It was originally used to describe the dispersion of Jews after their exile from Babylon in the 6th century BC, and later to refer to all Jewish people scattered in exile outside Palestine. Today it has come to describe any group of people who are dispersed or scattered away from their home country with a distinct collective memory and a myth of return.

There is no ambiguity about the term when it is used in relation to the Jewish people, but once it is applied to other religious or ethnic groups, it becomes difficult to make a clear distinction between what is a migration and what is a diaspora, or between what is a minority and what is a diaspora. We do not use the term "British Diaspora" when discussing the presence of even recent descendants of British people in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada or the United States. They are simply Aussies, Kiwis, South Africans, Canadians or Americans, even though they meet most of the requirements of a diaspora. Nor is the term applied to the many German colonies established in Central and Eastern Europe, or in several Latin American countries. These colonies, in both Chile and Argentina for instance, continue to retain their Germanic identity – normally a key-defining feature of a diaspora, – but there is no reference to a "German Diaspora" in our lexicon. They are typically referred to as a "minority of superiority."

A diaspora is also characterized by the role played by a collective memory, which retains the historical facts that precipitated the dispersion or scattering, as well as the cultural heritage of the homeland, and is often religious in nature. The Indian Diaspora fulfills all these conditions. We maintain our family traditions of origin, but also are gradually subject to social, cultural and political integration into the host nation. We are acutely aware of our Indian (and regional) origins, but don't go much further than a sympathetic curiosity about them; however, our personal identity is significantly affected by that awareness. We take an active interest in the general fate of India, and in important events in India. We perpetuate significant aspects of our Indian culture like language – most of us speak Hindi, as well as our mother tongues – and we maintain our religions and our tradition for weddings, upananyanams, and cremations. We maintain regular communications with our family and friends in India and send remittances back home on a regular basis. India is number one in the world, with over $55 billion in annual remittances (China is second with $50 billion). Lastly, we attempt to influence our host country governments to pursue policies favorable to India, such as the intense lobbying by the Indian Diaspora in the US to get a recalcitrant US Senate to approve the Nuclear Treaty.

The Historical Evolution of the Indian Diaspora, which numbers around 30 million, goes back at least two thousand years. The first migration from what is modern day India was around the time of Emperor Kanishka, in the first century AD. These were the Romani people, now known all around the world as "Gypsies," from what today is the Indian state of Rajasthan. They emigrated from India towards the northwest and eventually settled in Eastern Europe.

Another major migration from the Indian subcontinent was to Southeast Asia, starting around 500 AD. The Cholas, a great naval power, conquered what is today Indonesia and Malaysia and dominated the Indianized kingdoms of Southeast Asia. The influence of Indian culture is still strongly felt in the royal Brahmins, kings of Thailand, the archeological wonders of the Angkor Kingdoms of Cambodia, and in Indonesia, especially in central Sumatra and Bali.

However, in all these early migrations, it is not reasonable, or even acceptable, to apply the label of "Indian Diaspora" to the descendants of those emigrants. Intermixture with the local population over the centuries has been so great as to eliminate all traces of such Indian identity, and they are no longer considered PIOs (people of Indian origin).

Over the past two centuries, India has arguably achieved the world's most diverse and complex migration history, forming the modern Indian Diaspora. Spread across six continents and 125 countries, it is estimated to number around 30 million. The characteristics of this diverse group, all part of the same Indian Diaspora, varies to such an extent that we define three subsets: the Old Diaspora; the New Diaspora; and the Gulf Diaspora. There is one consistent theme to all three. They were, and are, all created by a labor migration – unskilled labor, starting two centuries ago, and highly skilled labor, post the mid-1960s.

The first wave of today's Indian Diaspora, the Old Diaspora, began during the early 19th century and continued until the end of the British Raj. Britain abolished slavery in 1833 and this act was followed by other colonial powers like France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Their colonies now urgently needed manpower to work the sugar and rubber plantations that were once worked by African slaves. To meet this demand, the British established a system of indentured labor migration from the Indian subcontinent.

In 1834, Britain first began exporting bonded Indian labor to Mauritius. The Dutch and French replicated the British system, also exporting Indian workers to their colonies. In just a decade, this small-scale migration became a mass movement to provide cheap labor to British and other European colonies. Conditions of absolute poverty in many parts of India, and the prospect of gaining wealth overseas, motivated people to sell themselves and become bonded laborers. Conditions of these journeys were extremely difficult and mortality was high on British, Dutch and French boats from the subcontinent to these colonies, not much better than the slaver boats that brought black Africans to the plantations of the southern United States.

Workers for plantations in Mauritius, Suriname, Trinidad and Fiji were mainly recruited from the present-day states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In Guyana and East Africa, laborers originated primarily from Punjab and Gujarat. Given the proximity of Tamil Nadu to French possessions in India like Pondicherry, the workers in most French colonies, such as Guadeloupe, Martinique, and La Reunion, were Tamils. These migrants were almost all males. This brutal indenture system lasted until World War I.

In response to severe criticism, Britain abolished the indenture system in 1916. By that time, more than 1.5 million Indians had been shipped to colonies in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. During roughly the same period, another form of labor migration was taking place. Tapping the labor surplus of South India, mostly in what is today the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the colonial bosses of tea, coffee, and rubber plantations in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Burma authorized Indian headmen to recruit entire families and ship them to plantations. About five million Indians, mostly poor Tamils, migrated to these three countries, until the system was abolished just prior to World War II.

Around that same time, in addition to low-skilled workers, merchants and traders from Gujarat and Sindh settled in British colonies in the Middle East, and South and East African. Gujarati and Sindhi merchants became shop owners in East Africa, and traders from Kerala and Tamil Nadu were involved in the retail trade, and in money lending to poor Indian peasants in Burma, Ceylon and Malaya. By the second World War, the Indian Diaspora was approximately six million, with over one million Indians in Burma. At that time, there were only 6,000 Indians in United States.

Today this Old Diaspora constitutes 60% of our Indian Diaspora, or approximately 18 million PIOs, and is primarily a pre-WW II phenomenon. The New Diaspora, on the other hand, consists of migrants who left India in large numbers from the mid-60s onwards, primarily to developed countries like the UK, US, Canada, Australia and Western Europe. Around 1900, there were less than a thousand Indians in both the UK and the United States. By World War II, the number had grown to around 6,000

in each country. In Britain these were mostly unskilled, low-wage workers and in the US, mostly Sikhs who worked in agriculture in California.

Many factors contributed to this de minimis trickle of migrants from India to these developed countries. Draconian legislation in the United States had banned immigration to the US from all but a handful of Western European countries. The Johnson–Reed Act of 1924, probably the most overtly racist immigration law in the world at the time, served to limit the annual number of immigrants to the US from any country to two percent of the number of people from that country who were already living in the US dating back to 1890. The law was aimed at stopping Eastern European Jews, who had migrated in large numbers to the US, particularly after 1890, to escape persecution in Europe. That is why the act chose 1890 as its measurement date; it simultaneously had the collateral effect of prohibiting the entry of Middle Easterners, East Asians, and Indians to the US. According to the US Department of State at the time, the purpose of the act was "to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity."

Similarly, at the turn of the century in Canada (also part of the British Empire), there were about 100 Indians. This number rose to 5,000 by 1907, before a restrictive new law stopped any further immigration. This law required that whoever landed in Canada for the purpose of immigrating, make a continuous journey from the country of one's citizenship. It stopped Indian immigration in its tracks, since no steamships traveled directly from India to Canada. It was a very clever sleight of hand, since its goal was to stop immigration into Canada from all but a few Western European countries.

The landscape began to change after Indian independence. Unskilled, and some skilled workers, mostly male Punjabi Sikhs, migrated from India to the United Kingdom. This was due to Britain's post-war demand for low-skilled labor, India's post-colonial ties, and the UK's Commonwealth immigration policy, which allowed any citizen of a Commonwealth country to live, work, vote, and hold public office in the United Kingdom. Many settled in London, as well as industrial cities like Leicester and

Birmingham. From 1947 until 1962, Indian nationals, as Commonwealth citizens, had an unrestricted right to enter the United Kingdom.

In 1962 and again in 1968, the British Commonwealth Immigration Acts rescinded these rights for Indians. However, 20 years later, when the UK was faced with a shortage of highly skilled labor, the UK reversed itself and Indian migration to the UK picked up considerably. Additionally, from the mid-60s onward, the anti-Indian discrimination in African countries like Kenya and Uganda also resulted in a large-scale secondary migration of PIOs to the UK. Of the current Indian Diaspora in the UK, one-fifth is as a result of this secondary migration from East African countries and South Africa.

The dividing line for Indian immigration to the United States, and resultant significant diaspora formation, is the year 1965. It was in 1965 that President Lyndon Johnson and the US Congress passed the historic Hart-Celler Act. This legislation terminated the racist 1924 Johnson-Reed act, abolished national origins quotas, and made it possible for high-skilled immigrants, including Indians, to gain legal, permanent residence in the United States, and bring their family members, as well.

As in the US, significant immigration of Indians to Canada was triggered by new immigration legislation that opened the door to highly skilled immigrants. In 1968, Canada introduced its points system, which assigns value to qualifications rather than a person's ethnic or national background. As a result, Indian immigration to Canada boomed.

The 1990s software boom and rising economy in the US attracted Indians by the boatload. The US Immigration Act of 1990, effective from 1995, facilitated this process further by introducing the H-1B temporary worker program, allowing US businesses to hire foreigners with a minimum of a bachelor's degree in "specialty occupations," including doctors, scientists, engineers, and IT specialists. Indian citizens are by far the top recipients of H-1B visas each year, and as a result, the Indian diaspora in the US is highly skilled. The US Census Bureau estimates that 75 percent of all

ethnic Indians working in the US hold at least a bachelor's degree, and 69 percent work in management and professional occupations.

US, UK, and Canadian census data from 2010 estimates that the Indian Diaspora grew to three million in the US, 1.5 million in the UK, and one million in Canada; a twenty-fold increase in half a century. Today, we are the fourth largest immigrant group in the United States after Mexicans, Filipinos, and Chinese.

Since the 1990s, Australia and New Zealand have also become important destination countries for Indians, since both countries look to attract English-speaking, highly qualified professionals, often to supply their IT industries. The Indian Diaspora in Australia numbers 400,000, almost two percent of their total population.

The most recent development of the Indian Diaspora is the Gulf Diaspora. The 1970s oil boom in the Middle East triggered significant migration from India to the Persian Gulf. An increasing number of semi and unskilled workers, primarily from South India, have worked in the gulf countries on temporary schemes in the oil industry and in services and construction. With modern air transportation, this was on a contractual, rather than permanent basis, as in the 19th century. These Gulf countries have a common policy of not naturalizing non-Arabs, even if they are born there, thereby relegating our diaspora in those countries to a kind of second-class status. At one time the fastest growing segment of our diaspora, the Gulf Diaspora has now stabilized at around five million.

The common thread between all the three groups of the Indian Diaspora is that they are labor migrants. The more recent migration of skilled and highly-skilled labor went to the developed countries like the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and formed a part of new Indian Diaspora. The lower-skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor went to the Gulf region.

So what is the future for our diaspora? The answer depends on a variety of factors, some within our control, but most not. While ethnic Indians are

a small but wealthy minority in the US, UK, and the countries of the New Diaspora, they constitute 40 percent of the population in Fiji, Trinidad, Guyana, Reunion and Suriname, and 70 percent of Mauritius – all Old Diaspora countries.

The new Indian Diaspora, especially in the United States, is highly organized with many regional and pan-Indian cultural, professional, religious, and charity organizations. In recent years, Indians have demonstrated their increasing political influence with the election of Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley, New York Attorney General Preet Bharara, and the formation of the India Caucus in both the Congress and the Senate.

Other countries have seen even more Indians elected to major public office. In Canada, there are currently nine MPs of Indian origin in that country's parliament, the Canadian House of Commons. In the UK, a record number of eight Indian candidates, including two women, have been elected to the British Parliament, and eight members of the House of Lords are people of Indian origin.

The success of Indian entrepreneurs, CEOs, scientists, academics, media personalities, filmmakers, and IT professionals in the US, has created trust in India's intellectual abilities abroad. It has been a major factor in branding India as a source of well-educated and hard working professionals. Remember, it was not more than 20 years ago when India was not "cool." There was no "India Shining" or "Incredible India," but rather India was viewed as a poverty-ridden country of snake charmers and elephants; but no more. This new India brand explains the increased interest in recruiting Indian graduates and professionals in several countries. It also contributes to the willingness of US and other companies to collaborate with, and outsource to, Indian companies. Ethnic Indians, particularly in New Diaspora countries, have become known for their economic, professional, academic, scientific, and artistic successes and generally peaceful integration. However, the vast majority of our 30 million diaspora, including those on temporary contracts that make up the

Gulf Diaspora, face discrimination, have limited rights, and can only look forward to less secure futures.

Lets face it – we are a people who differ in ethnicity, skin color and religion from the majority populations of most of our host countries. Despite the general acceptance of ethnic Indians, and the increasing "coolness" of being Indian, we remain potential targets of xenophobia and hate-inspired violence. Incidents of ethnic tension exist all across our diaspora. In Old Diaspora countries like Malaysia, despite some political representation, Indians face discrimination, exacerbated by religious tension between the predominantly Muslim Malays (Bhumiputras) and the predominantly Hindu Indians. In Fiji, where ethnic Indians comprise over 40 percent of the population, anti-Indian resentment resulted in an ethnic Fijian coup d'état in 2000, which removed from office the democratically elected Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry. This coup was wholeheartedly supported by the Methodist Church of Fiji, which likened Indians to the evil citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah. In Trinidad, the Speaker of the House, Occah Seapual, an Indian woman, was unseated by the People's National Movement (PNM), the black party which had held power for most of the recent history of Trinidad. They did it by promulgating a state of emergency in the dead of night, placed her under house arrest, and eventually removed her as Speaker of the House.

This discrimination persists not just in countries like Malaysia, Fiji, and Trinidad, but also in the New Diaspora countries like the UK and Germany, where skinhead Brits and Germans have violently clashed with people from South Asia, and in Australia, where attacks on Indian students have happened at an alarming rate. Even in the US, a country where Indians have made immense strides in all fields, we are not immune from hate crimes, like the Dot-buster gangs of New Jersey, or the massacre of worshipers at the Sikh Gurdwara in Wisconsin.

Wherever Indians are able to establish themselves, they became indispensable as the principal arteries of trade and shopkeepers to the nation, and so unfortunately open themselves to the charge that they

have done so by illicit activities, by marginalizing the local population, and with no other thought than of enhancing their own interests and prosperity. We become victims of our own success.

Having noted all of this, our diaspora should be a source of pride to all Indians, inside and outside of India. Though Indian migrants have lived in conditions of appalling poverty in many places of the world where they were first taken as indentured labor many years ago, a number of remarkable transformations have taken place over the past generations. Through thrift, dogged perseverance, hard work, and most importantly, by a withdrawal into our own culture, in which they found forces of sustenance, these Indians successfully labored to give their children and grandchildren better economic futures. These descendants, over time, came to capture the trade, commerce and business leadership of their new homelands. This was just as true in South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda, as it was in Trinidad, Mauritius, Suriname and Burma, notwithstanding the resentment and discrimination of the local populace and political establishments.

If Indians appear to have done well for themselves within the economic domain of these Old Diaspora countries, our affluence in New Diaspora countries like the United States is even more pronounced, as is our presence within top professions. Though our share of the population in the US is less than one percent, Indians account for well over five percent of the scientists, engineers, and software specialists, and almost ten percent of all the doctors. No group has a higher median household income than Indians, which is almost double that of the overall average of the United States.

Indeed, when India, the nation, was teetering on the edge of bankruptcy 20 years ago, the flood of such success stories coming from our diaspora helped to lay the groundwork for the abolition of India's senseless licensing restrictions on capacity creation, product diversification, and import competition. The very effective lobbying of the Indian government by our diaspora eventually triggered our liberal reforms and set us on the path to becoming an economic juggernaut – a so called BRIC country.

Who can forget the clarion call of "Desh Bachao, DOT Hatao" from a couple of Indian stalwarts from California, that became the catalyst for our telephone system in India going from worst to first in the world.

India's recent transformation is analogous in some ways to what happened to Japan during the Meiji Restoration in Japan 150 years ago. Emperor Meiji ended the shogunate and forced Japan to change from being a closed feudal society to a market-driven economy. Japan's transformation was accomplished through major initiatives enabled by gifted Japanese who were sent abroad by the emperor to bring back ideas that were adapted to Japan's culture and needs. In India's case, our diaspora has served a similar function, though unlike Japan, not because of our government, but in spite of it.

Our diaspora has also contributed to India's ascendency in the world by its achievements in the fields of entrepreneurship, business, academia, science, arts and culture, in all the countries we have migrated to. Experts predict that India will overtake China as the most populous country in the world by 2050. Our population will be young, and thus highly mobile. Given the conundrum of an expanding middle class in India, juxtaposed against the continuing abject poverty of over half a billion Indians, migration patterns will accelerate. In spite of discrimination, xenophobia, and exclusion in many countries, our diaspora added over ten million to its numbers in the last decade alone. The migration of highly skilled professionals, the continuing export of labor, and illegal immigration to New Diaspora countries are likely to add to those numbers.

As I look back at our diaspora's past, and try to look forward to its future, I am reminded of Omar Khayyam's famous poem from his signature work Rubaiyat:

"The moving finger writes; and, having writ
Moves on: nor all thy piety nor wit,
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,
Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it."

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Kindly visit this Web Page:
https://www.america-times.com/the-indian-diaspora-past-present-and-future/

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


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
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
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The Gallery of
Indian Diaspora

The Encyclopaedia of Indian Diaspora

Edited by Brij Lal
University of Hawai'i Press, 2006

Resource:
https://ameenagafoorinstitute.org/encyclopedia-of-indian-diaspora

Australia By Salim Lakha

In 1837, John Mackay recruited about 40 Indian labourers to work in New South Wales. They were mostly Dhangars, a hill tribe of Chota Nagpur. More Indian men arrived over the next 10 years and were dispersed into neighbouring colonies. The threat of a violent reaction from European settlers forced the Indian government to restrict the emigration of Indian coolie labour. In 1839, the Indian Emigration Act, enforcing restrictions on Indian indentured labour to Australia, came into effect.

However, a sponsorship scheme was allowed, which assured a return passage to India for young married couples with up to two children. A few Indians took advantage of this scheme and migrated as itinerant merchants.

Similarly, 200 Anglo-Indians (of 'mixed' European and Indian origin) arrived, many to work as compositors for Henry Parkes's printing press. In 1840, Edward Gleeson employed Indians on the sheep station he had established along the Hutt River in Western Australia. In 1843, Major Alexander Davidson, who came from India, brought with him 14 Indian servants and settled in Port Phillip. One year later, P. Friell, also formerly a resident of India, brought 25 domestic workers to Sydney, including women

and children. In 1846, the ship Orwell brought 51 Indian coolies under private indenture for three landowners.

In the 1890s, the hysteria surrounding imported coloured labour resurfaced. In 1895, articles with derogatory references to the presence of 'black and turbaned heathens' appeared in the New South Wales press. The final decades of the 19th century saw further legislative measures introduced by the colonial government in Australia to restrict or prohibit coloured or Asian immigration. At the turn of the 20th century, the presence of about 4500 ethnic Indians alongside other non-white ethnic groups was enough to fuel apprehension in the dominant white population, leading to the birth of the 'White Australia policy'.

Fiji By Brij Lal

Perhaps the most vulnerable people in the lines were women. Presumed by outsiders to be of low moral character – 'unstable and mercenary', according to the agent general of immigration in 1902, 'as joyously amoral as a doe rabbit', according to an Australian overseer, or a 'rudderless vessel [without any] controlling hand', according to C. F. Andrews-they were traded by their own men, abused by overseers and sirdars, and blamed for all manner of ills afflicting the Indian community. Sexual assaults on them were common and frequently ignored by the authorities. No burden, however, was as serious for them as the widespread belief that they were responsible for the high suicide rate among Indian men in Fiji: at the turn of the century, the rate was the highest among Indian labour importing colonies. 'Sexual jealousy' was the phrase used: women, so it was said, traded on their scarcity and deserted their marriages or relationships for men who offered more comfort or luxury, leaving the jettisoned, jilted partner to end his life. The truth was more complex; women as much the victims of indenture as men, and sometimes more victimised, as has been said, 'not just by actions, hostilities, or indifferences of men, but by the institutions of law, invested as they were with the majesty of the state, the formidability of the male jurists and lawyers, and the unbroken faith of the public', in the words of Bertram Wyatt-Brown, an American scholar. No doubt, some women were unscrupulous, but the harshness

of plantation life and the anxiety associated with the realisation that there was no going back to India sufficiently account for most suicides. It is worth noting that 22 per cent of the suicides occurred within six months of the deceased's residence in Fiji, 30 per cent within the first year, and 75 per cent within the first five years. Whatever the truth about these suicides, the publication of reports in India of the ill-treatment of Indian women in the archipelago led to the abolition of indentured emigration to Fiji.

Indo-Fijians once comprised half of the population of Fiji. In a few years time, their numbers ill decline to about a third because of low birth rates and migration. Their history in Fiji has been a tragically ironic one. They were brought to the islands so that the Fijians could be spare the ordeal of plantation work and thus preserve their way of life, their land and their labour, all under threat from European encroachment. The Fijians prospered in their subsistence environment because Indians toiled on the plantations, but they came to view Indians as their nemesis. After more than a century, Indo-Fijians still struggle for political equality in the land of their birth. The deeply felt but often unacknowledged need of the human soul to belong, to have a place of one's own, to be rooted is denied them. How long, they ask, should a people live in a place before they are allowed to call it home? 'From Immigrated to Emigration'; that may in time come to be the epitaph of Fiji's Indo-Fijian community.

The French Caribbean by Ulrike Niklas

The first ship to arrive from India was the Aurelie, which docked in St Pierre, Martinique, on 6 May 1853, and again a year later in Guadeloupe. Indian immigration to Martinique continued until 1883 and to Guadeloupe until 1889. Its end was brought about by the increasing industrialisation of sugar production from sugar beets in Europe, which brought world sugar prices down, thus weakening the economic base of planters in the Caribbean islands considerably.

Recruitment

The main ports of embarkation in India for the journey to the Caribbean islands were Calcutta, Madras, Karaikkal and Pondicherry. Whereas in the non-French Caribbean

region Indian migrants were primarily from North India, in the French Caribbean, the picture was different: 60 per cent of the Indian population in Guadeloupe and up to 100 per cent on the other French islands were from South India. Although the main ports of embarkation for the French islands were those located in the French enclaves of India (Pondicherry and Karaikkal), the recruitment of labourers took place largely beyond French territories-initially in a clandestine manner designated by Madras newspapers as 'kidnapping'. In 1861, a more regular process was instituted following a convention between British and French authorities in India. Labourers who embarked at French ports came from a wide range of districts in the Madras Presidency, and from the French colonies of Yanam, Karaikkal and Pondicherry.

Records show that between the mid 1950s and the late 1880s nearly 68,000 indentured Indian labourers were brought to the French Caribbean. Descendants of those indentured workers now constitute a significant part of the islands' population. In 2005, the population of Guadeloupe was estimated at 449,000, and that of Martinique at 433,000. 'East Indians' on both islands constitute less than 5 per cent of the population, but people of Indian descent have also assimilated with 90 per cent, or the majority, of the population, which is of mixed ancestry, and these people are predominantly Roman Catholic. Both islands have a community of Hindus, and in Guadeloupe, there is also a small Muslim population.

Jamaica By Verene Shepherd

Historical Origins

Between 1845 and 1945, approximately 38,000 Indians went to Jamaica through Indian labour migration. The first batch of 261 immigrants arrived in 1845 on the *Blundell Hunter*.

Jamaica never developed a large, densely settled Indian community because irregular importation and repatriation (perhaps also combined with a low fertility rate initially and a high mortality rate) kept the population small and scattered. The Indian population in Jamaica in 1911 stood at only 17,380.

Indian immigration to Jamaica was meant to provide landholders with labourers who would return to India upon the expiration of their contracts. By the 1880s, however, Indian immigration had developed into a form of settler colonisation as fewer and fewer indentured workers returned. Voluntary return via the state repatriation scheme, along with involuntary settlement as a result of coercion on the part of the planters, and lack of finances when state-assisted repatriation was discontinued in 1930, resulted in close to 62 per cent of the Indian unmigrants settling permanently in Jamaica. The last return ship sponsored by the government in Jamaica was the *SS Sutlej*, which repatriated 425 Indians in 1929.

On the ships, single women were placed in the aft, followed by married people, with the single men in front. Attempts were made to ensure that the ships bad adequate crew, medical personnel, sweepers (*topazes*) and cooks to look after the welfare of the migrants. In the early years of Indian emigration, the *topazes* were black people. By the 20th century, they had been replaced by Indian *topazes* because of racial tensions between black *topazes* and Indians. Surgeon Superintendent Comins noted, 'I found the West Indian Topazes very useless, indolent and subordinate,' and that 'the prejudices and dislike of east and West Indians to each other, offer a great bar to their acting well together on board ship.'

Surinam By Rosemarijn Hoefte

In many Caribbean colonies, the planters resorted to hiring supposedly cheap and docile immigrants to replenish the labour pool. The Surinamese planters introduced Portuguese, Madeirans, Chinese, West Africans and inhabitants of other Caribbean territories to work in the fields and factories. Their numbers, however, were not enough to boost the industry; instead, they increased the heterogeneity of an already diverse population. Immigration really got off the ground with the importation of Indian labourers.

The recruitment of labourers from British India was not a first in Caribbean history. In fact, Indians had already arrived in neighbouring British Guiana some 35 years earlier. It was, however, an important moment in the history of Surinam. Ultimately, 34,304

Indians would come to the colony. The bulk of these immigrants settled in Surinam and soon formed a considerable part of the population. Initially, their impact on society at large was mainly demographic and economic, but in the 20th century their cultural influence and political power came ever more to the fore. The arrival of Indian contract labour and its aftermath markedly shaped the (recent) past and present of Surinam.

Guyana By Clem Seecharan

Evolution of Indenture

The contract for indenture evolved progressively, but the basic terms were established by the 1870s. The immigrant had to work every day, except on Sunday or authorised holidays, with seven hours spent in the field or 10 hours in the factory. Able-bodied males aged 16 and over were paid 1 shilling (12 pence) per day; adult males who were not able-bodied, minors aged 10 to 15 and female adults were paid 8 pence per day, but were entitled to extra pay when working overtime. The contract legitimised child labour.

Indentured labourers also had the option of task work, with higher remuneration computed ostensibly on the basis of wage rates obtained by unindentured workers. This was one of the most contentious issues, was workers continually disputed the basis on which earnings from task work were calculated. The alleged grievance was that the vagaries of differing tasks were often not given due recognition. Unlike enslaved Africans, however, Indians had recourse to the immigration agent general, or district agents authorised to visit plantations and investigate specific complains. In reality, indentured labourers tended to leave the plantations and march to the office of the protector to seek redress of grievances. This often resulted in labourers being prosecuted for breach of contract. In comparison with the rights of employers, those of Indian labourers were breached consistently, even within the judicial system. Between 1874 and 1875, only 208 employers were prosecuted successfully, whereas 65,084 indentured labourers were convicted

Trinidad and Tobago By Kusha Haraksingh

Between 1845 and 1917, a total of 143,939 immigrants from India were taken to Trinidad under the system of indenture to work on sugar plantations. They were generally from the same catchments as immigrants to other British colonies where the indenture system was in effect. The first entry on the log of the first vessel to Trinidad is 'Bhuruth, male age 20' and he came from the main source of recruits, the aboriginal borderland of Chota Nagpur. Before long, the Calcutta hinterlands emerged as the prime recruiting ground. After 1870, the net was cast more widely, and thereafter, the eastern part of the North-Western Provinces and the extreme west of the Bengal Presidency, comprising modern-day Uttar Pradesh and Bihar respectively, supplied the majority of migrants. Smaller numbers came from Madras, but they developed a reputation for being more prone to sickness and less satisfactory labourers. Madras thus became a supplementary source of immigrants in times of severe scarcity from other areas, but in the last decade of indenture, several ships would sail from there to Trinidad as well.

East Africa By Gijsbert Oonk

The year 1890 marked the end of the Arab ascendancy in East Africa and the region was partitioned among the European powers. By then, over 6000 Indians lived in Zanzibar and along the East African coast. Between 1890 and 1914, this relatively small number was augmented by almost 38,000 indentured labourers (mainly males) who worked on the construction of the Uganda Railway. These railway workers generally came from Punjab on a contract of between three and five years. Almost 80 per cent of them left East Africa at the end of their contracts. Roughly 7000, however, remained in East Africa at the end of their contracts. Upon its completion, the railway was manned for several decades by Indian drivers, foremen, stationmasters., linesmen, telegraphers, mechanics, gangers, repairmen, upholsterers, carpenters and other artisans.

South Africa By Surendra Bhana and Goolam Vahed

The first Indians in South Africa were slaves imported by the Dutch East India Company in the 17th century from Bengal and South India. They were few in number and came to be absorbed into the Cape Malay population. The majority, however, are descendants of the 152,184 indentured labourers introduced into Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal) between 1860 and 1911 to work on sugar plantations, as the indigenous Zulu, who had access to land on colonial locations and Christian missions, resisted absorption into the capitalist economy. Indian migrants were highly stratified: 62 per cent were men, 25 per cent were women, and 13 per cent were children; 60 per cent were Tamil and Telugu speakers from Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh in southern India, while the rest were from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in the north; over 80 per cent were Hindu, about 15 per cent Muslim, and there was a small number of Christians. Indian migrants comprised several hundred castes ranging from Brahmins to Pariahs. Madras was the point of departure from the south and Calcutta from the north.

Thailand By Amarjiva Lochan

The presence of Indians in modern Thailand can be traced back more than a century. Tamils from Penang are reported to have settled in Phuket in southern Thailand as early as the 1860s. King Chulalongkorn's visit to India in 1871 created an opportunity for Indians to trade in the capital city of Bangkok. Those Tamils living in southern Thailand developed an expertise in the cattle trade and the mining of precious stones. Service groups, such as the Chettiars, began moving into Bangkok from Phuket, Penang and Singapore. This was when the Thai royalty offered a specially designated area for both Indian and Chinese traders. Not far from the Grand Palace and the Chinese settlement of Yaworat, and Indian market area known as Phahurat (Bahu-ratha in Sanskrit) was developed. It is still the only market where Indians own or run most of the shops. In 1879, king Chulalongkorn granted land to a group of South Indian businessmen living in Bangkok, on which the Sri Maha Mariamman Temple was built. By the early 20th century, the Bohras and Tamil Muslim merchants from Pondicherry and Karaikkal were the only important Indian businessmen in Thailand.

Though Thailand was able to avoid European colonial control, several European companies played a dominant role in the country. The contracts of several development projects were awarded to British companies operating there. By the beginning of the 20th century, many British citizens were holding senior positions in various government departments.

As a result, British Indian labourers from Malaya and Singapore arrived in Thailand to work on projects such as the railway link from Malaya to Bangkok. The labourers came from the Madras Presidency, the clerks were mostly Parsi and the watchmen were generally from the United Provinces (UP) and Punjab. Some Bengalis also came directly from Calcutta.

Singapore By Rajesh Rai

Although most early Indians in Singapore arrived because of their association with the colonial militia of as 'free' come commercial and labour migrants, 'forced' Indian migration followed soon after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. The treaty, which secured the British position in Singapore, also resulted in the transfer of Bencoolen (present day Bengkulu, Indonesia) to the dutch in exchange for British control over Melaka. The closure of the British penal colony for Indian convicts in Bencoolen led to the establishment of an alternative detention facility in Singapore. In April 1825, the brig *Horatio* brought the first batch of 80 Indian convicts who had originally been transported from Madras to Bencoolen. This was followed by 122 convicts who arrived from Bengal a week later. The convicts represented a cross-section of Indian society, including Benares *brahmanas,* Sikh and Dogra Kshatriyas, Chettiar, Bengali and Parsi financiers and peasants, and untouchables from various other parts of the subcontinent.

Housed in a walled compound at Bras Basah Road, Indian convict labour was used to clear jungles and construct roads, jetties, canals, bridges and buildings. Some of the finest architecture in Singapore in the 19th century was the product of convict labour, including St. Andrew's Cathedral (1862) and the Istana (1869). By 1860, the number

of convicts on the island was 2275, of which few were known to have returned to India.

Large scale Indian labour migration followed with the expansion of the port and the growth of the plantation sector in the second half of the 19th century. Commercial plantations produced gambier, cloves, nutmeg, pineapple, sugar cane and, towards the end of the century, rubber. Although Chinese farmers dominated the agricultural sector, European planters employed Indian labour; and in dairy farming and the laundry sector, Indians occupied key positions. Furthermore, the majority of workers employed in public projects, servicing the budding administrative, development, commercial and defence functions in the settlement, were drawn from India.

For much of the 19th century, Indian labour recruitment for the plantation sector was carried out through the indenture system. As elsewhere, indentured labour in Singapore was regulated through contracts. The contracts were for five years, at meagre wages, and expenditures such as travel costs. During his sojourn, the labourer was subject to extreme demands made by employers. In 1876, following growing pressure to improve the plight of indentured labourers, the contract was shortened to three years. Nevertheless, through numerous liabilities which increased the labourers' debts, employers were often able to demand an extended period of indenture. From the 1870s, a parallel method called the *kangani* system was employed, whereby the *kangani,* a south Indian foreman, was paid by his employer to recruit labour from his home district or village.

Malaysia By Amarjit Kaur

Indian migration to Malaya was an important dimension of British colonial rule in Asia and coincided with the growth of the international economy in the second half of the 19th century. There were three main migration streams, each of which was associated with specific economic roles. The first and largest stream, the indentured workers, comprised mainly Tamils and Telugus who worked in the plantations, on the construction and maintenance of transportation lines (roads and railways), and at the ports. The second stream, the auxiliaries, consisted predominantly of North Indians

who were recruited for the police force and security services, and Malayalis and Jaffna Tamils who were employed in clerical and subordinate civil service occupations. The third stream, the traders, comprised Indian merchants and the Chetttiars, a money lending caste from South India. North Indian migrants were far fewer compared to the other Indian migrant groups and constituted a distinct community. The occupational differentiation between the Indian migrants also had religious overtones and helped to create a distinctive diasporic consciousness among them.

Colonial Labour Policy

Three principles governed colonial labour policy: the acquisition of a plentiful, diversified and cheap supply of labour for colonial and capitalist enterprises; the (limited) assurance of the labourer's freedom of movement; and the provision of a limited amount of protection for workers. Crucially, a diversified recruitment policy meant that migrant labour could be manipulated easily and ensured that workers were not easily assimilated or readily accepted by the local inhabitants. The colonial government and employers collaborated to maintain low wage costs and sustain occupational differentiation based on ethnicity, resulting in vertical cleavages of ethnicity, kinship and religion, and facilitating the substitution of one worker group by another.

Thousands of Indian labour migrants arrived annually in Malaya under the two recruitment systems: between 1844 and 1910, about 250,000 indentured labourers came to Malaya. The peak of *kangani*-assisted recruitment occurred in the 1910s, when about 50,000 to 80,000 Indian workers arrived annually. From 1844 to 1938, *kangani*-assisted migration accounted for 62.2 per cent of total Indian labour migration, compared to 13 per cent for indentured migration.

Myanmar By Tin Maung Maung Than

After the British annexed lower Burma during the Second Anglo-Burmese War (in early 1853), making it a province of British India, the Indian government encouraged the flow of Indian labour into what was known as British Burma. During the decade

following 1876, the government subsidised the migration process undertaken by private agents in India. (Even after British Burma was formally separated from India in April 1937, the colonial government's unrestricted immigration policy continued. Following the final takeover of the entire country in 1885, migration continued unabated well into the 20th century, taking its cue from the laissez-faire economy of British Burma, which became rapidly integrated with the economy of British India and, subsequently, to the international economy. For example, the total value of imports into British Burma tripled between 1884 and 1911, and doubled again in the next 1O years. Similarly, the value of exports to India as a share of British Burma's total exports increased from 21 per cent to 52 per cent between 1884 and 1921, while the value of total exports increased more than six times. As the modern monetised economy developed, many Indians came to British Burma to work. Indian migrants played a significant part in transforming Burma's subsistence economy into a commercialised export economy.

Sri Lanka By Tilman Frasch

Indian Communities in Sri Lanka other than "Estate Tamils"
Indian Tamils migrated from South India to Ceylon mainly in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. The vast majority of these migrants supplied much sought after labour to the plantations, especially the tea estates, of the island's central hill districts around Badulla, Ratnapura and Nuwara Eliya. The 2001 census classified 855,888 people as Indian Tamils, out of which 695,705 live on estates. These plantation workers were neither the only Indians nor the only Tamils who came to Ceylon. Other Tamil migrants were recruited in the late 19th century for the expansion of Colombo Harbour as well as for the construction of the island's roads and railways, finding employment in the dock companies or the railway and public works departments. Between 1891 and 1911, for instance, a little more than 5000 Indians worked regularly at Colombo Harbour.

As the climate and altitude of the hill districts proved ideal for the cultivation of coffee, a real estate boom set in, and by 1860, coffee plantations covered almost the whole

of central Ceylon. With a sufficient supply of water and a reasonably stable temperature, coffee plants provided a relatively rich and reliable yield without needing much care. Labour was needed to pluck, peel, wash and pack the coffee beans only during the harvest season between November and January. Sinhalese peasants were unwilling to undertake these tasks as they looked down on menial agricultural work, hence planters had to import labour from South India. After the ban on emigration was lifted in 1842, an increasing number of south Indians, mainly from the districts along the coast adjacent to the islands (Tinnevelly, Ramnad, South Arcot, Madurai, Chinapoli and Pudukottai), were recruited for the plantations.

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Indian Diaspora Hits Record-Breaking Numbers

This article is part of: India Economic Summit

30 Sep 2019

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/indian-diaspora-largest-in-world-numbers/

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits the United States, he is among compatriots – 4.4 million of them.

India has the largest diaspora in the world, with around 18 million of its citizens living in other countries. The US is their top destination: in 2017, people of Indian descent made up 1.3% of the American population, and they are the most successful immigrants in the country.

As economist Nirvikar Singh says in an interview with the University of California Santa Cruz, "Indian entrepreneurship is a very important engine of economic growth." The co-author of a book on the Indian diaspora in the US notes that 8% of the founders of high-tech companies are Indian. With Sundar Pichai running Google and Satya Nadella the CEO of Microsoft, Indians play a prominent role in some of America's biggest tech firms.

Indian diaspora is a numbers game

Despite a sizeable outflow, India is still home to 1.39 billion people – and by 2027, it's set to overtake China as the world's most populous country. While there has been progress in reducing extreme poverty levels, there are still 176 million people living in poverty in India, and money remitted by expatriates is an important part of economic development and growth. In 2018, Indians abroad sent back $80 billion, making the country the leading recipient of funds from overseas.

According to the Reserve Bank of India, inward remittances helped to finance 43% of the country's trade deficit in 2017-18. They also help to meet the needs of the poor by covering the cost of daily living expenses and allowing people to invest in business and education.



The ever-changing direction of migration

With a significant spike in emigration since 2015, India has overtaken other countries that once represented significant migrant populations – many escaping political upheaval or conflict. This has increased Indian diaspora numbers by huge amounts.

Nearly 9 million people were displaced by the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 2019, nearly half of all international migrants live in just 10 countries, with the Russian Federation – now home to 12 million migrants – among them.



Source: UN DESA (2019a), UNHCR (2018) and UNWRA (2019)

Ukraine follows a similar pattern, with the number of people leaving the country decreasing rapidly after 2000. Emigration from Mexico has also now levelled off. In 2007, there were 12.8 million Mexican migrants to the US. By 2014, that had dropped to 11.7 million – a number that continues to decline. On the other hand, Indian diaspora numbers have been increasing all through these years.

RSR RELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW
A Quarterly Review of Publications in the Field of Religion and Related Disciplines
RICE

The Encyclopaedia of the Indian Diaspora – Edited by Brij V. Lal

Jennifer B. Saunders
First published: 29 August 2008

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-0922.2008.00305_8.x

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- DOI:10.1163/156853109X415417

- Corpus ID: 144104284

The Encyclopaedia of Indian Diaspora

- N. Raghunath
- Published 2009
- Sociology
- Asian Journal of Social Science

Containing

a] some important 45 Citations of Papers/Articles/Case Studies/Dissertations on different diaspora locations;

&

b] Papers/Articles covering the critical issues/challenged relating to Indian diaspora in several countries.

https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Encyclopedia-of-Indian-Diaspora-Raghunath/c73f53fd05a0124c6e240bc4c651ad8c609ead4e#related-papers

The Encyclopaedia of Indian Diaspora

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

To read, print and download the soft copy, please visit the Web Page:

https://archive.org/details/isbn_9789814155656

Selected List of Web Pages, containing some very useful/important details/information on Indian Diaspora

https://www.academia.edu/48842834/The_Encyclopedia_of_the_Indian_Diaspora

https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/EthnicityandDiasporicIdentity.pdf

https://www.india.gov.in/content/indian-diaspora

https://www.economist.com/international/2023/06/12/indias-diaspora-is-bigger-and-more-influential-than-any-in-history

https://www.america-times.com/the-indian-diaspora-past-present-and-future/

https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indian-diaspora-past-present-and-future-part-i/

https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indian-diaspora-past-present-and-future-part-ii/#

https://www.gatewayhouse.in/indian-diaspora-new-chapter-indias-story-2/

https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/pravasi-bhartiyas-divas-convention-indians-abroad-history-spread-remittances-8371541/

Books and Articles on
Indian Migration and Diaspora

Resource: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/BibliographyResearcher.pdf

The List containing some 100+
selected Books & Papers on
Indian Diaspora

Mahatma Gandhi
in
South Africa

[Source: High Commission of India, Pretoria, South Africa]
https://www.hcipretoria.gov.in/eoi.php?id=Africa

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi arrived in South Africa 24 May 1893 to attend to a legal matter of Dada Abdullah Jhaveri. Dada Abdullah, who hailed from Porbandar, knew of M.K. Gandhi and hired him, as he apart from being a London trained lawyer also spoke Gujarati. This was a perfect fit for the Durban based merchant keen to resolve a family commercial dispute.

Within weeks of Mahatma Gandhi's arrival in Durban, he was asked to travel to Pretoria to settle the dispute. On 7th June 1893, he was thrown off the First Class compartment of a Pretoria bound train in Pietermaritzburg. The young lawyer spent the night in the Waiting Hall on the deserted railway station. The humiliation that he went through convinced him to take on a greater call to fight for the rights of Indians in South Africa. He soon mobilised Indians in Durban and in 1894 the Natal Indian Congress was born to look into the question voting rights for Indians. After three years of stay and struggle in the country, Mahatma Gandhi return to India in 1896. But the same year, on the request of the Natal Indian Congress, he returned to Durban. This time he came with his family. On the arrival of his ship in Durban Harbour, there was a massive protest by the white community who would not allow him to disembark. His ship was kept in quarantine for about three weeks and when he was finally allowed to come ashore, he was attacked by a mob and brutally beaten. His trusted friend and supporter Parsi Rustomji came to his safety.

Mahatma Gandhi founded an Ambulance Corps of around 1100 volunteers in support of the British in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. He thought that support for the British would translate into better conditions for Indians in Transvaal and South Africa in general. His hopes, however, were belied. He returned to India in 1902 briefly and met with Indian

leaders and mobilised support for the welfare of Indians in South Africa. He returned to South Africa in 1902 and the following year founded the Transvaal British Indian Association in Johannesburg. The British-Boer understanding after the War led to further restrictions on Indians in Transvaal. In 1903, he started his law practice and established his legal office on Rissik Street close to the Government Courts in Johannesburg. He was the first Indian to do so. He handled cases of discrimination and racism against Indians but most of the time was consumed in political work. He had a constant stream of clients at his home in Troyville and sometimes, they would sleep in the veranda and leave next morning as briefings would go on till late in the night.

By 1903, Gandhiji's theatre of action had firmly shifted to Johannesburg. His family joined him in 1904 and their rented place in Troyville was shared with the Polaks: Henry Polak and Millie Graham. The Polaks along with Herman Kallenbach; Sonja Schlesin, his secretary; and lawyer L.W Ritch were his close associates in the mining town. His trusted followers in the Indian community were Ahmed Mohamed Cachalia and Thambi Naidoo, the latter helped him connect with the indentured lot.

In1904, Mahatma Gandhi founded the Phoenix Settlement in Durban for community living. In 1906, the Bambatha [Zulu] rebellion broke out in Natal and he again established a Stretcher Bearer Corps to treat the wounded. When this happened, his gave up his Troyville house and sent his family to Phoenix.

After the rebellion, he moved to stay with his trusted friend Herman Kallenbach in his "Kraal", an African homestead sort of a house in Johannesburg. It was while residing here that he launched Satyagraha for the first time. There was a mass meeting of over 3000 people chaired by him on 11 September 1906 at the Empire Theatre in down town Johannesburg. This was in protest against an Ordinance which made it compulsory for Asiatics to carry passes and register for them by giving finger prints. The agitation continued.

In January 1908, Mahatma Gandhi was ordered to leave Transvaal. He refused and was arrested and sentenced to two months imprisonment for disobeying the pass laws. He was kept at the Old Fort Prison Complex. This was his first of the four prison terms in South Africa; the other three being in Volkrust [1908], Pretoria [1909] and Volkrust [1913]. He was released on 30 January after he reached an agreement with General Jan Smuts. Some members of the Indian community did not agree with the compromise on voluntary registration that he reached with Jan Smuts and one Mir Alam Khan brutally attacked him.

It was a near death incident for the Mahatma. He was taken to the home of Reverend Doke who looked after and nursed him.

Smuts did not keep to his promise. In August 1908, Mahatma Gandhi carried out a massive pass burning campaign outside the Hamidia mosque. In 1910, Mahatma Gandhi founded the Tolstoy Farm on the outskirts of Johannesburg to prepare satyagrahis. The Farm which occupied 1100 acres of land belonged to Herman Kallenbach. It had 85 residents and all that was consumed was mostly produced locally. Life was austere and frugal with salt being served only on Sundays. Children and others were imparting lessons and training in carpentry and other manual work. The Satyagrahis were allowed to take the train to town only if they went on official work or else had to trek to Johannesburg, a distance of 35 kilometres. The Farm was disbanded in 1913.

In 1912, the South African Native National Congress [pre-cursor to ANC] was formed with John Dube, the Mahatma's neighbour in Ilanga next to Phoenix, as its first President. Gandhiji's political ideas, mobilisation and Satyagraha would have impacted its formation.

In 1913, Mahatma Gandhi launched the famous Volkrust Satyagraha against the pass laws, Registration of marriages Act, 3 Pound tax and restriction on movement of Indians. Women played a leading role in this protest and Kasturba Gandhi along with others were sent to prison. Mahatma Gandhi was himself put behind bars. Ultimately, General Smuts gave up and in 1914 passed the Indian Relief Act which did away with the discriminatory laws. Having achieved his mission, Gandhiji set sail for his motherland from Cape Town on 19 July 1914 and reached Mumbai on 9 January 1915 amid jostling and cheers by a huge crowd at Apollo Bunder.

Mahatma Gandhi came to South Africa for a short professional stint but ultimately went on to spend 21 long years in the country with brief spells in India and England.

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Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/mohandas-karamchand-gandhi

*[*Note: The focus of this biography is on Gandhi's life and times in South Africa.]*

Early life and education

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born to a Hindu family on 2 October 1869, in Porbandar, Gujarat, India. He was the last child of Karamchand Gandhi, his father and his father's fourth wife Putlibai. His father, a lawyer and an important government official, belonged to the merchant caste. His early schooling was in nearby Rajkot, where his father served as the adviser or prime minister to the local ruler. India was then under British rule. His father died before Gandhi could finish his schooling. At thirteen, the young Gandhi was married to Kasturba [or Kasturbai], who was of the same age as himself. She bore him four sons. In September 1888 Gandhi set sail for England, to pursue a degree in law. Gandhi left behind his son Harilal, then a few months old. He spent three years in London being a serious student, living a very simple lifestyle. He became deeply interested in vegetarianism and the study of different religions. His stay in England provided opportunities for widening horizons and a better understanding of religions and cultures. Through meeting local vegetarians he had also developed an interest in books on philosophy, particularly those by Leo Tolstoy, John Ruskin and Henry David Thoreau.

Gandhi successfully completed his degree at the Inner Temple and was called to the Bar on 10 June 1891. He enrolled in the High Court of London, but later that year he left for India. For the next two years, Gandhi attempted to practice law in India, establishing himself in the legal profession in Bombay. Unfortunately, he found that he lacked both knowledge of Indian law and self-confidence at trial. His practice collapsed and he returned home to Porbandar. It was while he was contemplating his seemingly bleak future that a representative of an Indian business firm situated in the Transvaal (now Gauteng), South Africa offered him employment. He was to work in South Africa for a period of 12 months for a fee of £105.00.

Gandhi in South Africa

Gandhi arrived in Durban, Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal - KZN) in 1893 to serve as legal counsel to a merchant Dada Abdulla. In June, Dada Abdulla asked him to undertake a rail trip to Pretoria, Transvaal, a journey which first took Gandhi to Pietermaritzburg, Natal. There, Gandhi was seated in the first-class compartment, as he had purchased a first-class ticket. A White person who entered the compartment hastened to summon the White railway officials, who ordered Gandhi to remove himself to the van compartment, since 'coolies' (a racist term for Indians) and non-whites were not permitted in first-class compartments. Gandhi protested and produced his ticket, but was warned that he would be forcibly removed if he did not make a gracious exit. As Gandhi refused to comply with the order, a White police officer pushed him out of the train, and his luggage was tossed out onto the platform. The train steamed away, and Gandhi withdrew to the waiting room. "It was winter," Gandhi was to write in his autobiography, and "the cold was extremely bitter. My overcoat was in my luggage, but I did not dare to ask for it lest I should be insulted again, so I sat and shivered". He says he began to think of his "duty": ought he to stay back and fight for his "rights", or should he return to India? His own "hardship was superficial", "only a symptom of the deep disease of colour prejudice."

The next evening he continued the train journey-this time without a mishap. But a bigger mishap awaited him on the journey from Charlestown to Johannesburg which had to be covered by stagecoach. He was made to sit with the coachman on the box outside, while the white conductor sat inside with the white passengers. Gandhi pocketed the insult for fear of missing the coach altogether. On the way the conductor who wanted a smoke spread a piece of dirty sackcloth on the footboard and ordered Gandhi to sit there so that the conductor could have Gandhi's seat and smoke. Gandhi refused. The conductor swore and rained blows on him, trying to throw him down. Gandhi clung to the brass rails of the coach box, refusing to yield and unwilling to retaliate. Some of the White passengers protested at this cowardly assault and the conductor was obliged to stop beating Gandhi who kept his seat.

The position of Indians in the Transvaal was worse than in Natal. They were compelled to pay a poll tax of £3; they were not allowed to own land except in specially allotted locations, a kind of ghetto; they had no franchise, and were not allowed to walk on the pavement or move out of doors after 9 p.m. without a special permit. One day Gandhi, who had received from the State Attorney a letter authorizing him to be out of doors all hours, was having his usual walk. As he passed near President Kruger's house, the policeman on duty, suddenly and without any warning, pushed him off the pavement and kicked him into the street. A Mr. Coates, an English Quaker, who knew Gandhi, happened to pass by and saw the incident. He advised Gandhi to proceed against the man and offered himself as a witness. But Gandhi declined the offer saying that he had made it a rule not to go to court in respect of a personal grievance.

During his stay in Pretoria, Gandhi read about 80 books on religion. He came under the influence of Christianity but refused to embrace it. During this period, Gandhi attended Bible classes. Within a week of his arrival there, Gandhi made his first public speech making truthfulness in business his theme. The meeting was called to awaken the Indian residents to a sense of the oppression they were suffering under. He took up the issue of Indians in regard to first-class travel in railways. As a result, an assurance was given that first and second-class tickets would be issued to Indians "who were properly dressed". This was a partial victory. These incidents led Gandhi to develop the concept of Satyagraha. He united the Indians from different communities, languages and religions, who had settled in South Africa.By the time Gandhi arrived in South Africa the growing national- perpetuated by the White ruling authorities and the majority of the White citizenry - anti-Indian attitude had spread to Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal). The first discriminatory legislation directed at Indians, Law 3 of 1885, was passed in the South African Republic, or the Transvaal. The right to self-government had been granted to Natal in 1893 and politicians were increasing pressure to pass legislation aimed at containing the 'merchant [Indian] menace'.

Two bills were passed in the following two years restricting the freedom of Indians severely. The Immigration Law Amendment Bill stated that any Indian had to return to India at the end of a five-year indenture period or had to be re-indentured for a further two years. If he refused an amount of £3 annual tax had to be paid. The bill came into law in 1895. A Franchise Amendment Bill was introduced in 1894. It was designed to limit the franchise to Indians who had the vote. Although there were only 300 of them, in comparison to 10,000 white voters, the Bill caused outrage among Indian leadership. They decided to contest the measure by any means available to them. Having completed his work in Pretoria, Gandhi returned to Durban and prepared to sail home. At a farewell dinner, in April 1894, given in his honour someone showed him a news item in the Natal Mercury that the Natal Government proposed to introduce a bill to disfranchise Indians. Gandhi immediately understood the ominous implications of this bill which, as he said, "is the first nail into our coffin" and advised his compatriots to resist it by concerted action. But they pleaded their helplessness without him and begged him to stay on for another month. He agreed little realizing that this one month would grow into twenty years.

Gandhi immediately turned the farewell dinner into a meeting and an action committee was formed. This committee then drafted a petition to the Natal Legislative Assembly. Volunteers came forward to make copies of the petition and to collect signatures - all during the night. The petition received much favourable publicity in the press the following morning. The bill was however passed. Undeterred, Gandhi set to work on another petition to Lord Ripon, the Secretary of State for Colonies. Within a month the mammoth petition with ten thousand signatures was sent to Lord Ripon and a thousand copies were printed for distribution. Even The Times admitted the justice of

the Indian claim and for the first time, the people in India came to know of the oppressive lot of their compatriots in South Africa.

Gandhi insisted that if he had to extend his stay in South Africa he would accept no remuneration for his public services and since he still thought it necessary to live as befitted a barrister he needed about £300 to meet his expenses. He therefore enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court of Natal. On 25 June 1894, at the residence of Sheth Abdulla, with Sheth Haji Muhammad, the foremost Indian leader of Natal in the chair, a meeting of Indians was held and it was resolved to offer opposition to the Franchise Bill. Here Gandhi outlined his plan of action to oppose this bill. Gandhi played a prominent role in the planned campaign. As a talented letter-writer and meticulous planner, he was assigned the task of compiling all petitions, arranging meetings with politicians and addressing letters to newspapers. He also campaigned in India and made an, initially, successful appeal to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Ripon. He was instrumental in the formation of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) on 22 August 1894, which marked the birth of the first permanent political organisation to strive to maintain and protect the rights of Indians in South Africa.

By 1896 Gandhi had established himself as a political leader in South Africa. In this year, he undertook a journey to India to launch a protest campaign on behalf of Indians in South Africa. It took the form of letters written to newspapers, interviews with leading nationalist leaders and a number of public meetings. His mission caused great uproar in India and consternation among British authorities in England and Natal. Gandhi embarrassed the British Government enough to cause it to block the Franchise Bill in an unprecedented move, which resulted in anti-Indian feelings in Natal reaching dangerous new levels. While in India, an urgent telegram from the Indian community in Natal obliged him to cut short his stay. He set sail for Durban with his wife and children on 30 November 1896. Gandhi did not realize that while he had been away from South Africa, his pamphlet of Indian grievances, known as the Green Pamphlet, had been exaggerated and distorted. When the ship reached Durban harbour, it was for held for 23 days in quarantine. The European community, misled by garbled versions of Gandhi's activities in India and by a rumour that he was bringing shiploads of Indians to settle in Natal, were wild with anger and threatened to drown all the passengers.

News of this cowardly assault received wide publicity and Joseph Chamberlain, the British Secretary of States for the Colonies, cabled an order to Natal to prosecute all those who were responsible for the attempted lynching. However, Gandhi refused to identify and prosecute his assailants, saying that they were misled and that he was sure that when they came to know the truth they would be sorry for what they had done. It was during this second period in South Africa that Gandhi underwent a gradual change. Previously he was anxious to maintain the standard of an English barrister. Now he began, to methodically reduce his wants and his expenses. He began

to do his own laundry and clean out his own chamber pots but often his guests as well. Not satisfied with self-help, he volunteered, despite his busy practice as a lawyer and demand of public work, his free service for two hours a day at a charitable hospital. He also undertook the education at home of his two sons and a nephew. He read books on nursing and midwifery and in fact, served as a midwife when his fourth and last son was born in Natal.

In 1899 the Second Anglo-Boer (South African War) war broke out. Though Gandhi's sympathies were with the Boers who were fighting for their independence, he advised the Indian community to support the British cause, on the grounds that since they claimed their rights as British subjects, it was their duty to defend the Empire when it was threatened. He organized and, with the help of Dr. Booth, trained an Indian Ambulance Corps of 1,100 volunteers and offered its services to the Government. The corps under Gandhi's leadership rendered valuable service and was mentioned in dispatches. In 1901, at the end of the war, Gandhi wanted to return to India. His professional success in South Africa might, he feared turn him into a "money-maker". With great difficulty he persuaded his friends to let him go and promised to return should the community need him within a year. He reached India in time to attend the Calcutta session of the Indian National Congress and had the satisfaction of seeing his resolution on South Africa pass with acclamation. He was however disappointed with the congress. He felt that Indian politicians talked too much but did little. Hardly had he set up in practice in Bombay when a cablegram from the Indian community in Natal recalled him. He had given them his word that he would return if needed. Leaving his family in India he sailed again.

He had been called to put the Indian case before Joseph Chamberlain who was visiting South Africa. But the Colonial Secretary who had come to receive a gift of thirty-five million pounds from South Africa had no intention to alienate the European community. Gandhi failed in his mission to win Chamberlain's sympathy and discovered in the process that the situation in the Transvaal had become ominous for the Indians. He therefore decided to stay on in Johannesburg and enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court. Though he stayed on specifically to challenge White arrogance and to resist injustice, he harboured no hatred in his heart and was in fact always ready to help when they were in distress. It was this rare combination of readiness to resist wrong and capacity to love his opponent which baffled his enemies and compelled their admiration. When the Zulu rebellion broke out, he again offered his help to the Government and raised an Indian Ambulance Corps. He was happy that he and his men had to nurse the sick and dying Zulus whom the White doctors and nurses were unwilling to touch. Gandhi was involved in the formation British Indian Association (BIA) in 1903. The movement was to prevent proposed evictions of Indians in the Transvaal under British leadership. According to Arthur Lawley, the newly appointed Lieutenant Governor Lord Alfred Milner said that Whites were to be

protected against Indians in what he called a 'struggle between East and West for the inheritance of the semi-vacant territories of South Africa'.

Satyagraha

Influenced by the Hindu religious book, the Bhagavad Gita, Gandhi wanted to purify his life by following the concepts of aparigraha (non-possession) and samabhava (equability). A friend gave him the book, Unto This Last, by John Ruskin; Gandhi became excited about the ideals proffered by Ruskin. The book inspired Gandhi to establish a communal living community called Phoenix Settlement just outside of Durban in June 1904. The Settlement was an experiment in communal living, a way to eliminate one's needless possessions and to live in a society with full equality. Gandhi moved his newspaper, the Indian Opinion, established in June 1903, and its workers to the Phoenix Settlement as well as his own family a bit later. Besides a building for the press, each community member was allotted three acres of land on which to build a dwelling made of corrugated iron. In addition to farming, all members of the community were to be trained and expected to help with the newspaper.

In 1906, believing that family life was taking away from his full potential as a public advocate, Gandhi took the vow of brahmacharya (a vow of abstinence against sexual relations, even with one's own wife). This was not an easy vow for him to follow, but one that he worked diligently to keep for the rest of his life. Thinking that one passion fed others, Gandhi decided to restrict his diet in order to remove passion from his palette. To aid him in this endeavour, Gandhi simplified his diet from strict vegetarianism to foods that were unspiced and usually uncooked, with fruits and nuts being a large portion of his food choices. Fasting, he believed, would also help still the urges of the flesh. Gandhi believed that his taking the vow of brahmacharya had allowed him the focus to come up with the concept of Satyagraha in late 1906. In the very simplest sense, Satyagraha is passive resistance. However, Gandhi believed the English phrase "passive resistance" did not represent the true spirit of Indian resistance since passive resistance was often thought to be used by the weak and was a tactic that could potentially be conducted in anger.

Needing a new term for the Indian resistance, Gandhi chose the term "satyagraha," which literally means "truth force." Since Gandhi believed that exploitation was only possible if both the exploited and the exploiter accepted it, if one could see above the current situation and see the universal truth, then one had the power to make change. (Truth, in this manner, could mean "natural right," a right granted by nature and the universe that should not be impeded by man.)In practice, Satyagraha was a focused and forceful nonviolent resistance to a particular injustice. A Satyagrahi (a person using Satyagraha) would resist injustice by refusing to follow an unjust law. In doing so, he would not be angry, would put up freely with physical assaults on his person

and the confiscation of his property, and would not use foul language to smear his opponent. A practitioner of Satyagraha also would never take advantage of an opponent's problems. The goal was not for there to be a winner and loser of the battle, but rather, that all would eventually see and understand the "truth" and agree to rescind the unjust law.

On 28 December 1907, the first arrests of Indians refusing to register were made, and by the end of January 1908, 2,000 Asians had been jailed. Gandhi had also been jailed several times, but many key figures in the movement fled the colony rather than be arrested. The first time Gandhi officially used Satyagraha was in South Africa beginning in 1907 when he organised opposition to the Asiatic Registration Law (the Black Act). In March 1907, the Black Act was passed, requiring all Indians - young and old, men and women - to get fingerprinted and to keep registration documents on them at all times. Gandhi advised the Indian community to refuse to submit to this indignity and to court imprisonment by defying the law. Indians refused to get fingerprinted and picketed the documentation offices. Mass protests were organised, miners went on strike, and masses of Indians travelled, illegally, from Natal to the Transvaal in opposition to the Black Act. Many of the protesters were beaten and arrested. In January 1908, he was arrested and sentenced to two months simple imprisonment. He was followed by other Satyagrahis. This was the first of Gandhi's many jail sentences. It took seven years of protest before the Black Act was repealed in June 1914. Gandhi had proved that nonviolent protest could be immensely successful.

The Indians made a bonfire of their registration certificates and decided to defy the ban on immigration to the Transvaal. Jails began to be filled. Gandhi was arrested a second time in September 1908 and sentenced to two months' imprisonment, this time hard labour. The struggle continued. In February 1909 he was arrested a third time and sentenced to three months' hard labour. He made such good use of his time in jail with study and prayer that he was able to declare that "the real road to ultimate happiness lies in going to jail and undergoing sufferings and privations there in the interest of one's own country and religion".Before the prison term was over General Jan Smuts sent him an emissary proposing that if the Indians voluntarily registered themselves he promised to repeal the Act. Gandhi and the leader of the Chinese population in South Africa, Leung Quin, agreed to the compromise. He always believed in trusting the opponent, but other Indians were not so trusting. One burly Indian, a Pathan, even charged Gandhi with having betrayed them and threatened to kill him if he registered. On the day Gandhi went out to register he was waylaid and attacked by this and other Pathans and severely injured. When he recovered consciousness and was told that his assailants had been arrested he insisted on them being released.

Gandhi registered, but his disappointment was great when Smuts went back on his word and refused to repeal the Black Act along with denying any promises were made. The Indians made a bonfire of their registration certificates and decided to defy the

ban. In June 1909, he left for London after having defended his position as leader of the Transvaal merchant community. Gandhi returned to South Africa in December 1909 to find that members of the NIC were openly plotting against him. He was fighting for his political survival and withdrew to Tolstoy, a farm he had purchased in 1910 to support the families of jailed passive resisters. Gandhi only came under the public eye again in 1912 as a result of a visit to South Africa by Indian statesman Gopal Krishna Gokhale. He was accused of preventing opponents of his policies to speak with the visitor and finally, on 26 April 1913 Gandhi and his rivals in the NIC went their separate ways.

In 1911, a provisional settlement of the Asiatic question in the Transvaal brought about a suspension of the Satyagraha campaign. In the following year, Gokhale visited South Africa and on the eve of his departure assured Gandhi that the Union Government had promised to repeal the Black Act, to remove the racial bar from the immigration law and to abolish the £3 tax. But Gandhi had his fears which were soon borne out. The Union Government went back on its promise, and to this fire was added a very powerful fuel when a judgment of the Supreme Court ruled that only Christian marriages were legal in South Africa, turning at one stroke all Indian marriages in South Africa invalid and all Indian wives into concubines. This provoked Indian women, including, Kasturbai, to join the struggle.It was illegal for the Indians to cross the border from the Transvaal into Natal, and vice versa, without a permit. Indian women from the Tolstoy Ashram, which Gandhi set up in the Transvaal, crossed the border without permits and proceeded to Newcastle to persuade the Indian miners there to strike. They succeeded and were arrested. The strike spread and thousands of miners and other Indians prepared, under Gandhi's leadership, to march to the Transvaal border in a concerted act of non-violent defiance.

On 29 October 1913, hundreds of men, women and children led by Gandhi marched from Newcastle, Natal Colony (now KwaZulu Natal) into the Transvaal to purposefully defy the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 (Act no. 22). Gandhi was followed by two parties led by Thambi Naidoo and Albert Christopher. This marked one of the greatest episodes in South African history. He was arrested the following day at Palmford. Prior to this march, Thambi Naidoo mobilised the Indian community at Newcastle to start the Satyagraha Campaign (Passive Resistance Campaign). Gandhi made strict rules for the conduct of the Satyagrahis who were to submit patiently and without retaliation to insult, flogging or arrest. While leading a march on 6 November 1913, which included 127 women, 57 children and 2037 men, Gandhi was arrested. He was released on bail, rejoined the march and was re-arrested. The Indian Relief Bill was finally scrapped.

At one time there were about fifty thousand indentured labourers on strike and several thousand other Indians in jail. The Government tried repression and even shooting, and many lives were lost. "In the end", as an American biographer has put it, "General

Smuts did what every Government that ever opposed Gandhi had to do - he yielded." A spontaneous strike by Indians in Natal altered the situation radically. Here violent confrontation ruled and several strikers were killed and injured in clashes with the police and more protesters joined. By the end of November 1913, produce markets in Durban and Pietermaritzburg had come to a standstill, sugar mills were closed and hotels, restaurants and homes were left without domestic workers. Reports in India relating the arrest of Gandhi and police brutality caused uproar and the British government was forced to form an agreement with the strikers. Gandhi was released in order to negotiate with Smuts over the Indian Relief Bill, a law that scrapped the £3 tax on ex-indentured workers. The law was scrapped. Gandhi was released and, in January 1914, a provisional agreement was arrived at between him and General Smuts and the main Indian demands were conceded. Gandhi's work in South Africa was now over and, in July 1914, he sailed with his wife for England. Before sailing, he sent a pair of sandals he had made in jail to General Smuts as a gift.

Recalling the gift twenty-five years later, the General wrote:

I have worn these sandals for many a summer since then, even though I may feel that I am not worthy to stand in the shoes of so great a man."

Return to India

Having spent twenty years in South Africa helping fight discrimination, Gandhi decided it was time to head back to India in July 1914. On his way home, Gandhi was scheduled to make a short stop in England. However, when World War I broke out during his journey, Gandhi decided to stay in England and form another ambulance corps of Indians to help the British. When the British air caused Gandhi to take ill, he sailed to India in January 1915. Gandhi's struggles and triumphs in South Africa had been reported in the worldwide press. By the time he reached home, in India, he was a national hero. Although he was eager to begin reforms in India, a friend advised him to wait a year and spend the time travelling around India to acquaint himself with the people and their tribulations. Yet Gandhi soon found his fame getting in the way of accurately seeing the conditions that the poorer people lived in day to day. In an attempt to travel more anonymously, Gandhi began wearing a loincloth (dhoti) and sandals (the average dress of the masses) during this journey. If it was cold out, he would add a shawl. This became his wardrobe for the rest of his life. During this year of observation, Gandhi founded another communal settlement, this time in Ahmadabad called the Sabarmati Ashram. Gandhi lived in the Ashram for the next sixteen years, along with his family and several members who had once been part of the Phoenix Settlement.

The title 'Mahatma'

It was during his first year back in India that Gandhi was given the honorary title of Mahatma ("Great Soul"). Many credit Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, winner of the 1913 Nobel Prize for Literature, for both awarding Gandhi this name and publicising it. The title represented the feelings of the millions of Indian peasants who viewed Gandhi as a holy man. However, Gandhi never liked the title because it seemed to mean he was special while he viewed himself as ordinary. However other sources claim it was Nagar Sheth of Jetpur, Shri Nautamlal B. Mehta (Kamdar), who was the first to use and bestow "Mahatma" for Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi on 21 January 1915 at Kamri Bai School, Jetpur, India. From then on, Gandhi was known as Mahatma Gandhi. It is commonly believed that Rabindranath Tagore first bestowed the name. However, this is incorrect.

On 30 January 1948, Gandhi hurriedly went up the few steps of the prayer ground in a large park in Delhi. He had been detained by a conference with the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and was late by a few minutes. He loved punctuality and was worried that he had kept the congregation waiting. "I am late by ten minutes," he murmured. "I should be here at the stroke of five." He raised his hands and touched the palms together to greet the crowd that was waiting. Everyone returned the greeting. Many came forward wanting to touch his feet. They were not allowed to do so, as Gandhi was already late. But a young Hindu from Poona, Nathuram Vinayak Godse, forced his way forward and while seeming to do obeisance fired three point-blank shots from a small automatic pistol aimed at the heart. Gandhi fell, his lips uttering the name of God (He Ram). Before medical aid could arrive the heart had ceased to beat.

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Gandhi in South Africa

During his time in South Africa from 1893 to 1915, Mahatma Gandhi underwent a transformative journey that laid the foundation for his future role as a global leader of nonviolent resistance. Initially arriving in South Africa as a young lawyer, Gandhi was confronted with the harsh realities of racial discrimination, particularly against the Indian community. The seeds of his activism were sown as he experienced prejudice and injustice. The infamous incident at

In the vicinity of this plaque
M. K. GANDHI
was evicted from a first class
compartment on the night of
7 June 1893
This incident changed
the course of his life
He took up the fight
against racial oppression
His active non-violence
started from that date.

Pietermaritzburg Station, where he was forcibly removed from a "whites-only" compartment, became a turning point. In response to such incidents, Gandhi initiated nonviolent campaigns and civil disobedience, employing strategies that would later define his approach to social and political change. His years in South Africa were instrumental in shaping Gandhi's philosophy of satyagraha (truth force) and Sarvodaya (welfare of all). The experiences and lessons learned during this period laid the groundwork for his future endeavors in India, where he would lead the nation to independence through nonviolent resistance.

Gandhi in South Africa (1893-1914)

- Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's experiences and activism in South Africa played a pivotal role in shaping his political ideologies and his leadership in the Indian freedom movement. His time in South Africa provided him with firsthand exposure to racial discrimination and injustice, which deeply influenced his commitment to fighting for social justice and equality.
- Upon arriving in South Africa in 1893, Gandhi was confronted with the harsh realities of racial discrimination faced by the Indian community. As

a lawyer, he actively fought against discriminatory laws, including the infamous Asiatic Registration Act, through legal channels. However, he soon realized that legal battles alone were insufficient to bring about real change.

- It was during his struggle against the Asiatic Registration Act that Gandhi developed the concept of Satyagraha (truth force) and began employing nonviolent resistance as a means to combat injustice. Through civil disobedience and peaceful protests, Gandhi sought to confront oppressive laws and policies while adhering to the principles of truth, nonviolence, and self-sacrifice.
- Gandhi's leadership and philosophy gained traction among the Indian community in South Africa, and he emerged as their prominent leader. He organized numerous campaigns and movements, including the Natal Indian Congress, to advocate for the rights and welfare of Indians in South Africa.
- Gandhi's experiences in South Africa not only shaped his understanding of social and political issues but also provided him with valuable lessons in organizing and mobilizing communities. These lessons became instrumental when he returned to India and led the Indian freedom movement against British colonial rule.
- Gandhi's formative years in South Africa significantly influenced his approach to activism, his belief in nonviolent resistance, and his unwavering commitment to justice. Throughout his life, he drew upon these experiences to guide his actions and inspire millions to join the struggle for freedom and independence in India.
- While Gandhi acknowledged his South African journey as formative, it is important to note that he always considered himself an Indian by birth and maintained a deep connection to his homeland. His transformative experiences in South Africa contributed to his evolution as a leader and philosopher, ultimately shaping the path he would take in leading India towards independence.

Gandhi's association with South Africa

- Gandhi's association with South Africa played a pivotal role in shaping his personal and political journey. His experiences in South Africa were

transformative and significantly influenced his beliefs and strategies in the struggle for justice and independence.

- Gandhi's arrest at the Pietermaritzburg train station in 1893, when he was forcibly removed from a whites-only compartment, became a turning point in his life. This incident exposed him to the realities of racial discrimination and sparked his determination to fight against injustice. It marked the beginning of his journey towards nonviolent protest and civil disobedience as powerful tools for social change.
- Throughout his years in South Africa, Gandhi actively campaigned for the rights of the Indian community and fought against discriminatory laws and policies. He organized protests, strikes, and boycotts, using the principles of Satyagraha to confront oppression and seek redress.
- Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolent resistance, developed and refined during his time in South Africa, would later become a cornerstone of his leadership in the Indian freedom movement. His experiences with racial discrimination, unjust laws, and the power of peaceful resistance shaped his commitment to truth, nonviolence, and the pursuit of justice.
- Furthermore, Gandhi's leadership in South Africa not only impacted the Indian community there but also resonated globally. His approach to activism and his philosophy of nonviolence inspired movements and individuals around the world, contributing to the broader struggle for decolonization and social justice.
- Gandhi's time in South Africa provided him with the opportunity to develop and test his ideas and principles in real-world scenarios. It was a period of personal growth, self-discovery, and the honing of his leadership skills. The challenges he faced and the successes he achieved in South Africa laid the foundation for his future endeavors in India and his impact on the global stage.
- In summary, Gandhi's association with South Africa was transformative and instrumental in shaping his path towards becoming a global icon of nonviolent resistance and a leader in the fight against injustice. His experiences in South Africa fuelled his determination to challenge oppression, inspired his philosophy of nonviolent protest, and propelled him toward his lifelong mission of achieving freedom, equality, and peace.

Gandhi's Contribution to South Africa

- Gandhi's contribution to South Africa was significant and far-reaching. During his 21-year stay in the country, he played a crucial role in raising political awareness, organizing nonviolent protests, and advocating for the rights of the Indian community and oppressed groups.
- **Beginning of Active Non-Violence:** The incident of being thrown off a train for sharing a compartment with a white man marked the beginning of Gandhi's commitment to nonviolent resistance. This event influenced his adoption of Satyagraha, a philosophy of nonviolent protest and civil disobedience.
- **Formation of Natal Indian Congress:** In 1894, Gandhi established the Natal Indian Congress, which became a platform to voice the concerns and grievances of the Indian community. The organization led nonviolent protests against the discriminatory treatment of Indians and native Africans by the white population.
- **Development of Satyagraha:** Gandhi used his Phoenix Farm and later Tolstoy Farm as training centers for Satyagraha, refining the principles of nonviolent resistance and peaceful restraint, which became instrumental in his future campaigns.
- Satyagraha Campaigns: Gandhi organized several Satyagraha campaigns to protest unjust laws and discriminatory policies. Notably, the 1906 campaign against the Transvaal Asiatic Ordinance and the 1907 campaign against British oppression were significant milestones.
- Engagement with Authorities: Gandhi engaged in negotiations with authorities, including General Smuts, representing Indian interests in South Africa. These negotiations helped secure some concessions and improved conditions for the Indian community.
- The passing of the Indian Relief Act: By the end of Gandhi's stay in South Africa, the government passed the Indian Relief Act, granting many of the demands put forth by Gandhi and his colleagues. This was a significant achievement for the Indian community.
- Inspiration for Future Movements: Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence and civil disobedience inspired future generations of leaders and activists, including those who led the Defiance Campaign in the 1950s. This campaign marked a turning point in South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle.

- Legacy and Leadership: Gandhi's work in South Africa laid the foundation for his leadership in the Indian independence movement. His experiences and strategies in South Africa heavily influenced his approach to leading India's struggle for freedom.
- In summary, Gandhi's time in South Africa was transformative not only for him but also for the country and its people. His dedication to nonviolence, political activism, and advocacy for justice left a lasting impact on South Africa's struggle for equality and freedom, and it also shaped his future leadership in India's fight for independence.

Resource:

https://edukemy.com/blog/gandhi-in-south-africa-modern-history-notes/

Selected Pictures

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#VintageIndia
South Africa was only meant to be a short stopgap for Gandhi but turned into a 21-year stay. During his time there, he developed satyagraha.
HISTORY TV

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
TRANSVAAL
FREE STATE
NATAL
ORANGE
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
INDIAN OCEAN
Centenary of Satyagraha
MAHATMA GANDHI

Gandhi in South Africa: 1893- 1914

Gandhi while serving in the Ambulance Corps during the Boer War.

- In South Africa, Gandhi faced discrimination directed at Indians. He was thrown off a train at Pietermaritzburg after refusing to move from the first class to a third class coach while holding a valid first class ticket. Traveling farther on by stagecoach he was beaten by a driver for refusing to travel on the foot board to make room for a European passenger. These events were a turning point in his life, awakening him to social injustice and influencing his subsequent social activism.

Returning to India in 1915

- In 1915, Gandhi returned from South Africa to live in India. He spoke at the conventions of the Indian National Congress, but was primarily introduced to Indian issues, politics and the Indian people by Gopal Krishna Gokhale, a respected leader of the Congress Party at the time.

this is exact place
PIETERMARITZBURG RAILWAY STATION, SOUTH AFRICA
THIS IS RAILWAY STATION WHERE GANDHIJI WAS THROWN OUT OF TRAIN
PART-10

alamy


GANDHI JI IN SOUTH AFRICA
Mahatma Gandhi thrown out of the train in South Africa.
When Gandhi ji was travelling by train to Pretoria, Gandhi ji, despite carrying first class ticket, was thrown out of the train by the authorities because a white man complained of an Indian sharing the space with him.

ANI
Watch: Sushma Swaraj unveils bust of Mahatma Gandhi at Pietermaritzburg Railway Station

Social Realities of Indian Americans

Results From the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey

As the profile of the Indian American community has grown, so too has its economic, political, and social influence. But how Indian Americans choose to deploy this influence remains an open question.

By Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur, Jonathan Kay, and Milan Vaishnav

Published on 9 Jun 2021

Source: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/06/social-realities-of-indian-americans-results-from-the-2020-indian-american-attitudes-survey?lang=en

Summary

Indian Americans are the second-largest immigrant group in the United States. As the number of Indian-origin residents in the United States has swelled north of 4 million, the community's diversity too has grown.

Today, Indian Americans are a mosaic of recent arrivals and long-term residents. While the majority are immigrants, a rising share is born and raised in the United States. Many Indian immigrants might have brought with them identities rooted in their ancestral homeland, while others have eschewed them in favor of a nonhyphenated "American" identity. And despite the overall professional, educational, and financial success many Indian Americans enjoy, this has not inoculated them from the forces of discrimination, polarization, and contestation over questions of belonging and identity.

There is surprisingly little systematic data about the everyday social realities that Indian Americans experience. How do Indian Americans perceive their own ethnic identity? How do they respond to the dual impulses of assimilation and integration? And how might their self-conception influence the composition of their social networks?

These are not merely academic questions. As the profile of the Indian American community has grown, so too has its economic, political, and social influence. But

how Indian Americans choose to deploy this influence remains an open question. To what extent do people of Indian origin encounter discriminatory behavior—on what grounds and by whom? As the United States witnesses a resurgence of violence and hate speech targeting Asian Americans, how might it affect Americans of Indian origin?

This study draws on a new source of empirical data to answer these and other questions. Its findings are based on a nationally representative online survey of 1,200 Indian American residents in the United States—the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey (IAAS)—conducted between September 1 and September 20, 2020, in partnership with the research and analytics firm YouGov. The survey, drawing on both citizens and non-citizens in the United States, was conducted online using YouGov's proprietary panel of 1.8 million Americans and has an overall margin of error of +/- 2.8 percent.

This study is the third in a series on the social, political, and foreign policy attitudes of Indian Americans. The major findings are briefly summarized below.

- **Indian Americans exhibit very high rates of marriage within their community.** While eight out of ten respondents have a spouse or partner of Indian origin, U.S.-born Indian Americans are four times more likely to have a spouse or partner who is of Indian origin but was born in the United States.
- **Religion plays a central role in the lives of Indian Americans but religious practice varies.** While nearly three-quarters of Indian Americans state that religion plays an important role in their lives, religious practice is less pronounced. Forty percent of respondents pray at least once a day and 27 percent attend religious services at least once a week.
- **Roughly half of all Hindu Indian Americans identify with a caste group**. Foreign-born respondents are significantly more likely than U.S.-born respondents to espouse a caste identity. The overwhelming majority of Hindus with a caste identity—more than eight in ten—self-identify as belonging to the category of General or upper caste.
- **"Indian American" itself is a contested identity. While Indian American is a commonly used shorthand to describe people of Indian origin, it is not universally embraced.** Only four in ten respondents believe that "Indian American" is the term that best captures their background.
- **Civic and political engagement varies considerably by one's citizenship status.** Across nearly all metrics of civic and political participation, U.S.-born citizens report the highest levels of engagement, followed by foreign-born U.S. citizens, with non-citizens trailing behind.
- **Indian Americans' social communities are heavily populated by other people of Indian origin.** Indian Americans—especially members of the first generation—tend to socialize with other Indian Americans. Internally, the social networks of Indian Americans are more homogenous in terms of religion than either Indian region (state) of origin or caste.
- **Polarization among Indian Americans reflects broader trends in American society.** While religious polarization is less pronounced at an individual level, partisan polarization—linked to political preferences both in India and the United States—is rife.

However, this polarization is asymmetric: Democrats are much less comfortable having close friends who are Republicans than the converse. The same is true of Congress Party supporters vis-à-vis supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

- **Indian Americans regularly encounter discrimination.** One in two Indian Americans reports being discriminated against in the past one year, with discrimination based on skin color identified as the most common form of bias. Somewhat surprisingly, Indian Americans born in the United States are much more likely to report being victims of discrimination than their foreign-born counterparts.
- **To some extent, divisions in India are being reproduced within the Indian American community.** While only a minority of respondents are concerned about the importation of political divisions from India to the United States, those who are identify religion, political leadership, and political parties in India as the most common factors.

Introduction

U.S. President Joe Biden remarked in a March 2021 phone call with Swati Mohan, an Indian-origin scientist charged with overseeing the highly anticipated landing of the Perseverance Mars rover for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: "It's amazing. Indian—of descent—Americans are taking over the country: you, my vice president [Kamala Harris, whose mother was born in India], my speechwriter, Vinay [Indian American Vinay Reddy]. . . . You guys are incredible."[1]

While some in the media interpreted Biden's off-the-cuff remark as an unfortunate gaffe, others viewed it as affirmation of the growing influence of the Indian American diaspora. In the same exchange, Biden later added: "One of the reasons why we're such an incredible country is we're such a diverse country. We bring the best out of every single solitary culture in the world here in the United States of America, and we give people an opportunity to let their dreams run forward."[2]

These sentiments are a far cry from those expressed by a special commission established by the U.S. Congress whose 1911 report declared that Hindus were "universally regarded as the least desirable race of immigrants thus far admitted to the United States."[3] More than a century later—from Silicon Valley CEOs to White House power brokers and influential members of Congress to leaders in fields like journalism, health, science, and engineering—the emergence of the Indian diaspora is a remarkable coming-of-age story.

U.S. Census data affirm that Indian Americans enjoy a standard of living that is roughly double that of the median American household, underpinned by substantially greater educational attainment—the share of Indian Americans with at least a bachelor's degree is twice the national average.[4] However, these aggregate figures mask severe inequalities within the community. Although overall levels of poverty are lower than the American average,[5] there are concentrated pockets of deprivation, especially among the large number of unauthorized immigrants born in India and residing in the United States.[6]

Additionally, a narrow focus on demographics such as income, wealth, education, and professional success can obscure important (and sometimes uncomfortable) social truths. What are the social realities and lived experiences of Indian Americans? How

does this group perceive itself, and how does it believe others perceive it? To what extent does the community exhibit signs of shared solidarity, and are there signs of division as the group grows in number and diversity? These are some questions this paper attempts to address.

While the social realities of Indian Americans are often glossed over, recent events have brought them to the fore. In 2020, California's Department of Fair Employment and Housing filed a lawsuit against U.S.-based technology company Cisco Systems after an employee from one of India's historically marginalized caste communities ("Dalits") alleged that some of his upper caste Indian American colleagues discriminated against him on the basis of his caste identity.[7] The suit, and subsequent media melee, triggered a wave of wrenching testimonials about the entrenched nature of caste—a marker of hierarchy and status associated with Hinduism (as well as other South Asian religions)—within the diaspora community in the United States.[8]

More recently, there has been a troubling surge in hate crimes targeting Asian Americans in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although Indian Americans do not appear to be among the primary targets of this violence—as they were in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks—the disquieting crime wave has cast a spotlight on the bigotry and violence many Asian immigrant populations experience in the United States.[9]

The official classification and self-identities of the Indian American community have posed a conundrum for more than a century, from "Hindoo" to "Asian" to "South Asian" to "Asian Indian" to "Indian American" to "American." Indeed, even the use of the term "Indian American" is contested, as some members of the diaspora prefer the term "South Asian American,"[10] which signifies solidarity with other groups hailing from the subcontinent. Still others reject hyphenation entirely, preferring to be known simply as "American." For instance, former Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal declared in 2015, "I do not believe in hyphenated Americans. . . . My dad and mom told my brother and me that we came to America to be Americans. Not Indian-Americans, simply Americans." Around the same time, Nina Davuluri (who was crowned Miss America 2014) remarked, "The fact that I am rooted in Indian culture helped me win [the] Miss America pageant."[11]

How then do we make sense of the heterogeneity encapsulated by the more than 4 million people of Indian origin in the United States, a group that is the second-fastest-growing immigrant community in the country?

This study utilizes a new source of empirical data to better understand the social realities of people of Indian origin residing in the United States. Its findings are based on a nationally representative online survey of 1,200 Indian American residents in the United States—the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey (IAAS)—conducted between September 1 and September 20, 2020, in partnership with research and analytics firm YouGov. The survey, drawing on both citizens and non-citizens in the United States, was conducted online using YouGov's proprietary panel of 1.8 million Americans and has an overall margin of error of +/- 2.8 percent.

Specifically, this study addresses seven questions concerning the social realities of Indian Americans:

1. What are the demographic characteristics of Indian Americans?
2. How do Indian Americans perceive their own ethnic identity and how much emphasis do they place on their "Indian-ness"?
3. To what degree do Indian Americans engage with American politics, their civic community, and Indian culture?
4. What do the social networks of Indian Americans look like?
5. Do religious differences and partisan politics exacerbate social distance between members of the Indian American community?
6. What are Indian Americans' experiences with discrimination, and how do discriminatory practices manifest?
7. How do Indian Americans relate to the Indian American community writ large?

This study is the third in a series of empirical papers on the Indian American community. The first, released in October 2020, explored the political attitudes and preferences of Indian Americans in advance of the November 2020 U.S. presidential election.[12] The second, published in February 2021, explored how Indian Americans view changes underway in Indian politics.[13]

Survey Overview

Indian Americans are the second-largest immigrant group in the United States.[14]

According to data from the 2018 American Community Survey (ACS)—which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau—there are 4.2 million people of Indian origin residing in the United States. Although a large proportion are not U.S. citizens (38 percent), roughly 2.6 million are (1.4 million are naturalized citizens and 1.2 million were born in the United States).

The data for this study are based on an original online survey—the IAAS—of 1,200 Indian American U.S. residents conducted by YouGov between September 1 and September 20, 2020. The IAAS sample includes both citizens and non-U.S. citizens; the former category accounts for 77 percent of the survey respondents. Table 1 provides a demographic profile of the IAAS sample in comparison to the Indian American sample in the 2018 ACS.

YouGov recruited respondents from its proprietary panel comprising 1.8 million U.S. residents. Only adult respondents (ages eighteen and above) who identified as Indian American or a person of (Asian) Indian origin were able to participate in the survey. YouGov employs a sophisticated sample matching procedure to ensure that the respondent pool is representative of the Indian American community in the United States, using data from the ACS as a target sample frame. All the analyses in this study employ sampling weights to ensure representativeness.[15]

TABLE 1

Demographics of the Indian American Attitudes Survey (IAAS) and American Community Survey (ACS)

	IAAS 2020	ACS 2018
Has U.S. citizenship	77%	62%
Median age (years)	35 years	34 years
Is married	65%	73%
Aged 25 years or older with a college degree	79%	76%
Median household annual income	$80,000–$99,000	$120,000

SOURCE: Authors' analysis of data from the IAAS and ACS 2018.

The overall margin of error for the IAAS is +/- 2.8 percent. This margin of error is calculated at the 95 percent confidence interval. Further methodological details can be found in Appendix A, along with a state-wise map of survey respondents.

The survey instrument contains 157 questions organized across six modules: basic demographics; immigration, citizenship, and family background; presidential campaigns and voting; U.S. politics and foreign policy; culture and social behavior; and Indian politics. Respondents were allowed to skip questions save for important demographic questions that determined the nature of other survey items. All attitudinal and perceptual measures and variables discussed in this paper are self-reported measures by respondents. For complete survey topline results, please visit Appendix B online.

Key Demographic Characteristics of Indian Americans

This section provides a snapshot of the Indian American population in the United States, as captured by the IAAS. It covers five broad areas: citizenship and residency status; educational attainment; marital status; Indian region of origin; and religion, religious practice, and caste identity.

Citizenship and Residency Status

As table 1 indicates, 77 percent of IAAS respondents are U.S. citizens, although there is significant variation within that category.[16] Thirty-nine percent of all respondents immigrated to the United States and later became naturalized U.S. citizens. Thirty-three percent were born in the United States but with at least one parent who was born outside of the United States. Another 4 percent were born in the United States to parents also born in the United States. The remaining 23 percent of the sample consists of immigrants residing in the United States who do not hold U.S. citizenship.

Not surprisingly, of the non-U.S. citizen population, 88 percent of IAAS respondents claim Indian citizenship. But members of this group exhibit significant variation in terms of their visa status (see figure 1).

FIGURE 1
Visa Status of Non-Citizens

Are you currently on a green card or any type of visa?



N = 264 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample excludes U.S. citizens.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Thirty percent of non-citizen IAAS respondents possess a green card (or a permanent residency card), which places them on a pathway to gaining U.S. citizenship. Twenty-seven percent are H-1B visa holders, a visa status for high-skilled or specialty workers in the United States that has historically been dominated by the technology sector. On average, an H-1B visa holder reports living in the United States for eight years, although 36 percent of H-1B beneficiaries report spending more than a decade in the country (that is, they arrived before 2010). Eighteen percent of non-citizens reside in the United States on an H-4 visa, a category for immediate family members of H-1B visa holders. Fourteen percent of non-citizens are on F-1, J-1, or M-1 visas—categories of student or scholar visas—while another 5 percent hold an L-1 visa, a designation available to employees of an international company with offices in the United States. A small minority of non-citizen respondents—6 percent—claim some other visa status.

Of the non-citizen population residing in the United States, the survey finds that 80 percent of them would accept U.S. citizenship if offered—an important preference given that Indian law forbids dual citizenship.

For those respondents who immigrated to the United States, over half (60 percent) arrived in the year 2000 or after (see figure 2).[17] Seventeen percent arrived in the 1990s, 13 percent immigrated in the 1980s, and just 10 percent arrived before the year

1980. There is a similar trend in naturalization for those who immigrated and later took U.S. citizenship. Sixty-four percent of this subset of respondents were naturalized after the year 2000, while the remainder received U.S. citizenship before that.

FIGURE 2

Indian American Immigrants' Year of Arrival, by Citizenship Status

In what year did you come to live in the United States?



N = 711 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample excludes non-immigrants.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

The Government of India maintains an Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) designation for persons of Indian origin residing abroad who do not hold Indian citizenship. OCI status effectively functions as a lifetime visa and also grants recipients the ability to live and work in India on a permanent basis. Forty-two percent of respondents who are not Indian citizens have taken advantage of the program.[18]

Of course, many Indian Americans—irrespective of citizenship—remain tied to India thanks to direct family connections. At the time of the survey, more than half (55 percent) of Indian Americans reported that they had an immediate family member (spouse, mother, father, brother, sister, son, or daughter) currently residing in India.

Educational Attainment

The survey also asks respondents about their educational attainment, which provides insight into the socioeconomic profile of Indians in America.

Overall, the Indian American population is highly educated compared to the U.S. average (see figure 3), as other studies have suggested.[19] Nearly three-fourths have a college education—40 percent of respondents have completed a postgraduate education and another 33 percent have finished four years of undergraduate study. Four percent have completed at least a junior college (two-year program) education, while 9 percent have completed some college. Thirteen percent have a high school diploma and just 1 percent have not finished high school.

FIGURE 3
Educational Attainment

What is the highest level of education you have completed?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

These numbers are actually a *lower* bound of Indian Americans' educational attainment. Many respondents are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five and, thus, are plausibly in the middle of their educational training. If one restricts attention to respondents aged twenty-five and older, nearly 80 percent have either a college or postgraduate degree (compared to 73 percent in the overall sample).

In all, 52 percent of Indians in America completed their education in the United States. Of that segment that was educated abroad, 42 percent arrived in the United States with an undergraduate degree and another 38 percent had completed a graduate or professional degree before their arrival. Eleven percent finished high school elsewhere, while only 8 percent had less than a high school education. These data suggest that the vast majority of the Indian immigrant population in the United States were already highly educated prior to arriving in the country.

Marital Status

Indian Americans exhibit high rates of marriage and low rates of divorce. Data from the ACS show that the share of married couple households in the community is 50 percent greater than the U.S. average.[20] In the IAAS sample, 66 percent of respondents were married or in a domestic partnership.

Existing research has found that among major Asian American communities, Indian Americans—both men and women—have the highest rate of endogamy (the custom of marrying within one's community) in both the first and second generations, although there is a noticeable increase in marriage outside of the community among members of the second generation.[21]

IAAS data confirm this finding. Eight out of ten respondents say they have a spouse or partner of Indian origin (ranging from 85 percent of foreign-born respondents to 71 percent of U.S.-born respondents).

FIGURE 4

Origin of Spouse or Partner

Is your spouse or partner of Indian origin?



N = 728 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample excludes respondents who were not married or in a domestic partnership and those who skipped the question(s).

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

The label "Indian origin" itself masks variation in terms of one's place of birth. Figure 4 unpacks this further and looks at three categories of spouses or partners: Indian origin

but born in India; Indian origin but born in the United States; and non-Indian origin. Responses are disaggregated by respondents' place of birth.

As the figure demonstrates, foreign-born Indian Americans are significantly more likely to have a spouse or partner who is of Indian origin and born in India. Seventy-seven percent of foreign-born Indian Americans fall into this category, compared to just 40 percent of U.S.-born Indian Americans. However, when compared to their foreign-born counterparts, U.S.-born Indian Americans are four times as likely to report having a spouse or partner who is of Indian origin but born in the United States (31 percent versus 8 percent). Finally, respondents born in the United States are also significantly more likely to report that they have a spouse or partner who is not of Indian origin: 29 percent of U.S.-born respondents compared to just 15 percent of foreign-born respondents.

Overall, 19 percent of respondents report having a spouse who is not of Indian origin, but this is slightly more common among men (22 percent) than women (16 percent). Interestingly, among foreign-born respondents, twice as many men (20 percent) have a spouse of non-Indian origin compared to women (10 percent), but the gap more than disappears among those born in the United States: while 27 percent of men have a spouse of non-Indian origin, this rises to 31 percent among women.

Region of Origin

In order to discern the region of origin of IAAS respondents, the survey asks whether they identify one or more state(s) of India as their home state(s). Sixty-four percent of respondents call a single state their home state, while 12 percent identify with multiple home states. Nearly one in four respondents reports no particular attachment to a state of origin.

Figure 5 maps respondents' states of origin in India. In cases where the respondent identifies with multiple states, both states are counted as a home state. (Hence, the percentages do not add up to 100.) The western state of Gujarat emerges as the most common home state, with 14 percent of respondents calling it their home, followed by Maharashtra (12 percent), Andhra Pradesh (10 percent), and Tamil Nadu (9 percent). Other popular home states include Delhi (9 percent), Punjab (8 percent), and Kerala (7 percent).

Another way of examining respondents' regional connections in India is to look at their linguistic backgrounds. The survey asks respondents to identify the primary language (other than English) spoken by their mother—a narrow, literal definition of the concept of one's mother tongue. Table 2 presents results of the most common languages among respondents, restricting attention to languages identified by at least 2 percent of respondents. The ordering in table 2 roughly corresponds with the map shown below.

Overall, Hindi is the most common mother tongue (19 percent), followed by Gujarati (14 percent), English only (10 percent), and Telugu (10 percent)—the latter is the primary language of the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.[22] Eight percent of respondents report Tamil as their mother tongue, while 7 percent apiece

report Punjabi or Bengali. Malayalam (6 percent), Urdu (5 percent), Marathi (4 percent), and Kannada (3 percent) round out the list. The balance (around 7 percent) consists of less frequently listed languages, ranging from Sindhi to Santali.

FIGURE 5

Indian Americans' Home States

Which of these states in India would you call your home state(s)?



N = 918 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Percentage indicates the proportion of respondents listing a given state as their home state. Sample excludes respondents who do not report a home state.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

TABLE 2

Distribution of Respondents' "Mother Tongues"

Language	Percentage
Hindi	19%
Gujarati	14%
English only	10%
Telugu	10%
Tamil	9%
Punjabi	7%
Bengali	7%
Malayalam	6%
Urdu	5%
Marathi	4%
Kannada	3%
Other	7%

N = 1,200 U.S. adult results

NOTE: Languages spoken by fewer than two percent of respondents are classified as "Other."

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Religion, Religious Practice, and Caste

Religion

According to IAAS data, 54 percent of respondents report belonging to the Hindu faith (see figure 6). The next most common response—those claiming no religious affiliation (a category that includes agnostics and atheists)—accounts for 16 percent of the sample. Thirteen percent of respondents are Muslim, 11 percent are Christian, and another 7 percent belong to a variety of other faiths including Buddhism and Sikhism. In certain cases, these larger groupings consist of smaller denominations that have been aggregated upward.

In addition to asking respondents about their religious identity, the survey also asks them about the role religion plays in their life. This emulates a standard set of survey questions that has long been asked by the Pew Research Center.[2 3]

When asked how important religion is in their life, 72 percent of respondents reply that religion is either very important or somewhat important. This statistic is nearly identical to the average of the American population at large. According to a 2019 Pew survey, 70 percent of Americans said religion is very important or somewhat important in their

lives.[24] Notably, responses to this question in the IAAS sample do not vary greatly by place of birth; respondents born in the United States are nearly as likely to report that religion is important to them as those born outside of the country.

FIGURE 6

Religious Identity

What is your present religion, if any?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Size of boxes corresponds to proportion of respondents belonging to that category.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

There does appear to be some variation based on respondents' religious identity (see figure 7). Muslims and Christians are significantly more likely than Hindus to say that religion is very important to them—a gap of nearly 30 percentage points. Hindus, in turn, are much more likely than Christians or Muslims to state that religion is somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important in their lives.

FIGURE 7

Importance of Religion, by Religious Identity

How important is religion in your life?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Figure excludes respondents who belong to other religious faiths or do not identify with any religion.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Religious Practice

In terms of attending religious services, there is also significant variation within the Indian American community. Twenty-seven percent of respondents report that they attend religious services (apart from weddings and funerals) once a week or more than once a week. This is identical to the share of all Americans who report attending services at least once a week, based on a 2020 Pew survey.[25] Forty percent, the modal category, of Indian Americans report attending religious services once or twice a month or just a few times a year. Another 31 percent report little or no participation in religious services, claiming they do so seldom or never.

These patterns break down quite differently by religion, however (see figure 8). Christians are the most observant group as far as attending religious services is concerned. Fifty-eight percent of Christians report attending church at least once or several times per week. Nearly half of all Muslims (48 percent) say they attend religious services regularly as well. This proportion declines dramatically for Hindus, with only 21 percent reporting regularly attending religious services. A majority of Hindus (52 percent) report attending religious services once or twice a month or just a few times a year, while another 25 percent report seldom or never attending religious services.

FIGURE 8

Attendance of Religious Services, by Religious Identity

Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Figure excludes respondents who belong to other religious faiths or do not identify with any religion.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Apart from attending religious services, the survey asks respondents how frequently they pray (outside of the times they attend religious services). Forty percent of respondents report praying either several times a day or once a day—significantly more than the 27 percent of the sample that attends religious services at least once a week. The share of Indian Americans who pray either several times a day or once a day is slightly below the U.S. average (46 percent according to Pew survey data).[26] Another 20 percent of Indian Americans report taking part in prayer a few times a week or once a week, while 11 percent pray at least a few times a month. Twenty-four percent of Indian Americans report seldom or never praying.

Clear differences along religious lines are evident in the responses to the question on the frequency of prayer (see figure 9). Not only are Hindus less likely to report attending religious services, but they are also less likely to say that they pray. Forty percent of Hindus say they pray once or several times a day—substantially less than the 58 percent of Muslims or 66 percent of Christians who answer similarly. Hindus are also more likely than Muslims or Christians to state that they pray a few times a month, seldom, or never.[27]

FIGURE 9

Frequency of Prayer, by Religious Identity

Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Figure excludes respondents who belong to other religious faiths or do not identify with any religion.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Caste

Finally, the survey explores the issue of caste. Caste has long been a sensitive and controversial issue in discussions about the Indian American community. Media reports about caste discrimination in the technology hub of Silicon Valley—where a large number of Indian Americans are employed—and a heated controversy over whether caste should be a part of history textbooks in the state of California have brought the issue to the forefront once more.[28] A 2018 survey of 1,500 South Asian Americans found that many low-caste members of numerous diaspora communities had endured firsthand experience of caste discrimination. However, the study is not based on a representative sample, raising questions about the generalizability of its findings.[29]

While caste is most commonly associated with Hinduism, caste hierarchies and caste self-identification are prevalent in most, if not all, of India's major religions. For instance, the category Other Backward Classes (OBC) is common among Muslims, while Scheduled Castes or Dalits can also be found in Buddhist, Sikh, Christian, and Muslim communities. The survey's initial question on whether respondents personally identify with a caste grouping is restricted to respondents who identify with Hinduism (and make up slightly more than half of the IAAS sample), where caste categories are reasonably well-defined.[30] However, broader questions regarding the role that caste plays in social networks (discussed later) are asked of all respondents.

Forty-seven percent of Hindu respondents report identifying with a caste, which means the majority (53 percent) said that they do not personally identify with a caste group of any kind. However, there is marked variation by place of birth. Whereas 53 percent of foreign-born Hindu Indian Americans affiliate with a caste group, 34 percent of U.S.-born Hindu Indian Americans do the same. There is no variation at all based on duration of stay in the United States. Hindus who recently arrived in the United States are just as likely to identify with a caste group as those who have been here for a quarter-century or more.[31]

Overall, there are 632 respondents in the IAAS sample who belong to the Hindu faith but only 293 who report identifying with a caste group. Of this latter group, the overwhelming majority—83 percent—categorize themselves as General or upper caste. Sixteen percent identify as a member of OBC and 1 percent each identify as Adivasi/Scheduled Tribe (ST) or Dalit/Scheduled Caste (SC).

One should treat these findings with caution. First, as noted above, the data on caste identification is restricted to Hindu respondents. Therefore, the sample size from which these percentages is derived is small—just one-half of the overall IAAS sample. Second, given the presence of SCs among some non-Hindu religious groups, it is likely that the absolute number of SCs—if not the percentage—in the IAAS sample is higher. Finally, given the sensitive nature of caste identity, nonresponses in the survey could mask those who do not wish to disclose their caste affiliation even if they are aware of their family's caste identity.

Indian (and American) Identities

In order to be eligible to serve as a respondent for the IAAS, members of YouGov's panel must self-identify as a person of (Asian) Indian origin who resides in the United States. But self-identification as a person of Indian origin tells us little about the strength of a respondent's Indian identity. This section explores how Indian Americans view the subject of their own identity.

Importance of Being Indian

First, the survey asked respondents how important being Indian is to their identity. Overall, 41 percent of respondents rate it as very important and another 37 percent rate it as somewhat important. Taken together, more than three-quarters of Indian Americans place a high value on their "Indian-ness." Around 22 percent state that their Indian identity is either somewhat or very unimportant.[32]

One might expect, however, that the importance of a respondent's Indian identity might vary by their place of birth. For instance, it is plausible that Indian Americans born in the United States would place less emphasis on their "Indian-ness" than their counterparts who immigrated. In fact, that is precisely what the data suggest (see figure 10).

Eighty-three percent of foreign-born Indian Americans claim being Indian is either very or somewhat important to their identity, compared to 70 percent of U.S.-born Indian Americans. The differences are most pronounced among those who say being Indian is very important to them. On the other end of the spectrum, 30 percent of Indian Americans born in the United States answer that being Indian is either somewhat or very unimportant to their identity—a response given by just 17 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans.

FIGURE 10
Importance of Being Indian, by Place of Birth

How important is being Indian to your identity?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

There is some evidence to suggest that there are "vintage" effects: the longer a respondent has spent in the United States, the less emphasis they place on their Indian identity—perhaps a reflection of their gradual integration into their adopted homeland. However, the magnitude of the effect is modest. Fifty percent of respondents who have been in the United States for ten years or less say that being Indian is very important to their identity, compared to 42 percent for those who have been in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Indian Americans in this latter category are also more inclined to state that being Indian is somewhat or very unimportant to them.[33] Respondents who identify as Republicans are also significantly less likely to place importance on the "Indian-ness" of their identity compared to Democrats or independents.

Religious affiliation too correlates with one's feelings toward their Indian identity. Eighty-eight percent of Hindus say being Indian is very or somewhat important to them,

compared to 79 percent of Christians and 66 percent of Muslims. This is possibly a reflection of India's current political climate. The February 2021 IAAS paper found that almost seven in ten Hindus approve of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's performance, while just one in five Muslims feel the same.[34] However, without longitudinal data, it is unclear to what extent the religious divide reflects the specificities of the current context—in which Muslims in India feel especially marginalized and discriminated against—or is instead a product of longer-term trends.

Self-Identification

The variation in respondents' feelings of "Indian-ness" begs the question of how Indian Americans navigate multiple identities linked both to their country of origin as well as their country of settlement.

The IAAS asks respondents how they self-identify; after all, identities are liminal and individuals might identify with any number of identity categories. To probe this issue, the survey provides respondents with eight identity categories and asks them which of the following best describes their background. The results are displayed in figure 11.

FIGURE 11
Varieties of Self-Identification

Which of the following would you say best describes your background?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Interestingly, while three-fourths of respondents identify with an "Indian" nomenclature, this masks exactly how that term is used. Only 43 percent of IAAS respondents believe that "Indian American" is the term that best captures their

background. One-quarter of all respondents self-identify as "Indian" while 7 percent choose the term "Asian Indian."

Ten percent of IAAS respondents identify as "South Asian American," a term which refers to diaspora populations from countries across the region such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Six percent choose no hyphenation at all and identify only as "American" and another 6 percent classify themselves as "Asian American," an identity category that includes a wide range of diaspora groups from the Asian continent. Two percent of respondents identify as "Other," indicating that none of the declared options satisfy them, while just 1 percent identify as "Non-resident Indian," the official appellation used by the Government of India to refer to Indian passport holders living outside of India.

As one might expect, first-generation (foreign-born) and second-generation (U.S.-born) respondents approach this question differently (see figure 12). Indian Americans who are born in the United States are more likely to identify as Indian American (48 to 40 percent) and markedly less likely to identify as Indian (just 11 percent compared to 33 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans). Conversely, second-generation Indian Americans born in the United States are more likely to embrace the terms South Asian American, Asian American, and the nonhyphenated American.

FIGURE 12

Varieties of Self-Identification, by Place of Birth

Which of the following would you say best describes your background?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Self-identification also varies by religion. While 86 percent of Hindus report identifying with some kind of "Indian" identity, 71 percent of Christians and 52 percent of Muslims do the same. Relative to Muslims, Christians and Hindus are equally likely to self-identify as "Indian American" (47 percent each versus 32 percent for Muslims), and Hindus are substantially more likely to self-identify as "Indian" (32 percent versus 17 percent for Christians and 12 percent for Muslims). On the other hand, Muslims are much more likely to self-identify as "South Asian" (27 percent compared to 7 percent of Christians and 5 percent of Hindus). Finally, Christians are more likely to self-identify as "American" without any hyphenation (9 percent versus 6 percent for Muslim and 4 percent for Hindus).

The length of one's stay in the United States also plays an important role in shaping self-identification. Just 24 percent of Indian Americans who have lived in the United States between one and ten years identify as Indian American, compared to 41 percent of those who have been here for eleven to twenty-five years and 53 percent of those who have been here for more than twenty-five years. The reverse is true when it comes to identifying as "Indian": the majority of Indian Americans who have lived in the United States between one and ten years (54 percent) feel most comfortable with this term, while that share declines to just 21 percent for those here for more than twenty-five years.

Navigating Multiple Identities

Although "Indian American" is a contested category, the survey attempts to understand how respondents perceive the push and pull between different aspects of their identity. For instance, do respondents feel more Indian than American, more American than Indian, equally Indian and American, or neither Indian nor American?

According to the data, the modal response of Indian Americans is that they weigh the two sides of their identity equally: 45 percent feel equally Indian and American. Thirty-one percent state that they feel more American than Indian and 19 percent state the converse—that they feel more Indian than American. A very small proportion, just 5 percent, state that they feel neither Indian nor American.

Predictably, responses vary by place of birth (see figure 13). Indeed, a plurality (44 percent) of Indian Americans born in the United States say that they feel more American than Indian (compared to 23 percent of foreign-born respondents). At the other end of the spectrum, 24 percent of foreign-born respondents feel more Indian than American, a sentiment shared by just 11 percent of their U.S.-born counterparts.

Interestingly, those born outside of the United States are most likely to say that they feel equally Indian and American—nearly one in two fall into this category (as do 38 percent of U.S.-born Indian Americans).[35] A slightly higher share of U.S.-born Indian Americans (7 percent) than foreign-born Indian Americans (4 percent) claim that they feel neither Indian nor American.

FIGURE 13

Weighing Indian and American Identities, by Place of Birth

Which of the following best describes your identity?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Social Capital and Social Networks

This section reviews two aspects of the social context within which Indian Americans operate. The first part looks at three types of engagement: civic, political, and cultural. The second part examines the social networks of Indians in America and how they vary by respondents' demographic characteristics.

Civic Engagement

The survey asks respondents whether—in the past one year—they participated in any of four common methods of civic engagement: working with others in their community to solve a problem; performing voluntary community service without pay; attending a public meeting, such as for a school board or city council; or attending a protest march, demonstration, or rally. The most common activity is performing community service, something 20 percent of respondents engaged in, followed by working with others in their community (15 percent), attending a public meeting (13 percent), and attending a protest or demonstration (11 percent).

Figure 14 disaggregates the results by place of birth and citizenship status. Respondents are classified as belonging to one of three categories: U.S.-born citizen, foreign-born citizen, and non-citizen. U.S.-born citizens report the highest levels of civic engagement,

followed by foreign-born citizens and, in all categories save for one, non-citizens report the lowest levels of civic engagement.

FIGURE 14

Indian Americans' Civic Engagement, by Immigration Status

In the last twelve months, have you participated in any of the following activities?

N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

A much higher share of U.S.-born citizens report attending a protest (18 percent) than either foreign-born citizens (8 percent) or non-citizens (4 percent). Seventeen percent of U.S.-born citizens report attending a public meeting, while 12 percent of foreign-born citizens and 6 percent of non-citizens report doing so. Community service is the most popular form of civic engagement for Indian Americans of all types. Twenty-six percent of U.S.-born citizens report taking part in voluntary service compared to 18 percent of foreign-born citizens and 14 percent of non-citizens.

The one slight deviation in the overall pattern of civic engagement is found in the final category—working with others in your community to solve a problem. Once more, U.S.-born citizens lead the pack with 22 percent of them reporting participation in this activity. However, non-citizens are about as likely as foreign-born citizens to engage in the resolution of community issues (12 percent versus 11 percent).

Political Engagement

The survey also queries respondents about whether they participated, over the past twelve months, in any of five political activities: volunteering or working on a political campaign; posting comments online about politics; discussing politics with friends and family; contributing money to a candidate, party, or campaign organization; or contacting their elected representative or another government official.

Nearly one in two respondents (45 percent) report discussing politics in the past year—by far the most common activity. Twenty-one percent report posting comments about political issues online. Contributing financially to campaigns (14 percent), contacting an elected representative or government official (12 percent), and volunteering on a political campaign (9 percent) are less popular activities.[36]

As with civic engagement, U.S.-born citizens are the most engaged, followed by foreign-born citizens and non-citizens (see figure 15). This finding tracks with other studies of immigrant communities.[37]

FIGURE 15

Indian Americans' Political Engagement, by Immigration Status

In the last twelve months, have you participated in any of the following activities?

N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

When it comes to discussing politics with family and friends, there are only small differences across citizenship status. Forty-seven percent of U.S.-born citizens report

engaging in this activity, but 45 percent of foreign-born citizens and 41 percent of non-citizens did so as well. When it comes to online discussions of politics, 28 percent of U.S.-born citizens posted comments about political issues on an online forum, compared to 18 percent of foreign-born citizens and 14 percent of non-citizens.

On the matter of campaign finance, one-fifth of U.S.-born citizens report contributing to a political campaign, while just 13 percent of foreign citizens and 5 percent of non-citizens said they did so. The low rate of political giving for non-citizens is expected given that non-citizens are forbidden from making political donations unless they are permanent residents (that is, they possess a green card). Relatively few Indian Americans across the board report contacting an elected representative or other government official: 15 percent of U.S.-born citizens, 11 percent of foreign-born citizens, and 9 percent of non-citizens engaged in this class of activities. Finally, volunteering or working on a political campaign appears to be the least common form of political engagement. Unsurprisingly, just 4 percent of non-citizens participated in this activity, while 8 percent of foreign-born citizens and 14 percent of U.S.-born citizens reported working on a campaign.

It is worth pointing out that nearly one-third (32 percent) of respondents report not engaging in any of the civic or political activities listed on the survey. However, non-citizens and foreign-born citizens report nonparticipation at roughly twice the rate of U.S.-born citizens: 47 and 41 percent, respectively, compared to 22 percent of U.S.-born citizens.

Cultural Engagement

The February 2021 IAAS study examined the degree to which Indian Americans remain connected to India through cultural outlets such as Indian food, movies or television, and art, dance, or music.[38] This paper looks at one additional aspect of cultural engagement: participation in select holidays regularly celebrated in India.

The survey asks respondents whether they participate in a set of holidays, some associated with India and others that are either associated with the United States or are more global in nature. Interestingly, among IAAS respondents, Diwali emerges as the most celebrated holiday—63 percent of respondents report that they celebrate the Indian festival of lights (see figure 16). U.S. Independence Day (July 4) ranks second (57 percent), followed by Christmas (54 percent). Given the relatively small share of Christians in the Indian American community, this suggests that Christmas is celebrated more on cultural than religious grounds. Rounding out the list, 41 percent report celebrating Holi (the Indian festival of colors that traditionally marks the beginning of Spring), 39 percent celebrate Valentine's Day, 35 percent mark Indian Independence Day (August 15), and 20 percent commemorate Eid. Fewer than one in ten respondents (9 percent) do not participate in any of these seven holidays.

FIGURE 16
Celebration of Major Holidays

Do you participate in celebrations of any of the following?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Foreign-born Indian Americans are much more likely to commemorate Diwali, Holi, and Indian Independence Day than respondents born in the United States. The differences are especially stark for Diwali and Indian Independence Day, where the gap between the two groups is on the order of 20 percentage points. There is also important variation by one's religious identity. Diwali and Holi are largely celebrated by Hindus, while very few non-Muslims commemorate Eid. Interestingly, more than half of all Hindu respondents (56 percent) celebrate Christmas compared to just one in five Muslim respondents.

Social Networks

This section reviews some basic characteristics of the social networks of Indian Americans. The objective of this inquiry is to assess to what extent Indian Americans associate with other Indian Americans relative to those from outside the community.

Social Circles

The IAAS asks respondents, "Which of the following best describes your personal group of friends?" Respondents choose from a list of five possible responses (not counting

"don't know"): that all, most, some, very few, or none of their friends are of Indian origin.

The modal response—selected by 38 percent of respondents—is that some of their friends are of Indian origin. Thirty-six percent report that either all or most of their friends are of Indian origin, while 21 percent report that very few or none of their friends are of Indian origin. Five percent responded "don't know." Overall, the distribution is skewed in favor of a social network populated with relatively more people of Indian origin.

Of course, the composition of one's social networks is likely to be affected by their location. As the number and/or concentration of Indian Americans in a geography increases, one might expect that respondents' social networks might become more insular. For instance, the social networks of an Indian American in Wyoming (where there are very few Indian Americans) will likely be dominated by non-Indian Americans. But in New Jersey, where there is a significant concentration of Indian Americans, Indian Americans are more likely to associate with their own.

Indeed, the survey finds that in counties with more Indian American households, respondents are significantly more likely to say their social networks are dominated by fellow Indian Americans (see figure 17).[39] This effect appears to be roughly linear, although there is a steep rise once more than 5 percent of households in a county are Indian American.

As one might expect, the composition of respondents' social networks varies by their birthplace. As figure 18 shows, 43 percent of foreign-born Indian Americans have a social network dominated by Indian-origin friends, compared to 25 percent of respondents born in the United States (adding up the shares of those who say all or most of their friends are of Indian origin). U.S.-born Indian Americans, however, are more likely to report a social network with a limited number of Indians (stating very few or none of their friends are of Indian origin) or to take the middle ground—42 percent of them report that some of their friends are Indian origin, compared to 35 percent of foreign-born respondents.[40]

FIGURE 17

Composition of Social Networks, by Respondent Location

Respondents reporting that most or all of their friends are of Indian origin



N = 928 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample excludes respondents who skipped the question(s), those who did not indicate having any Indian friends, and those for whom county-level demographic data could not be ascertained.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

FIGURE 18

Composition of Social Networks, by Place of Birth

Which of the following best describes your personal group of friends?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Figure excludes respondents who selected "Don't know."

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Diversity in Indian American Networks

Homophily—the tendency of individuals to associate with people similar to themselves—is a strong determinant of social networks.[41] But which dimension—religion, region of origin, or caste—drives one's associations? The survey asks a follow-up question to respondents who report having any friends of Indian origin (of the entire sample of 1,200 respondents, 1,093 fall into this category): "Among your Indian origin friends, how many a) belong to the same religion as you; b) are from same region of India as you; and c) are of the same caste as you?" The purpose of this question is to investigate whether Indian-origin social networks are internally homogenous or heterogeneous.

Figure 19 displays the responses to this question, collapsing five response categories into three for ease of exposition. It appears that respondents' social networks are more homogenous in terms of religion than either region or caste. Forty-eight percent of respondents report that most or all of their Indian friends share their religious faith, while another 36 percent report that some of their friends are coreligionists. Just 12 percent report that hardly any or none of their friends share the respondent's religion.

In contrast, there is more variation on the dimensions of region and caste. Twenty-nine percent of respondents report that most or all of their friends are from the same region of India. Forty-three percent report that some are, while 23 percent say that hardly any or none are. The pattern is similar when it comes to caste, although nearly one-quarter of respondents claim they do not know what share of their friends belong to their caste group, suggesting that caste is a less salient category for a significant segment of IAAS respondents.

Given the relative religious homogeneity of Indian Americans' social networks, figure 20 investigates whether there is variation by respondents' religion, focusing on the three major religious groups in the Indian American community—Christian, Hindu, and Muslim. Several interesting patterns emerge from this breakdown.

First, Hindus are more likely to report that most or all of their Indian friends are also Hindus, underscoring a greater degree of religious homogeneity in their social networks. Fifty-eight percent of Hindus respond in this way, while 48 and 46 percent of Muslims and Christians, respectively, report that their networks are comprised of those of the same religion. Second, around one-third of Christians and Hindus and two-fifths of Muslims are situated in the middle, reporting that some of their Indian American networks are made up of friends of the same religion. Third, Christians are much more likely to report that hardly any or none of their Indian friends share their religion. Nearly one in five (19 percent) identify this way, compared to 10 percent of Muslims and only 6 percent of Hindus.

The smaller the size of a given group, the fewer opportunities individuals have of meeting someone from their same group. Conversely, the larger the size of a group, the greater the likelihood of meeting someone from that group. Given that there are many more Indian Americans who are Hindu in the IAAS sample—and the fact that nearly half of Christians and Muslims report that all or most of their friends share their

religion—this means that both Christians and Muslims have substantially more religious homophily, relative to Hindus.

FIGURE 19

Composition of Social Networks: Religion, Region of Origin, and Caste

Amongst your Indian friends, how many are...



N = 1,088–1,091 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample size varies by question. Sample excludes respondents who skipped the question(s) and those who did not indicate having any Indian friends.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

FIGURE 20

Religious Composition of Social Networks, by Religious Identity

Amongst your Indian friends, how many are of the same religion as you?



N = 1,091 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample excludes respondents who skipped the question(s) and those who did not indicate having any Indian friends. Figure excludes respondents who selected "Don't know."

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Figure 21 looks more closely at the caste composition of social networks among Hindus. Seventy-four percent of Hindu respondents who report *not* identifying with a caste nevertheless know enough to be able to identify the caste identities of their social networks. Only 26 percent of Hindus who do not identify with a caste respond to questions about the caste composition of their social networks by answering "don't know." This indicates that even though a large proportion of Hindu respondents say they do not identify with a caste, only a small fraction is unaware of the caste composition of their networks.

What is also striking is how relatively small the differences are between respondents who identify with a caste versus those who do not. While the former report that a slightly higher share of their social network comprises people of the same caste, if one sets aside the "don't know" responses, the relative differences between caste identifiers and non-identifiers is marginal. For instance, 27 percent of Hindu respondents who identify with a caste report that all or most of their Indian friends share their caste affiliation. Nineteen percent of those who do not identify with a caste group answer similarly. Respondents who acknowledge a caste identity are only slightly more likely to report that some of their social network is made up of people of the same caste (41 percent versus 33 percent for those without a caste identity).

FIGURE 21

Caste Composition of Social Networks, by Caste Identification

Among your Indian friends, how many are from the same caste as you?



N = 600 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample excludes non–Hindus, respondents who skipped the question(s), and those who did not indicate having any Indian friends.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Social Distance

The previous section demonstrated that, for many Indian Americans, shared religious affiliation is the most important characteristic of respondents' social networks. This could be the result of circumstance and context, or it could be the product of social distance—the relative distance that one feels toward members of an out-group (religious, ethnic, partisan, and so on) relative to members of one's own in-group.

Questions that measure social distance are often used to understand the salience of group identity and perceptions of group hierarchy, and as a basis of prediction of inter-group prejudice. The IAAS draws on a series of questions adapted from the political science literature in order to measure inter-group social distance in the Indian American community.[42] Namely, the survey explores how Indian Americans feel about having close interactions with out-group members along two prominent cleavages: those who are of a different religion, or who carry a different partisan affiliation. The examination of partisanship, in turn, further distinguishes between partisan support in India and in the United States.[43]

Religion

To measure interreligious social distance, the survey asks respondents how comfortable they would be having close friends that are Hindu or Muslim. Respondents can select from one of three responses: very comfortable, somewhat comfortable, or not comfortable. The results are shown in figure 22.

FIGURE 22
Attitudes Toward Religious Groups

How comfortable are...



N = 931 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample excludes respondents who skipped the question and those who did not indicate having any Indian friends. Figure excludes respondents who belong to other religious faiths or do not identify with any religion.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

As one might expect, both Hindus and Muslims are overwhelmingly comfortable having close friends who share their faith: 97 percent of Hindu respondents' report being very or somewhat comfortable having close Hindu friends, and 96 percent of Muslims report the same.

However, Hindus and Muslims exhibit less comfort when it comes to having close friends of the opposite faith. Overall, 89 percent of Hindus and Muslims apiece report they are very or somewhat comfortable having friends of the other faith. However, the major distinction has to do with the intensity of this feeling, exemplified by the sharp difference in the share of respondents who report being very comfortable with friends of the opposite faith: 52 percent of Hindus are very comfortable having close Muslim friends, while 46 percent of Muslims are very comfortable having close Hindu friends. There are, consequently, a large share of respondents who are only somewhat comfortable having close friends of the opposite faith. Christians, whose views are represented in the bottom two horizontal bars of figure 22, hold roughly similar attitudes toward both Hindus and Muslims.

Partisan Support in the United States

Given the degree of partisan polarization present in U.S. politics, the survey examines how much this polarization is present within the Indian American community as well. The October 2020 IAAS study found that Indian Americans who identify as Democrats rate the Republican Party and former president Donald Trump very unfavorably. Republicans, for their part, view the Democrats, current President Joe Biden, and Vice President Kamala Harris in equally unfavorable terms. However, whereas the earlier data looked at political leaders and organizations, this section reviews interpersonal attitudes. The data described below unambiguously reveal a high degree of polarization, although its structure is asymmetric.

The key takeaway is that Republicans are more comfortable having close friends who are Democrats than the converse (see figure 23). Fifty-four percent of Republicans say they are very comfortable having Democratic friends. Thirty-six percent say they are somewhat comfortable and 10 percent say they are not comfortable at all.

FIGURE 23
Attitudes Toward American Political Parties



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Democrats, however, are more strident in their views toward individuals from the other party. Just 27 percent say they are very comfortable having Republican friends—half the number of Republicans who feel that way toward Democrats. Fifty-one percent of Democrats say they are somewhat comfortable with Republican friends and 22 percent say they are not comfortable (more than twice the number of Republicans who felt that way about Democrats). The survey's findings are notable in this regard because previous research on polarization among the American general public has generally found that Republicans, not Democrats, possess greater antipathy toward members of the other party.

Indian Americans who have no allegiance to either major party hold slightly asymmetric views as well. They are more likely to say they are very comfortable having Democratic than Republican friends, and three times as many say they would not be comfortable having close Republican friends than close Democratic friends.

Partisan Support in India

The February 2021 IAAS study found several indications that polarization in India had successfully metastasized in the Indian American community in the United States. Religious differences, in particular, have emerged as a salient divide both in India and among members of the diaspora. This paper explores a different cleavage—partisan affiliation in India—by examining how Indian Americans who favor the Congress or the BJP view supporters of the other party.

As with political parties in the American context, there is a certain degree of asymmetric polarization as far as supporters of the Congress and the BJP are concerned, although both groups are generally more hostile toward supporters of the opposing Indian party than is true in the analogous case of Republicans and Democrats (see figure 24).

Thirty percent of Congress supporters are not comfortable having close friends who support the BJP; this is double the share of BJP supporters who are uncomfortable having close friends who are Congress supporters. Thirty-seven percent of Congress supporters are somewhat comfortable having friends who support the BJP (identical to the share of BJP supporters who are somewhat comfortable having Congress friends), but just 23 percent say they are very comfortable having BJP supporters as friends (for BJP supporters, the analogous share is 35 percent).

Respondents who support neither the BJP nor the Congress—listed as "Other"—appear more favorably inclined toward the Congress. Nineteen percent of them are not comfortable having close friends associated with the BJP. Just 9 percent of them hold the same views vis-à-vis the Congress. This too mirrors the American political context, where supporters of smaller parties or those who are unaffiliated hold more favorable views toward Democrats.[46]

FIGURE 24

Attitudes Toward Indian Political Parties

How comfortable are...



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Figure excludes those who selected "Don't know."

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

These findings raise two questions worthy of further exploration: Why does political polarization among Indian Americans differ from that characterizing Americans at large? And to what extent are these differences being driven by political polarization in the country of origin (in this case, India)? Immigrants often import social norms from their home countries to their newly adopted homes. However, their political views in the latter might also be influenced by politics in their country of origin. These views, in turn, are further affected both by selection effects (who emigrates) and political dynamics in the country of settlement.

Discrimination

This section reviews respondents' views on discrimination against Indian Americans. It explores this contentious subject in three ways. First, the survey asks respondents to consider how discrimination against Indian Americans compares to discrimination directed toward other minority communities in the United States. Second, the survey asks respondents about their own lived experience with discrimination. Finally, the survey examines the identity of the person(s) responsible for engaging in discriminatory behavior.

Perceptions of Discrimination

In the last few years, there has been much greater recognition of the discrimination faced by minority groups in the United States. For instance, a March 2020 Pew survey found that 79 percent of Americans agree that there is a lot or some discrimination against African Americans. Seventy-six percent believe there is a similar degree of discrimination against Hispanic people, while 71 percent say the same about discrimination against people of Asian origin.[47]

The IAAS survey first asks respondents if they think discrimination against people of Indian origin is a major problem. Thirty-one percent respond that it is a major problem, 53 percent believe it is a minor problem, and a small minority (17 percent) believe it is not a problem at all.

One way to understand the dynamics of discrimination at play is to place discrimination against Indian Americans in a comparative context. The survey asks respondents whether they believe other minorities experience a greater degree of discrimination relative to Indian Americans (see figure 25).

FIGURE 25

Perceptions of Relative Discrimination

In your opinion, which of the following groups are discriminated against more than Indian Americans in the United States?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

A narrow majority—52 percent—of respondents believe that people in the United States discriminate *more* against all of the other minority groups listed than they do against Indian Americans. That means just less than half of all respondents believe that Indian Americans face a *greater* degree of discrimination than at least one other minority

group. Seventy-three percent of respondents believe that Asian Americans who are not of Indian origin face more discrimination than Indian Americans. Much larger shares believe that other minority groups face greater discrimination than Indian Americans, including Latino Americans (90 percent), LGBTQ Americans (89 percent), African Americans (86 percent), and women (86 percent).

Experience With Discrimination

In addition, the survey asks respondents whether, in the last twelve months, they have personally felt discriminated against. To broaden the aperture, the survey asks about discrimination along several dimensions beyond country of origin: skin color, gender, religion, and caste.

The data in figure 26 show that one in two Indian Americans reports being subject to some form of discrimination in the past year. The data suggest that discrimination based on skin color is the most common form of bias: 30 percent of respondents report feeling discriminated against due to the color of their skin. An equal percentage of respondents—18 percent apiece—report that they have been discriminated against due to their gender or religion.

Muslims report the greatest degree of religious discrimination by far (39 percent), followed by Hindus (18 percent), Christians (15 percent), and believers of other faiths (9 percent). Sixteen percent of Indian Americans report being discriminated against by virtue of their Indian heritage. And, finally, 5 percent of all respondents report having encountered discrimination due to their caste identity.

FIGURE 26
Experience with Discrimination

In the last 12 months, have you personally felt discriminated against because of any of the following reasons?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

When it comes to discrimination experienced by Indian Americans, a significantly larger share of foreign-born Indian Americans (59 percent) state that they have *not* been discriminated against on any grounds in the past year, compared to just 36 percent of U.S.-born Indian Americans (see figure 27).

Both U.S.- and foreign-born Indian Americans report significant discrimination based on skin color—35 percent and 27 percent, respectively. Interestingly, respondents born in the United States report twice as much discrimination along gender and religious lines than those born outside of the United States. Reported discrimination based on country of origin and caste is roughly similar for both groups (around 15–16 and 5–6 percent, respectively). The heightened levels of discrimination that U.S.-born respondents report compared to immigrants hold true across categories—whether skin color, gender, religion, or even caste. Although the latter difference in perceptions of caste discrimination is tiny, it is nonetheless interesting given the lower degree of caste consciousness among U.S.-born Indian Americans.

One might expect that foreign-born respondents might face greater discrimination given that they are more likely to bear obvious markers that tie them to India (such as accents or dress). However, the results point in the opposite direction. There are a host of plausible reasons why U.S.-born Indian Americans might report greater discrimination, including differences in social norms, greater awareness of discriminatory practices, or less fear of retaliation.[48]

FIGURE 27

Experience with Discrimination, by Place of Birth

In the last 12 months, have you personally felt discriminated against because of any of the following reasons?



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

Discrimination by Whom?

If half of all Indian Americans report some form discrimination, this begs the question: Who is discriminating against them? For respondents who experienced discrimination, the survey asks whether the perpetrators of discrimination were Indian, non-Indian, or both (see figure 28).

FIGURE 28
Sources of Discrimination

Who discriminated against you on the basis of your...



N = 68-372 adult U.S. residents

NOTE: Sample size varies by question. Sample excludes respondents who did not report experiencing a given form of discrimination.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

A few findings merit attention. First, respondents overwhelmingly blame non-Indians when it comes to discrimination on the basis of country of origin or skin color. In both instances, roughly three-quarters of perpetrators were identified as non-Indians. In about one-fifth of instances, both Indians and non-Indians were perceived to be jointly responsible.

Second, while respondents suggest Indians hold somewhat greater responsibility for engaging in discriminatory practices along religion and gender lines, here too they point mainly to non-Indians or a combination of Indians and non-Indians as primary sources of discrimination.

Third, caste discrimination is a surprisingly equal opportunity offense. Responses are divided neatly into thirds when it comes to who is doing the discriminating: Indians, non-Indians, and people of both categories are almost equally to blame.[49]

How might non-Indians discriminate against Indians on the basis of caste if caste is not a salient category for them? This is a genuine puzzle. One possibility is that the person

or persons engaged in caste discrimination could be from another South Asian country, where caste might be a meaningful marker of status and hold greater salience.[50] Another possibility is that respondents interpret caste discrimination as a stand-in for other forms of discrimination—on the basis of skin color or country of origin, for example. Given that only 5 percent of IAAS respondents report being victims of caste discrimination, any subgroup analysis must be interpreted with due care given the small sample sizes involved.

Indian American Community

This final section examines how respondents relate to the Indian American community. It focuses on three issues: membership in Indian American organizations, divisions within the Indian American community (and the drivers of those divisions), and the role the Indian American community plays in U.S.-India relations.

Membership in Indian American Organizations

The survey asks respondents if they are a member of any Indian American organization or group, such as a cultural, regional, religious, caste, community, or school-based organization. Overall, one-third of respondents report membership in an Indian American organization. While this does not necessarily mean that two-thirds of Indian Americans are disconnected from their community, it does suggest that formal participation is somewhat limited. Forty percent of respondents born in the United States report being a member of an Indian American organization, compared to 29 percent of those born elsewhere.

Divisions Within the Indian American Community

The survey further asks respondents to assess whether they believe that domestic politics in India might be creating or exacerbating divisions within the Indian American community. Responses are very divided. Twenty-eight percent respond in the affirmative—that political divisions in India are infecting dynamics within the Indian community in the United States. But this remains a minority view: 40 percent of Indian Americans do not believe that domestic politics are dividing the Indian diaspora in the United States. Fully one-third of respondents—a large proportion—do not express an opinion either way.

For the 28 percent of respondents who perceive that polarization in India is impacting the diaspora community, the survey asks what specific features of India's domestic politics are responsible (see figure 29). (Respondents can select multiple choices from a preselected menu of options, so the percentages in the figure do not add up to 100.)

As the figure demonstrates, religion leads the way—59 percent of Indian Americans believe it is responsible for creating internal divisions in the community. But religion only narrowly edges out the role of India's political leadership (56 percent) for the top spot, and political parties (47 percent) are not far behind. Rounding out the list are

caste (35 percent), economic policy (29 percent), and language (24 percent). One percent of respondents point to some other factor.

FIGURE 29

Drivers of Division in the Indian American Community

What features of India's domestic politics are most responsible for creating divisions in the Indian American community?



N = 344 U.S. adult residents

NOTE: Sample includes only respondents who indicated that domestic politics in India are dividing the Indian American community.

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

To a certain extent, however, many of these factors are inseparable. For instance, for Indian Americans who skeptically view the rise of Hindu majoritarianism in India, it is unclear how they might apportion blame given that religion, leadership, and political parties are all deeply intertwined, especially in the current political scenario. Although Indian Americans born in the United States assess India's present trajectory more critically than those born outside of the United States—a finding the February 2021 IAAS study established [51]—the latter are somewhat more likely to blame religion (62 percent versus 55 percent) as well as political leadership (61 percent versus 48 percent).

Role of the Indian American Community

Where does this leave the Indian American community and its role in promoting U.S.-India relations? After all, for more than two decades, the Indian diaspora in the United States has been a critical bridge-builder between the two countries.[52] But with divisions in the community more apparent and increasingly linked to political disputes in India, we have suggested elsewhere that the diaspora's unity of purpose could suffer a setback.[53]

As a final step, the survey asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: "Overall, the Indian American community has a positive impact on U.S.-India relations." As of now, the community is quite bullish about the diaspora's achievements in this regard. Seventy percent state that they strongly or somewhat agree with the statement. A very small minority, around 10 percent, strongly or somewhat disagrees. Around 21 percent express no opinion either way. This suggests that the evidence of polarization, while real, should not be overinterpreted either.

Conclusion

More than half a century after the passage of the historic 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed for a new wave of Indian migration to the United States, the Indian American community has come of age. Its rapidly growing size, economic success, and growing political visibility have given it greater salience in American life. In many ways, the community is often portrayed as the poster child of America's historic opening to new immigrants who—in ways big and small—have transformed the country.

But that same visibility also invites greater scrutiny, shedding light on tensions within the community. This paper argues that while there is much that binds the community, there are also nascent signs that these common bonds are being tested as religious cleavages, generational divides, and political polarization invite fragmentation. In that sense, the currents coursing their way through the Indian diaspora are perhaps reflective not only of broader developments in American society but also—and perhaps even to a greater extent—the turbulence afflicting India.

At the time of writing, India is reeling under a devastating resurgence of the coronavirus. Members of the Indian American community—both individually and collectively—are mobilizing in response. Motivated by their emotional ties to India, as well as their rights and responsibilities as American citizens, Indian Americans have pushed the U.S. government to mount a large-scale humanitarian response.[54]

For Indian Americans, the past is not just a distant country. On the contrary, India continues to exist in the present as it influences the lives of the diaspora—even as its members chart a new path in their adopted home.

This study is the third in a series on the social, political, and foreign policy attitudes of Indian Americans. Click *here for the second part of this series*, an examination of how Indian Americans view Indian politics, and click *here for the first part of the series*, which explores how Indian Americans view U.S. politics.

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Note:

To read the complete paper [with references, etc.,], kindly visit the cited Web Page:

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https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states-2021

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https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/small-indian-american-community-making-grand-contributions-in-the-us-report/article68294238.ece

03] How small Indian-American community is employing millions in US

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https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/indian-american-diaspora-and-politics-in-india-and-the-us/

05] Social Realities of Indian Americans: Results From the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey

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Indian Diaspora in Africa

Historical Roots and Current Strength

PUBLICATIONS

The Global Research Forum on Diaspora and Transnationalism (GRFDT) is a consortium of researchers and policymakers drawn from national and international universities, institutes, and organisations.

Author

By **Dr. Rajneesh Kumar Gupta**,
Assistant Professor
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https://grfdt.com/PublicationDetails.aspx?Type=Articles&TabId=1033

India has more than three thousand years' history of cultural and commercial relations with Africa. Commercial relations have a longer history than cultural contacts. Indian sources indicate that there were contacts and trade relations between Dravidians and Babylonians as early as the seventh century B.C. On their way to Mesopotamia the Indian merchants and sailors would have certainly visited Southern Arabia, which is situated on the maritime route and most probably the Eastern part of Horn of Africa- the Somali peninsula. Freya Stark writes that a flourishing maritime trade existed between India and Southern Arabia before the fourteenth century B.C. (Richard: 1954, 28-30). Indian contacts in ancient period were more visible in Eastern and Southern coast of Africa and ancient Indian epics like 'Vedas' and 'Shrimad Bhagwat Geeta', provide valuable information regarding contacts between the two regions. Daniel D.C. Don Nanjira rightly says "If we consider all early invaders of East Africa to have been foreign visitors or traders, then Indians (Hindus) were definitely among the invaders whose connections with the East African coast go back many centuries before Christ" (1976, 3).

However, in modern history major gesticulates of migration are closely related to the colonialism. During the *Raj*, Indians were taken over as indentured labourers to far-flung parts of the Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a circumstance to which the modern Indian Diaspora of Africa, Caribbean and other places attest in their own peculiar ways. In this period Indians went broadly under three different capacities- (i) the indentured worker in sugar colonies of Caribbean, Oceania and Africa, (ii) Under *Kangani / maistry* system to Malaysia and Ceylone, and (iii) free or passenger Indians primarily in East Africa (Dubey: 2010, 1-2). It has been estimated that during 1829-1924 about 769,437 Indians migrated to Mauritius, South Africa, Reunion, Seychelles and East African region (Kadekar: 2005, 36). Later period of colonial era also witnessed increased frequencies of free emigration as traders, skilled artisans, bankers, petty contractors, clerks, professionals and entrepreneurs.

In independent India, following the oil boom of the mid-1970s, the Middle East has witnessed a massive induction of the Indian workers. Though in the era of liberalization, privatization and globalization, United State of America, Canada and West European countries have become favorite destination for highly skilled Indian immigrants, prevailing opportunities in Africa still attracts significant number of Indian migrants. Majority of new immigrants go there on temporary work permit and do not seek permanent citizenship. After working there for some time, they explore opportunity in Western countries, and as soon as they get chance they emigrate from these countries. In late 1990s, this trend increased many folds and number of illegal migrants also took advantage of this. Some years back '*The Analyst*' (a Kenyan magazine) reported, 'While official figures show that only 1918 (731, 703 and 484, respectively) work permits were issued between 1995 and 1997, unconfirmed reports state that between 30,000 and 40,000 immigrant workers from the Asian sub-continent have entered Kenya in the last four years' (1999, 9). Term Asian refers here to Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi and even Sri Lankan but majority among them are Indian. Survey conducted by the author in Kenya during June-July 2007 with a sample size of 100 participants also indicates that Indian immigration to Africa is still ongoing.

Similarly, official records of the Government of India also note increasing presence of Indian communities in the African continent. Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora released in the 2001 estimated total number of Indian Diaspora in Africa 2,063,178 which includes 1,969,708 People of Indian Origins (PIO's), 89,405 Non Resident Indians (NRI's) and 3,500 stateless people. They were spread in 34 countries located in various regions of the continent (2001, xlvii). Latest available estimates on overseas Indians indicate that current Diasporic strength of India in Africa is 2,696,956 out of those 2,508,503 are PIOs and rest 155,897 are NRIs. Currently, Indian Diaspora resides in 46 countries of Africa covering all linguistic, cultural or geographical regions of Africa (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2010). Indian Diaspora in Africa constitutes 12.48 per cent of the total Diasporic strength of India. It would be interesting to note that among Indian Diaspora in Africa more than 93 per cent are PIO's and they constitute 21.13 per cent of the global strength of PIO's.

With regard to population of Indian Diaspora in individual countries of Africa, we see substantial variation. Whereas, in Mauritius Indian Diaspora constitutes 70 per cent in total population; in Republic of Sao Tome and Principe this strength is merely 3. To analyze current strength of Indian Diaspora in Africa, broadly speaking we can classify them in four categories- (1) dominant strength (2) substantial strength (3) marginal strength, and (4) minimal strength.

Dominant strength Mauritius is the only country not only in Africa but in entire globe which should be included in this category. High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora

regarded Indian Diaspora in Mauritius unique and distinctive as here Indian Diaspora constitutes an overwhelming majority- nearly 70 per cent of the total population and they were among first permanent settlers in the island (2001, 49). They are playing vital role in the political process of the country and holding important elected posts and in current parliament of Mauritius there are 36 members of Indian origin; although, unlike other parts of the world they are not economically affluent community. Indians in Mauritius are not a monolithic homogenous community. There are divisions on the basis of religion, caste, place of origin, language etc. Each of them has beautifully preserved their cultural identity. There are associations and organizations associated to their culture/language. Every township of Mauritius is graced with temple, *gurdwara*, mosque and various community halls. Famous '*Ganga Talab'* is said to be purified by water of holy river *Ganga* and being considered as pilgrimage for Hindu's in Mauritius. Due to cultural resemblance Mauritius is often regarded as little India away from geographical territory of India.

Substantial strength South Africa and Reunion Island can be included in this category. In South Africa total strength of Indian Diaspora is 1,218,000 and they constitute almost 3 per cent of the total population of South Africa. They are concentrated in the major industrial centres of South Africa and around 75 per cent of the Indian community lives in Kwazulu Natal. Durban, the capital of this province accounts for a considerable part of largely urbanized Indian population of this country (Report of High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora: 2001, 84). This concentration makes them politically influential in this area which is incidentally among highly industrialized and prosperous regions of South Africa. Similarly, in Reunion Island total strength of Indian Diaspora is 275,200 and they constitute almost 30 per cent of the total population.

Marginal strength In this category countries which having population of Indian Diaspora between 100,000 to 10,000 could be included. By this criteria Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe comes under this category. In these countries, strength of Indian Diaspora in terms of total population of host country is very small and in scattered in various regions. Therefore, they don't make influential political constituency and there is very less chance of obtaining political offices on the basis of ethnic identity. But incidentally, Indian Diaspora in these countries are economically well off and culturally keen to retain identity. Some of leading journalist, prominent academician and lawyers, who shape public opinion in these countries, belong to Indian communities.

Minimal strength Fourth category includes countries where strength of Indian Diasporic community is less than 10000 people. There are some 33 African countries which fall under this category. As they are spread in different geographical location of their host-land and do not make any single constituency. Moreover, in number of cases they are temporary resident working in projects and still hold Indian Passport. Therefore,

in political terms their presence is insignificance and in most of the cases they are not able to obtain political offices in their host-land. Malawi could be only exception, where Indian community has been actively engaged in the politics. There has been representation of Indian communities in parliament and government. Currently, Mr. Mohammed Sidik Mia is serving as a Deputy Minister for Irrigation and Water Development of Malawi. Institute for Policy Interaction, most influential NGO of Malawi, working on issues of governance is headed by PIO. But this kind of success is not seen in any other country of Africa with such a small number of Indian communities.

Conclusion



Indians have been visiting African continent since ages. Despite of age-old linkages, modern settlement of Indians in Africa is certainly linked with the colonial exploration of the continent. In the colonial period migration occurred in both ways- by force as well as by choice. Further, a large-scale migration occurred in the post independent period. Today, Indian Diaspora in Africa constitutes 12.48 per cent of the total Diasporic strength of India and they reside in 46 countries of Africa covering all linguistic, cultural or geographical regions of the continent. These people went with limited resources and physical and climatic conditions of the region were usually very difficult. However, all those hardships were proven gnome with the courage, hard work and dedication of Indian Diaspora.

Table : Indian Diaspora in Africa: County-wise Strength

S. No.	Country	Indians Diaspora	NRI	PIO
1	Algeria	450	447	3
2	Angola	6000	6000	0
3	Botswana	11000	9000	2000
4	Burkina Faso	100	100	0
5	Burundi	250	200	50
6	Cape Verde Islands	12	12	0
7	Comoros	300	50	250
8	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	4000	3600	400
9	Djibouti	350	350	0
10	Egypt	3600	3450	150
11	Equatorial Guinea	100	100	0
12	Eritrea	500	0	500
13	Ethiopia	994	992	2
14	Gambia	333	329	4

15	Ghana	10000	10000	0
16	Guinea (Republic of)	550	550	0
17	Guinea Bissau	31	31	0
18	Ivory Coast	500	500	0
19	Kenya	75000	37500	37500
20	Lesotho (Kingdom of)	1200	800	400
21	Liberia	1501	1500	1
22	Libya	15000	14995	5
23	Madagascar	23000	3000	20000
24	Malawi	7000	1500	5500
25	Mali	201	200	1
26	Mauritania	30	30	0
27	Mauritius	882220	15000	867220
28	Morocco	300	300	0
29	Mozambique	21500	1500	20000
30	Namibia	160	140	20
31	Niger	60	60	0
32	Nigeria	30000	0	30000
33	Reunion Island (France)	275200	200	275000
34	Rwanda	1040	1000	40
35	Sao Tome and Principe (Republic of)	4	4	0
36	Senegal	440	412	28
37	Seychelles 8500 4000 4500	8500	4000	4500
38	Sierra Leone 710 700 10	710	700	10
39	South Africa	1218000	18000	1200000
40	Sudan	3599	3500	99
41	Swaziland	700	200	500
42	Tanzania	54700	5300	49400
43	Togo	510	500	10
44	Uganda	20000	15000	5000
45	Zambia	20500	12500	8000
46	Zimbabwe	10500	500	10000
Total		**2710645**	**174052**	**2536593**

Source: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India (2012)

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DIPLOMACY & BEYOND PLUS
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Indian Diaspora in Africa

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https://diplomacybeyond.com/indian-diaspora-in-africa/

Geographically, India is connected with the African continent, therefore our cultural ties to the continent run deep. Relationships between India and Africa, especially in trade, can be traced back to the Ethiopian Aksumite Empire (100–940 AD). There were several reasons for these trade relationships and despite their geographical separation, these nations' economies and social requirements were similar. Also, the coast of the Horn of Africa was an important trading route between India, Egypt, and the Roman Empire and the periodic changes in the Indian monsoon made it easier for trade to occur. The western coast of India was the focal point of trade interactions and Indian merchants remained in majority of foreign businessmen in Ethiopia during most of the 19th century, and the Indian rupee was used as the official currency in various sections of Ethiopia. There are many reasons for Indian migration towards Africa at different times and purposes. For example, the Indian Diaspora during the colonial period in Africa was primarily indentured labourers brought by the British and French for construction work in East Africa for sugar plantations. Nevertheless, migration always carries socio-cultural heritage and protects their distinct identities.

The waves of Indian Diaspora in Africa can be broadly divided into four parts; Pre-colonial migration of Persons of Indian Origin towards Africa, during colonial time, Postcolonial time, and the present context. In pre-colonial times, Indian coastal communities developed good ties with East Africa, East Asia, and Central Asia. The 'trade Diaspora' was distinguished as it consisted mainly of 'temporary' and 'circular' migration. They were sent to look for trade elsewhere but expected to return to their motherland eventually. International trade allowed people from different cultures to learn about and appreciate one another. Many South Asian merchants began migrating outside Asia in the eighteenth

century. The second phase of migration; into Africa by Indians came due to colonization. Significant clusters of Indians were taken as indentured labourers across the colonial empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is important to note that some Indians emigrated to serve colonial administrations abroad in the capacities of clerks and instructors, expanding the reach of colonial power. About 769,427 Indians are estimated to have emigrated to Mauritius, South Africa, Seychelles, and the East African area between 1829 and 1924. After numerous African nations became independent in the 1960s, many Indians in the professional classes served in Africa in countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria as instructors in schools and universities, railways, mines and hospitals. Such persons were not settlers but were seeking to put their skills toward creating personal financial security. Others saw opportunities in the African marketplace for entrepreneurism and acquired rapid fortunes in import trading.

In South Africa, where the number of Indian-origin persons is most prominent in the continent, the descendants of indentured labour became educated and upwardly mobile. They gained merit as doctors and lawyers during the freedom movement in defending the cause of African political prisoners. The number of Indians living overseas, known as the Indian Diaspora, has grown to 2, 710, 6545, according to the most recent estimates. People from India reside in 46 different African countries. Indians in Africa constitute 12.37 percent of all Indians who have moved away from India over time. The number of people from India who live in different parts of the continent varies greatly. For example, 70 percent of the people living in Mauritius are from the Indian Diaspora. In Nigeria, more than 800,000 Indians live and own about 100,000 businesses there.

Trade was the prominent reason for the Indian migration and brought cultural connection too. During the colonial period of the 19th century, British and French colonies brought Indians as indentured labour for railway construction work, and later, they became residents of the host countries. During the liberation of African countries, Indians supported Africa, and Mahatma Gandhi played a significant role in fight against racial discrimination in South Africa. Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the non-alignment movement and supported south-south cooperation with African leaders like Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah. Later, Nelson Mandela was a big supporter of the Indian Diasporas and when he became the first president of South Africa, he appointed several Indians to the South African parliament. Our cultural and art, historical and geographical linkage is the most prominent evidence for the close connection with Africa. Indian Diaspora communities play the most significant role in Africa regarding economic development and political transformation. Former Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia said that

India and Africa are "two soulmates, friends, and partners." Within the broader context of India's adoption of a neoliberal economic policy framework in 1991, a new assertiveness to India's Diaspora has emerged. Indian private businesses have been at the forefront of Africa's economic boom in recent years, profoundly influencing how the Indian government sees its Diaspora.

India's growing political and economic interests in Africa and Indian Diaspora would play big role to making robust partnership with the African countries and will also help to understand African current requirements and their cultural knowledge. Once every two years, the Indian Diaspora gathers for Pravasi Bharatiya Divas to renew links with their homeland and foster greater cooperation between the Indian government and the Diaspora. In addition, several initiatives, such as "Mission," have been launched by the Indian government to re-establish communication between the Indian Diaspora in Africa with its motherland India. In the 21st century, existing international institutions have accelerated the unification of the world's economies, societies, and cultures. The cultural and trade ties between India and Africa date back to over three thousand years and today through the links of diaspora the ties between the two countries have strengthened.

Some of Important Web Links

01] From the Archive: The Indian Diaspora in British Colonial Africa
https://microform.digital/boa/posts/category/articles/629/from-the-archive-the-indian-diaspora-in-british-colonial-africa

02] The African Diaspora in India: Assimilation, Change and Cultural Survivals
https://www.routledge.com/The-African-Diaspora-in-India-Assimilation-Change-and-Cultural-Survivals/Bhatt/p/book/9780367345181

03] Indian Diaspora in Africa: A Profile
https://idsa.in/africatrends/indian-diaspora-in-africa-a-profile_rkgupta_0614

04] The Indian Diaspora in Africa: An instrument of New Delhi' Soft Power in the Continent
https://www.policycenter.ma/opinion/indian-diaspora-africa-instrument-new-delhi-soft-power-continent

05] Indian Diaspora in Southeast Africa
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_diaspora_in_Southeast_Africa
06] Indian Diaspora in Africa
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_diaspora_in_Africa
07] African Diaspora in India
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261572812_African_Diaspora_in_India
08] Politics, Religion, and Polarization in Africa's Largest Indian Community
https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/politics-religion-and-polarization-africas-largest-indian-community
09] India to Africa to the UK: Diasporas don't influence politics in predictable ways
https://theconversation.com/india-to-africa-to-the-uk-diasporas-dont-influence-politics-in-predictable-ways-217453
10] An Overview of Indian Diaspora in Africa: Implications for India
https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/final-an-overview-of-indian-diaspora-in-africa.pdf

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Indian Middle East Diaspora

EMBASSY OF INDIA
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

INDIAN COMMUNITY IN UAE

https://www.indembassyuae.gov.in/indian-com-in-uae.php

Indian expatriate community is the largest ethnic community in UAE constituting roughly 30 per cent of the country's population. The number of resident Indian Nationals is estimated to be 3.5 million in 2021 as per UAE records. Approx. 20% of the diaspora is in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and rest in 6 Northern Emirates including Dubai. Though most of the Indians living here are employed, about 10 per cent of the Indian population constitutes dependent family members. Among the Indian States, Kerala is the most represented followed by Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. However, Indians from the Northern States, all put together, also form significant portion of the UAE Indian population.

Indian contact with the UAE dates back several centuries owing to trade and commercial links between the various Emirates of UAE and India. It uniquely provides a breadth in terms of numbers and depth in terms of categories of workers employed which distinguishes it from every other expatriate community in the UAE.

Home away from home: Where Indians go

Rank	Country	No of Indians (in million)	% of total Indian diaspora
1	UAE	3.5	22.4
2	US	2.0	12.8
3	Saudi Arabia	1.9	12.1
4	Kuwait	1.0	6.4
5	Oman	0.7	4.5
6	UK	0.7	4.5
7	Qatar	0.6	3.8

Total 15.6 million

The profile of the community has changed with the evolving needs of the country: in the 1970s and 1980s, when the principal requirement here was for blue – collar workers, the Indian community was blue - collar to the extent of 85-90 per cent, with a negligible percentage of professionals. In the 1990s, as the need for professionals to meet the need of the expanding service sector emerged, the profile of the community changed, and today, around 35 per cent of the Indian community is made up of professionally qualified personnel, businessmen & other white collar non-professionals and their families.

Demographic profile

The UAE population as per UAE Government data was 92,82,410 in 2020 a large proportion of whom are immigrants from foreign countries including India. The approximate break-up of Indian immigrants in UAE is as follows:

65% belong to the blue-collar category (employed mostly in construction companies, municipalities, agricultural farms)

20% belong to the white-collar non-professionals (clerical staff, shop assistants, salesmen, accountants, etc.) and 15% are professionals and businessmen.

Indian Community and Prominent Indians in UAE

The Indian community has played a major role in the economic development of the UAE. The Indian community is respected for its technical competence, sense of discipline and its almost absence of involvement with criminal activity compared to other expatriate communities. In view of these qualities, Indian expatriates enjoy an advantage over other nationalities.

15 eminent Indians and one Indian Community Association from UAE have been honored with Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award namely Mr. Yussuff Ali M.A, Mr. Syed M Salahuddin, Mr. B.R. Shetty, Mr. Krishnamurthy Kumar, Dr. J.R. Gangaramani, Dr. Azad Moopen, Mr. Mohan Jashanmal, Mr. P. Bava Haji, Dr. Shamsheer Vayalil Parambath, Mr. Bharat Kumar Jayanti Lal Shah, Mr. Ashraf Palara Kunnummal, Mr. Vasu Sharaff, Mr. Girish Pant, Mr. Surender Singh Kandhari, Dr. Zulekha Daud and India Social & Cultural Centre (ISC) Abu Dhabi.

Mr. Yussuf Ali was conferred the Padma Shri by the President of India in 2008 and in the following year Dr. B.R. Shetty and Mr. Sunny Varkey were also honoured with Padma Shri award. Dr. J.R Ganagaramani, Shri Azad Moopen and Shri Sundar Menon were also conferred the Padma Shri award in the year 2010, 2011 and 2016 respectively.

Indian Associations and Cultural activities of the community

Keeping in line with the diverse linguistic and cultural ethos of India, there are various linguistic/regional associations for social and cultural activities. All sections of the Indian community are culturally very active. UAE has a system of registering social organizations of the expatriate community and, within the guidelines laid down by the UAE Government, such associations can function freely. There are six registered Indian Associations in Abu Dhabi/Al Ain.

1. India Social and Cultural Center, Abu Dhabi
2. Abu Dhabi Malayalee Samajam
3. Kerala Social Center
4. Indian Islamic Center
5. Indian Social Center, Al Ain
6. Indian Ladies Association

The registered associations are umbrella bodies and smaller cultural/regional groupings (affiliated to the registered associations) also function under them. These associations extend support to the welfare initiatives of the Mission and conduct cultural/welfare activities regularly including sports activities. The Indian associations arrange cultural programmes tapping local talent as well as by bringing professional artists from India.

A number of cultural programmes involving prominent film artists; music and dance troupes get organized from time to time. Even though, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) was closed in 2014, the Mission continues to host cultural troupes from ICCR and organize various cultural programmes both in its auditorium as well as at other prominent locations in UAE in collaboration with various Indian associations on a regular basis.

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Emigration to the Gulf

https://ebooks.inflibnet.ac.in/socp11/chapter/emigration-to-the-gulf/

See the Video on **Emigration to the Gulf**
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=alcUx_0NFmk

1. INTRODUCTION

Migration is a universal phenomenon. The origin of migration can be traced to the origin of humankind. Indian presence in the Gulf region is civilizational, which has developed into a strong relationship primarily based on a complementary abundance of entrepreneurial skill and wealth. With the emergence of India as a large economic power in recent years and simultaneously the Gulf region witnessing spectacular economic growth, economic trends are reinforcing mutual interdependence (Pradhan 2009:15).

Gulf-India trading connections which began over 3,000 years ago have since then thriveninto a global network with India as its hub. Arab traders in search of exotic food, cloth and luxury items ventured out by boat and camel caravans, thereby developing barter trade. Ptolemy Philadelphus, (285-246 B.C.) the king of Egypt who had sent an envoy to the Mauryan court showed off his Indian connections by displaying Indian women, Indian hunting dogs, cows, Indian spices and many other objects in the royal possession (Chanda 2008: 17).

2. HOW CONTEMPORARY GULF MIGRATION STARTED

Emigration from India to the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) states is not a new phenomenon, and it has increased remarkably since 1970s due to the 'oil boom' in the region.The discovery of oil and manpower shortage in the Gulf attracted labour migration to the region. Given the population pressure and bleak economic prospects at home, Indian labourers flocked to the Gulf in search of employment and better wages. The presence of Indian labourers dates back to 1935 when BAPCO (Persian Oil Company) imported labor from India. (Pradhan 2009: 19) The oil prices increase in 1973 gave rise to massive investment programme in oil producing countries in Gulf and resulted in an increase in demand for labour in the region (Shekhar 1977: 1). These oil producing countries permitted the immigration of workers from other countries, because lack of indigenous labour. Gulf region required manpower of all kinds for its development projects. It includes: doctors, engineers, architectures, craftsmen, drivers, technical personal and also the people who can take care of shops, household and livestock. This process resulted in a massive emigration of workers from India and Pakistan to the Gulf. According to Winckler (1997:480-498), the Gulf governments used oil money for different purposes like governance apparatus, development of infrastructure including energy stations as well as administrative and agriculture sectors, improvement of social servicesincluding health care and education. The huge flow of oil revenues during the oil boom decadeconverted the desert economy into one of the fastest growing region of the World.

Indian labour in the Bahrain Petroleum Company constituted about 94 per cent of the total clerical and technical employees and nearby 91 per cent of the total number of artisans employed by the company in 1949, Indian expatriates also made up 86 per cent of ministerial and technical staff in the Kuwait Oil Company. Indians were employed in many states in different capacity in companies. Gulf Cooperation Council is an inter-governmental political and economic union of all Arab states of the Persian Gulf, except Iraq. Its members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Union was formed on 25th May 1981 in Abu Dhabi the capital city of UAE.

3. INDIAN POPULATION IN THE GULF

The Indian diaspora has a presence in a large number of countries, with an estimated total of 25 million (Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2015) . Of these, the largest proportion of about6 million lives in the Gulf. Indian population in GCC are as follows: Bahrain 0.3 million, Kuwait 0.6 million, Oman 0.6 million, Qatar 0.2 million, Saudi Arabia 1.4 million, UAE 1.5 million. Most of them they live in capital city of states. In most of the states Indian expatriates outnumber immigrants from other countries. (Pradhan 2009:21-25).According to

2002 estimates, the Indian population in the GCC countries constitutes about 11 per cent of the total population in those countries, the majority lives in Saudi Arabia (46%) and UAE (27%).

3.1Composition of Emigrants

Most of Indian migrants in the Gulf are males and from younger age group. Most emigrants to the Gulf belong to villages rather than urban areas. The composition of emigrants can be looked at in terms of region, religion, urban-rural and type of work – unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled and professional. Emigration from India to the Gulf countries takes place mainly from Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Gujarat, Goa, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (Nair,1983). The Indian states with the highest rate of migrants to the Gulf are Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. In particular, emigration from Kerala has received considerable scholarly and policy attention (Azeez et. al. 2009: 1).Around 40-50 per cent of Indian migrants to the Gulf countries originate in Kerala, majority of Indians in the Gulf are Sunni Muslim (56 per cent) followed by Christians (26 per cent) and Hindus (16 per cent)(Parekh*et.al.* 2003: 104).

3.2Categories of Indian workers in the Gulf

Migrants to the Gulf can be divided into four types: 1. Migration for business. 2. Migration of professionals in education, medicine and engineering. 3. Migration for technical works in GCC.

4. Migration for unskilled/semi-skilled like construction, domestic work as maids, transportation etc. (Storbeck 2011:29).The most obvious reason for migration is the wage differential between salaries paid for the work at home and salary given for the same work in the Gulf.

A large proportion of the Indian migrants in the Gulf are unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The category of skilled workers or professionals comprises about 30 per cent of the total Indian immigrants in the Gulf countries. It includes doctors, engineers, nurses and management consultants, teachers, architects, chartered accountants, media and health professionals (Kanchana 2012:48). Indian community runs schools, restaurants, clubs and other organisations. Second and third categories comprise almost 70 per cent of the total Indian immigrants; it includes semi-skilled and unskilled workers (ibid. 47). Semi-skilled workers are in transportation, industrial manufacturing, mining and oil and gas, power and utilities, retail sectors, service sector, housemaid etc. (ibid. 48). Un-skilled workers work as labourers providing help for construction and other kinds of works. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) are the two most popular destination for Indians. They account for more than 60 per cent of the total Indian workers/professionals/labourers.

It was easier for Indians to go to the GCC countries for work or business before 1970, post 1970 restrictions have been put for non- Arabs. This restriction was due to the increase in number of entries of non-Arabs in the region. Owning of business

was allowed for non-Arabs only if they took locals as business partners. States' religion is Islam and *Sharia* is the basic law and Arabic is the only official language of the region. GCC countries are sparsely populated. According to 2003 estimates, Saudi Arabia's population is 22.5 million while other regions ranged from 0.5 million to 2.6 million.

3.3 Migration from different regions in India:

According to rough estimates, most of the Indian expatriates in Saudi Arabia are from Kerala (40 -50 percent), Tamil Nadu (20 percent), and Andhra Pradesh (20 percent) while the remainders are from other states (Pradhan 2009: p.21).According to the data by MOIA the number of emigrants to Gulf from southern states has dropped significantly in last few years. South Indian states sent 88,389 workers to the Gulf in2008 while there was real estate boom. In later years there was a sharp decline to almost 75% (21,129) in the year 2012 (Arabianbusiness.com). Drop scenario has two aspects : one that South Indian states provide better job prospects now and second there is not much difference when it comes to salary they now earn back home (ibid page.) . In this scenario North has overtaken, south on the number of emigrants to the Gulf. In 2002, Uttar Pradesh sent the largest numbers of emigrants (1, 90,000) followed by Kerala (98,000), Andhra Pradesh (92,000) and Bihar (84,000) (South Asia Middle East Report 2012).

4. RECRUITMENT PROCESS AND AGENCIES

Recruitment to the Gulf is an expensive and complicated process and sometimes, migrants are duped by the recruitment agencies. Placement costs a lot of finance to one who migrates. For a unskilled worker it costs US$43 while for semi-skilled it is US$ 65 and for skilled workers it is US$ 108 and for professionals US $215 (Jain 2006:20). According to the rules visa and transportation charges should be borne by the employer but often it is flouted since migrants are not aware about it. So all that expense have to be borne by the workers instead. And if they go by the rule, then a worker has to get around US$ 1200 even before he/she leaves country (HRW2006:27). According to a study by HRW most of Indian workers had paid around US$ 2000-3000 to secure a job in the Gulf(ibid:23) . For unskilled labour getting necessary documents like passport, visa and emigration clearance has always been difficult. It is usually easier for professional and businessmen. Recruitment business has been a big market for recruiters in India. To pay huge amounts before even they leave country has always been difficult for the emigrants, they used to pay those amounts by borrowing from family, friends, taking a loan from moneylenders at high interest rates, and sell gold ornaments or land in the hope of a better life in the unknown or unseen country, *El Dorado* (place of opportunity)as Storbeck(2011:31) calls it. After reaching the Gulf, they have to be dependent on *Kafil* (sponsor). Only *Kafil* are responsible for their food, stay and healthcare

facility. After reaching migrants have to go through the medical checkup, and this dependency creates space for exploitation of migrants. But there is no doubt that conditions back home motivated Indian workers to immigrate to the Gulf.

Most important source of their inspiration to migrate to an alien unseen unknown country is the success of the neighbor who returned from Gulf.

5. INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Collection of information regarding recruitment and migration started mainly in 1983 when the government of India took initiative for keeping records of Indian emigrants living in other countries. It comes under the MOIA (Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs). This was an attempt to safeguard the interests of Indian nationals working abroad. Emigration Act, 1983 requires all workers seeking contractual employment abroad to seek emigration clearance from any of the eight offices of the Protectors of Emigrants (POEs). The Protector General of Emigrants (PGE) headquarters is situated in New Delhi. It has eight regional centres functioning under the overall control of PGE. It has offices in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Chandigarh, Cochin, Jaipur and Thiruvananthapuram. MOIA has decentralized the process of grant of emigration clearance for the convenience of the applicants. It has divided emigrant workers into those who require Emigration Check (ECR) and those under the Emigration Check Not Required (ECNR). Former category includes the semi-skilled and unskilled workers while the latter category comprises the skilled workers, professional and businessman.

Most members seek employment through friends, family members, agents or through the state manpower export corporations. Indian Emigration Act 1983, allows only registered recruitment agents to operate in the placement business. Registered agents have to follow certain guidelines before getting registration certificate (RC), such as better financial condition, adequacy of premises and experience in the field of manpower export. As Storbeck writes "there were 3,487 registered agents operating in the field since 1984 to 2001-2002 this number later has declined to 1250 as registered agents in the field(Op.cit.2011:30).These recruitment agencies have a presence in major cities all over India.

6. CONDITIONS OF WORK

Semi-skilled or un-skilled workers constitute around 70 per cent of Indian expatriates in the GCC countries. The demands for low skilled workers are always high. Workers like housemaid, cook, porter, gardeners etc. often live in sub-parconditions. They face human right abuses such as less pay than originally promised, making them work more than the stipulated time, putting them in poor working conditions and leading them into situations of debt bondage and forced labour(Exploited Dreams2014). Workers are also subject to other forms of abuse: beatings, verbal abuse, confiscations of passports and residency documents apart from being declared as absconding denial of exit permission to return home. Workers facing these abuses go through severe physical and psychological stress. (ibid

2014).Indian labour force doesn't come under the local laws. It is like modern day slavery.

Influential Indian business community in the Gulf does not face such conditions. Indian business community is primarily engaged in trading. Registered community associations (in the Gulf) provide a platform for interaction between visiting Indian dignitaries and influential locals. The Indian Business/professional Group-Abu Dhabi, Overseas Indian Economic Forum-Dubai, Indian Business Council-Dubai and Indian Sports Clubs are active in organizing such interaction and facilitating visits of Indian delegates.

There are more Indian migrants in the Gulf than in any other region in the world and little less than half of them are women (Wall Street Journal, 2015) they earn more in Gulf than they could in India. But reality of work in the Gulfis far from the expectation. There are reports that women face the kind of abuse that Indian indentured faced during British colonial phase. Abuses are physical, sexual and emotional including confinement or non-payment of wages aswell other abuses. (ibid.)

Exploitation of nurses came to light when nurses had been placed in hospitals run by the Saudi Ministry of Health in Rumah, Tumair, Sajer and Al Nafy under the sponsorship of Nukhba House Medical Services Company, a Riyadh- based firm. The grounds for holding them back, was the auto renewal of contract of hospital with government. Nurse's contract has expired the time firm's contract with government was extended. Nurses were held in hospital despite their unwillingness to work further. Labour laws are in a very poor condition in the Gulf.

7. NEW IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN HOST COUNTRIES

Due to long presence of foreigners on Arab soil and also huge monetary burden to the host, the trend of declining immigration started between 1997-1999.The host countries especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait adopted control and restrictive immigration policy for controlling non-Arab emigrants through localisation. Indians constitute two thirds of the labour force in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia started to follow a policy of inclusion of locals in labour force in all the sectors (Lal *et.al*. 2005:231). In the year 1993, Saudi government came up with the policy that anytime emigration population should not exceed more than 20 per cent of the kingdom's population. Saudi administration has forced business enterprises to employ more Saudis than outsiders(ibid. 232). As part of Arabisation, the government of Kuwait has put restriction on the emigration of dependent of workers who are earning less than US$ 1500 per month for public sector and US$ 2200 per month for private sectors. Many Indian workers were sent back in 2013-2014 saying they were working without proper documents. This was just an excuse, while the real agenda is localization.

The major difference between emigration to the Gulf and the West is that even if you spend two decades in a state like UAE you will neither get green card or citizenship status in GCC. Once you finish your work and your contract is over, you

have to go back to India. (Rohan 2005). In very exceptional cases, Oman has granted citizenship to few Indians.

8. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE

Many Gulf countries have very strict laws based on *Sharia*. Religious freedom is very limited or nil for migrants. Indian migrants face various issues. Hindu migrants in Saudi Arabia find it difficult to practice Hinduism since there is no Hindu temple. In rare cases, Hindu temples have been constructed in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Yemen. Although there is a significant Hindu population in Saudi Arabia, legally, Hindus are not permitted to worship in public. In fact, propagation of religion by non-Muslims is banned and conversion from Islam to another religion is punishable by death. Conditions in Qatar are not very different. For Muslim immigrants, there is freedom to participate in the local public religious activities, visit mosques and so on. Though there is huge business in GCC with outside world but their official language is Arabic. It is difficult to interact with locals. It is like a home to work and work to home situation.

Indians have established a large number of schools throughout the region which follow the Indian curriculum of the CBSE (Central Board of Secondary Education). Indian expatriate community in the region runs 59 schools, three in Bahrain, nine in Kuwait, ten in Oman, three in Qatar, three in Saudi Arabia and 31 in UAE (Lal *et.al*. 2005: 223).

Since it is a large diaspora, a number of facilities and conveniences have emerged to cater to its needs, like restaurants, shops, theatres which offer Indian products and services.

9. IMPACT BACK HOME

9.1 Remittances

Gulf migration provides four lakhs jobs for Indians every year. The major impact on the labour market in India is the reduction of unemployment through the migration of workforce (Paul and Subash 2005). A survey based study revealed that 38 per cent of the migrants were originally unemployed (Nair1986). Remittances are generally defined as that portion of migrants' earnings sent from the migration destination to the place of origin. Remittances can be sent in cash or kind. But, usually the term remittances is limited to indicate the cash transfers by immigrants to their families. Remittances reflect the local labour working in the global economy and have been shown to explain partly the connection between growth and integration with the world economy (Adison 2004:3).

The remittances from migrants working abroad are important for both families of migrants and the balance of payment reserves of their home country. Remittances from the Gulf to India are quite large. India gets the highest amount of remittance in the world roughly around $70 billion from all over the world. Three times the FDI

India receive (World Bank data 2012). While it receives about $ 32.7 billion from gulf. The major share of remittances from Gulf countries is received by Kerala. The South Asian Migration Study, 2004 conducted by Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, estimates the annual remittances to Kerala during 2004 to Rs.18,465 crores (Zachariah and Irudaya 2004:4). The impact of Gulf migration on development is more visible in Kerala state since 50 percent of the Indian contract workers in Gulf countries are from Kerala (Nair 1998). The contribution of Gulf migration to development of the Kerala region can be seen in various areas like housing, transportation, town planning, educational and religious institutions, amenities and other infrastructural facilities. The main impact of migration is on housing sector.

As the value of the rupee dropped from Rs39.25 to Rs43.15 per dollar (2008), and consequently against all GCC currencies which are pegged to the dollar, there has been a dramatic surge in the volume of transactions from the Gulf. From an estimated average monthly money transfer of Rs.120 billion from the GCC countries, the volume of transactions from the region shot up by 40 per cent to Rs.165 billion (2008). Remittances from the UAE account for 30 per cent, second to Saudi Arabia which accounts for almost 40 per cent of remittances to India from the region (Pradhan 2009:23).

These migrants are playing very significant role in the development of their regions back home. Oil generated revenues have been used to create social services (hospitals, education institutions, banks, etc. in home towns in India. Study by B.A. Prakash on migration to the Gulf and impact of remittance to Kerala (1978) shows that the impact is in the field of financial stability and increase in the investment patterns. The majority of receivers of remittance invested in land, bought consumer durables and invested in housing. The last was in two categories: building new houses, repairing the old one (Prakash: 1978:1109-1110) .Indians living in Saudi Arabia, UAE and other countries also transfer money through *hawalla* mechanisms. Kerala's economy very much depends on remittances from the Gulf.

Migrants have sent remittances back home in all kinds of circumstances. It not only helps the family back home but also helps the government to have positive balance of payment to import goods for country. It plays very crucial role for reducing abject poverty in certain areas.

In case of Indian emigrants in the Gulf most are unskilled and semi–skilled. They have no choice or any alternative jobs in the place of origin. They are marginalised in different ways: poverty, no steady jobs, poor education, low savings, debt etc. Once they get the job in the Gulf, various positive changes come to their lives. These changes can be seen in different spheres like housing, children's education, saving, purchasing power, repaying debts, transportation, financing community programmes, decision making, etc. The emigration to Gulf countries has radically changed the socio-economic conditions of certain regions in Kerala like Malappuram, Palakkad, Kasargod, Kozhikode and Thrissur. The changes are reflected in the consumption pattern, investment pattern, life style, housing, purchase power, religion and education. (Azeez et.al. 2009: 2)

9.2 Impact on family and socio-cultural life

Gulf migration has largely been single-sex migration and not family migration, due to the terms and conditions of jobs and government policies. Mostly it is only male migration, except for specific categories, like nurses and maids. In either case, family life has been disrupted and studies have demonstrated this. When a male migrates leaving behind his wife and children, prolonged lack of contact with fathers has a negative impact on children. Women left behind have to depend on relatives for social and emotional support and with the promise of remittance, there are quarrels within the extended family for their share. Loneliness and struggle to manage the family leads to depression and other mental problems (Gulati 1983). When women migrate leaving behind males, the impact on children is even greater, and the difficulties of the men left behind to accept the wife as the main earner has been noted.

At the level of popular culture, what labor migrants bring back with them often has profound influence on a number of local developments, such as hybrid forms of music, dance, art, popular culture, cuisine, and architectural forms. Influences of the labor migrants can be seen in the use of Arabic words and names in the local culture i.e. naming of office buildings (Muscat Tower) and food (Sharjah Shake) as well as the construction of large homes by successful labour migrants who returned from the Middle East to Kerala.

9.3. Return migration

Certain migrants come back after expiry of their contract with the sponsor in the Gulf. Some get another term for a few years through renewal of contracts. These migrants keep going again and again to the Gulf. Most migrants aim to earn quick money and settle down back at home. So they do not seek renewal of the contracts on their own. During the Gulf war in late 1990 most of the Indian emigrants were evacuated from Iraq and neighboring states. War phase was the worst phase for government in India as well as for the migrants. Both were losing a source of income.

Emigration has created certain problems at back home in Kerala also. The emigration of semi-skilled and un-skilled workers has increased demand for certain categories of workers within Kerala. The Kerala 's labour market experienced considerable shortage for semi-skilled labourers such as carpenters, welders, plumbers, drivers, electrician, motor mechanics and other craftsmen (Nair 1986). There are three reasons for this change (Azeez *et. al*. 2009:59). First, the majority of migrants went to the Gulf as electrician, carpenters, masons etc. Second, migrants use their remittances mainly for constructing new houses, repairing houses, improving land, buying gold etc. created more demand for workers at home. Third, reluctance of young people in India to engage in manual work due to increase in education, increase in standard of living through the earnings of parents working in gulf countries. The shortage of construction and other workforce in Kerala resulted in-migration of workers from neighboring states. It has also been noted that with some families returning after having achieved prosperity and others, the non-migrants still

having their earlier standard of living, the social fabric has become more disharmonious.

10.DO GULF EMIGRANTS FORM A DIASPORA?

Whether emigrants to the Gulf form a diaspora is a difficult question to answer. But what Prof. Myron Weiner calls 'incipient diaspora' is a very appropriate term for Gulf migrants. Weiner says that a relatively sizeable group of foreign workers in industrial or oil-producing economies who are ethically distinct from the host population and are allowed to remain in host country only to work, but are not granted citizenship form an incipient diaspora since they do, after a period, return to the homeland. They live in a state of legal and political ambiguity, economic insecurity and as social outsiders (Jain 2003:102).A large Indian population keeps going and coming back due to the contractual nature of work in the Gulf, it is almost impossible for migrants to get citizenship in gulf. Work nature is contractual and time bound and most migrants desire to return home after the contract finishes. So the migration to the Gulf is circulatory in nature, it has certain diasporic features but perhaps not yet a full-fledged diaspora.

Whether the Indian emigrants to the Gulf become a fully formed diaspora depends on the developments in the next few decades both in host and home country policies.

CONCLUSION

The contribution of Indians to the development of the host countries of the Gulf is widely acknowledged. A number of persons of Indian origin have been granted Omani nationality by Sultan Qaboos. Some of the prominent Omani Indians have received the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award from the Indian government, like Kanaksi Khimji (2003), P. Mohamed Ali (2004), P.N.C. Menon (2009), S.K. Virmani (2010), and Kiran Asher (2012). Some Indians hold high positions in GCC states.

Emigration for work is not new phenomenon but at what cost? A large number of migrants to the Gulf are semi-literate or not educated enough to understand the ground reality of an alien nation. Lack of local support creates 'double burden' for the labourers. Complete reliance on remittances makes it highly vulnerable to economic and political instability for the receiving country. The vulnerability of Kerala's and other states' economy which depends heavily on remittance gets highlighted during the time of shock (during war and recession). In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait; thousands of workers based in Kuwait, fled the country and came back. During the war, the Kerala economy was badly affected. In 2008, the global economic recession increased the burden of return migrants. Unfinished large scale construction and infrastructural projects and economic crisis in the oil industry have pushed low paid migrant workers to return to India temporarily or permanently.

The unskilled migrants themselves are vulnerable due to middlemen. Some employers do not even pay the workers the wages. Some argue that the Gulf has survived past crises like war and recession. But states' reliance on a remittance-based economy may not be good in the long run. It is reportedthat100 Indians committed suicide in the year 2011 in the Gulf (TOI, 2014). Reasons could be many. But the point is, something is wrong in this emigration business.

The situation could be improved by putting some measures in place: better support at the local level through the Indian embassy; proper checking of details of recruiters and welfare measures for the labour in the host country. Insurance schemes for the emigrants who travel to the Gulf as well as better counselling and medical facilities by the state governments and the Indian government. A 24×7 helpline can be of immense benefit. Change in *kafil* system can bring relief for the emigrants to the Gulf.

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Some Web Links for MORE INFO !

01] India's unprecedented love-in with the Middle East
https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/02/14/indias-unprecedented-love-in-with-the-middle-east
02] Kerala Gulf Diaspora
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerala_Gulf_diaspora
03] The Indian Diaspora in the Gulf States
https://is.muni.cz/th/snyze/Indian_Diaspora_In_The_Gulf_States_-_09.05.2022__Master_Thesis__-_Tanushree_Nayudu_491561_cj57u.pdf



INDIAN DIASPORA IN EUROPE
[UK as a Case Study]

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Abstract

Among European countries, the UK remains one of the important destinations for many from Asian regions, specifically, India and Pakistan. "EU Countries Granted Citizenship" (2019) states that Indians are the majority (52%) to receive British citizenship. Relations between the State and the immigrants have always remained dynamic. This dynamism is due to the needs of the host and that of the guest, which keeps altering simultaneously. The mismatch in these needs creates conflicts and thus a gate-keeping by the host is introduced through Immigration Policies. There is a certain level of subtle negotiation that takes place as these policies get firmed up. The UK has a significant assurance for the migration population through its policies, despite political desire to curb the immigrant population. Hence, there seems to be a dilemma among the immigrants if the state is curtailing their presence or accepting them as one among the hosts. To understand the intention of the state, a five-step framework analysis (using the Ritchie and Spencer 1994 model) of the immigration policies of the UK is carried out. In this paper, an attempt is made to present the representation of interests of Indian immigrants in the Immigration Policies of the UK.

Keywords: Frames, Immigrants, Immigration Policy of UK & Indian diaspora

Public Interest Statement

People have been migrating from one place to another for times immemorial. Migration has become more complex with the emergence of nation states that act as gatekeepers. This gatekeeping exercise is largely carried out by devising policies as per the needs.

The United Kingdom has been a destination for many migrants, particularly from the earlier colonies including India and Pakistan. There is a considerable population from these regions that have settled in the UK. This diaspora has recently made it to the political life within the UK and is negotiating for a better integration of people originating from their home countries.

This paper tries to trace the interests of the immigrants, particularly from the Commonwealth, reflected in the policies of the UK during the ten-year period between 2007 and 2017. This helps in discussions between the state and the immigrants in reaching better understanding in the future.

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European Union
EXTERNAL ACTION

New Homelands

The Indian Diaspora in the European Union

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/13701_en

On 20 Oct 2016, the EU Delegation held a workshop and exhibition on 'New Homelands: the Indian Diaspora in the European Union' opened at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi. Among the speakers at the workshop were Dr Cesare Onestini , Deputy Head of the EU Delegation to India, and Mr. Dnyaneshwar Mulay, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India.

Dr Onestini said that this cultural project aimed at providing fresh insights into the links between the people of the European Union and India. The EU and India have strong political and strategic relations; the EU-India Summit last March in Brussels adopted a Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility as the basis for future discussions and agreements in all areas related to mobility to and from the EU. In this context, this project was designed to train the camera lens of some distinguished Indian photographers on individuals from different parts of India who had made Europe their home in recent decades, and added to the vibrant culture and colourful social fabric of the EU.

Speaking of the "30 million Indian brotherhood" Mr. Mulay said that it helps the Indian diaspora that India is democratic and celebrates diversity, and in turn India is increasingly engaging its diaspora to develop good relations with entities such as the European Union. Experts including Dr Meera Sethi of the International Organisation for Migration, Professors Rupa Chandra and Chinmay Tumbe from the Indian Institutes of Management and Ishani Duttagupta who edits the Global Indian for the Economic Times described the significant contributions, both economic and social, of the Indian farmers in Italy, the Goans in Portugal, and the diamond merchants in Antwerp, Belgium.

Following the workshop, the exhibition was inaugurated by Mr. Cesare Onestini and Mr. Vijay Jolly, Member of the Executive Committee of the Delhi BJP. It has been curated by art historian Dr. Alka Pande and features the works of 3 award-winning photographers who have travelled through the EU for a month, capturing the journeys and lives of the Indian community. The exhibition will be on display at the India Habitat Centre till 7 November, moving to the Piramal Gallery, NCPA Mumbai on December 12.

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INDIASPORA

THE NETHERLANDS

Home to the Second-Largest Indian Diaspora in Europe

https://www.indiaspora.org/features/the-netherlands-home-to-the-second-largest-indian-diaspora-in-europe

With a population of 17.5 million, the Netherlands is home to about a quarter-million people of Indian origin, the largest Indian diaspora community in Europe after the United Kingdom. This includes approximately 200,000 Indo-Surinamese. The Indian community, the fastest-growing group of expatriates, is strong in the business world, is culturally and religiously active, and has even made their presence felt in politics.

Early settlers Though the Indo-Dutch contact went back more than 400 years ago, Indians first started settling in the Netherlands only in the 1940s and 50s. The initial settlers were from Punjab, who were traders, small businessmen, and people involved in the textile trade. The majority of the people of Indian descent in the Netherlands are of Indo-Surinamese origin. After abolishing slavery in the Dutch colony of Suriname, the Dutch government signed a treaty with the UK regarding the recruitment of contract workers. It was then that Indians began migrating to Suriname as indentured laborers in 1873, from what was then British India. The migrants were mainly from the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, as well as the surrounding regions. After the independence of Suriname in 1975, all of the Indo-Surinamese – who are referred to as Hindustanis - formally became residents of the Netherlands and thus owned a Dutch passport. A significant number of them then migrated to the Netherlands and settled down in The Hague - the administrative and royal capital of the Netherlands and its seat of government - and surrounding areas. In 1980, there was a military coup in Suriname, which resulted in another wave of Indo-Surinamese people settling in the Netherlands, a country known for a flat landscape of canals, tulip fields, and windmills. Recently, India's pool of knowledge workers, primarily from IT and fintech, have settled down in the Netherlands, which has emerged as a hub for Indian firms in Europe. Also, a large number of students have moved for their education, and stay back after finding jobs. Today the Netherlands is home to over 200 Indian companies, half of which are based in the business capital Amsterdam, which is known for its artistic heritage, elaborate canal system, numerous cycling paths, and narrow houses with gabled facades. There have been many employment opportunities for skilled Indian migrants, three-quarters of whom work in IT, pharma companies and information services. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his visit to the Netherlands in 2017, remarked in his address to the Indian Diaspora in The Hague that he was unaware that the Netherlands housed the second largest number of Indians in Europe. Last year, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte also praised the thriving and ever-expanding Indian community and said he was proud of their achievements and contributions to society.

Gandhi's legacy The Netherlands holds Mahatma Gandhi in high esteem. It is the only country other than India to have over 30 streets named after Mahatma Gandhi, India's father of the nation and apostle of peace. The Netherlands has statues of Gandhi in Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, and Zoetermeer. The legacy of Gandhi is still alive here as every year on his birthday on October 2 – which is also observed as the International Day of Non-Violence as mandated by the UN. In 2020, a series of programs were planned for the grand finale of the two-year celebrations of Gandhi's 150th birthday anniversary. Peace marches involving school children, cycle rallies to spread the message of Gandhi's philosophy of simplicity and sustainability, tree plantings, and singing of favorite songs and bhajans of Gandhi were organized in many parts of the Netherlands. Apart from this, a 'Follow the Mahatma' campaign to disseminate Gandhi's message of non-violence to school children was also organized. The Indian Culture Centre named 'The Gandhi Centre' was inaugurated on October 2, 2011, and actively promotes Indian culture through various programs, including yoga and other cultural activities. The Centre also partners with other local Dutch organizations to promote Indian culture. There is a famous restaurant in Amsterdam called 'Gandhi' that serves Indian cuisine. Interestingly, the

Indian community is very active in organizing various events – such as film festivals, cricket matches, dance shows, and religious programs – that connect the community and help them cherish their cultural roots. The Indian community mostly lives in larger cities like Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht, and they are the fastest-growing group of expatriates in Amsterdam, where an estimated 10,000 live. They have contributed to the enrichment of cultural ethos as well as the commercial success of the city, which is the country's most populous city and nominal capital. Amsterdam, which is also one of the top financial centers in Europe, attracts the Indian community as it offers many advantages to them, such as favorable tax agreements, relatively inexpensive housing, and easy access to Amsterdam's important Zuidas business district, a high-end international knowledge and business center that is also one of the most critical office locations in the Netherlands. The highly-skilled Indians living in Amsterdam mostly work for Indian companies like Tata Consultancy Services, which is a global leader in IT services; Tata Steel, one of the leading steel manufacturing companies of India; Infosys, a global leader in next-generation digital services; Sun Pharma, an Indian multinational pharmaceutical company; or one of the many other prominent Indian companies that have offices in the region. As many as 100 Indian companies are in Amsterdam, among over 200 in the Netherlands, employing around 20,000 people. According to 2019 statistics, Hindus represented about 1.0 percent of the Dutch population, thus making it a place where the third-largest Hindu community in Europe after the UK and Italy. There are as many as 20 temples in the Netherlands. The largest one is in The Hague, constructed with funding from the Hindu community. There are seven gurdwaras in the Netherlands for over 12,000 Sikh community members, with Amsterdam itself having four. One religious festival celebrated with great fanfare is the festival of light, Diwali. Day-long cultural programs are organized on a large scale, which see a significant turnout. Holi, the festival of color, Ramlila, the dramatic folk re-enactment of the life of Hindu God Rama on stage, and Durga Puja, the annual celebration of Hindu goddess Durga by the Bengali community, are the other festivals that are celebrated with gusto. Even on occasions, a sizable *rath yatra* (chariot march) is taken out by the Odiya Indian community. There are also five Hindu schools funded by the Hindu community, deemed as national schools. These schools follow the same curriculum as other schools, but its curriculum includes Hindi. As the community is very active and robust, they have established their own human rights group called Agni. The idea behind this is to address the grievances of the Hindu community. The community had their radio program on the national broadcasting system. There are also some independent radio shows that address the needs of the community. They also have their charity called Seva Network. There are many yoga schools and Ayurveda, an alternative medicine system, is also practiced. Indians love their food. So it is no wonder that the Netherlands offers a wide range of Indian restaurants, which serve traditional Indian non-vegetarian and vegetarian food. Dozens of restaurants offer South Indian and North Indian cuisine, with over 40 in Amsterdam alone. There are also outlets where one can learn how to cook Indian food. The Indian community, especially the Indo-Surinamese, has played a significant role in politics. One prominent name is that of former Deputy Mayor of The Hague Municipality, Rabin Baldewsingh. He is known for his contribution to politics and promoting Indian culture through his literary and linguistic work. He was conferred with the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award in 2014, making him the first member of the community in the

Netherlands to be awarded the prestigious award given by the Indian government, to honor the exceptional meritorious contribution of overseas Indians. The Indian government has also conferred the same honor on two other Indian-origin Indians, Ram Lakhina, an Indian entrepreneur and community leader, and Wahid Saleh, a social entrepreneur and a community leader, in 2009 and 2011 respectively for their contribution to diaspora- related work. There have been two Members of Parliament from the Indian community, Daulatram Ramlal, and Tanja Jadnansing. Prominent members of municipal councils include Deputy Mayor of The Hague Municipality, Kavita Prabhudayal. Indians have also made a name for themselves in various spheres, including business. One prominent name is that of Rattan Chadha. The Queen of the Netherlands has knighted him for his entrepreneurial success and various philanthropic activities in 2000. In 2004, the Grand Seigneur award of the Netherlands, the highest award in the country for excellence in branding and lifestyle marketing, was also awarded to him. There are an estimated 3,000 Indian students, with the number going up every year, pursuing various paths and research courses in multiple universities. There are fourteen international schools and various secondary schools that offer bilingual education. Also, the Amstell and Hospital in Amstelveen, in suburban Amsterdam, provides a dedicated India Desk for health advice. Due to their contribution to the economy, political and cultural life of the Netherlands, the Indian community has earned lots of praise. Last year at an event, Dutch Minister of Justice and Security Ferdinand Grapperhaus said that Indians living in the Netherlands are among the "best-integrated communities." The Indian community has played a significant role in contributing to the cultural ethos of both countries, while also helping in further expanding and creating a favorable climate for bilateral business relations.

This article is part of a new series, Indiaspora Features, which commissions journalists to write about topics of interest for the global Indian diaspora. Kavita Bajeli-Datt is an independent journalist associated with South Asia Monitor. She has worked in prominent Indian news organizations like IANS, PTI, and The Week where she wrote extensively on health, crime, politics, and art and culture.

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

India Diaspora in Western Europe

Adapting and Negotiating Identity

[https://doi.org/10.1080/19438192.2024.2358598]

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https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19438192.2024.2358598

Abstract

Indian Diaspora is one of the largest Diasporas, spread over continents. The nature and composition of the Indian Diaspora in Europe are quite diverse in terms of its number, history, and contemporary dynamics, yet in a few aspects, there is a striking similarity. Besides the settled Diaspora, the countries in Western Europe have substantial numbers of migrants and some illegal migrants from India as well. The present article explores the patterns of adjustment and identity construction among the Indian Diaspora, particularly the second-generation, and how it is negotiating its connections with the host and home country. The article gives a brief historical description of the journey of the Indian Diaspora and settlement in a select few countries in Western Europe. Subsequently, it discusses the issues of identity, adjustment and sense of belonging, and finally, it focuses on the second-generation of the Diaspora and the process of negotiation of identity and adjustments.

Kindly visit the cited Web Page to reach the Complete Paper:

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SPRINGER LINK **Indian Diaspora in Central Europe**

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Abstract

Central Europe has not been a traditional foreign destination for Indian migrants. This chapter analyses the origins and growth of Indian communities in Central Europe and provides a detailed overview of the key features of the Indian diaspora in each of the V4 countries. It explores their role in their new 'homes', assesses their impact on India-Central European relations and looks at future trends and significance in India's relations with the region. The chapter is based on the analysis of the secondary sources as well as new statistical information, big data and qualitative research (including participant observations, in-depth interviews and a survey) in Poland, which has the largest community in the region.

Kindly visit the cited Web Page to reach the Complete Paper:

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Three Indian-origin PMs in Europe is a new high for the Diaspora

Varadkar taking over in Dublin, Sunak in London and Costa in Lisbon thus reflects a new high for the Indian diaspora, estimated to be over 32 million across the globe.

https://www.khaleejtimes.com/opinion/three-indian-origin-pms-in-europe-is-a-new-high-for-the-diaspora

It didn't make as much news, but was no less significant than Rishi Sunak becoming prime minister of the United Kingdom. Leo Varadkar, son of a medical doctor-father from Maharashtra and Irish mother, took over as the prime minister of neighbouring Ireland on Saturday (December 17) as part of a power-sharing arrangement in Dublin. His elevation from the role of deputy prime minister is a historical development on at least two levels: it is for the first time both Ireland and the United Kingdom have prime ministers of Indian origin, and it also the first time that such a swap at the top has taken place in Irish politics.

It was following the April 2020 Irish election that the two main rival parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, reached a coalition agreement, when there was no outright majority for any party. Under the agreement, Micheal Martin of Fiana Fáil would take over as the prime minister until December 2022 and then leave office to be replaced by Varadkar of Fine Gael. It was the first time the two bitter rivals with roots in the Irish Civil War a century ago had reached an agreement to share power in government – it is as historic if, for example, the Conservative and Labour parties agree to share power in the UK. As part of the swap, Martin will take over Varadkar's role of deputy prime minister until the next election, due by early 2025.

The third European country with an Indian-origin prime minister is Portugal, where Antonio Costa, 61, has been prime minister since 2014, his Socialist Party (PS) winning a majority in the election earlier this year.

The Dublin-born Varadkar, a qualified medical doctor, was previously Ireland's prime minister and minister for defence from 2017 to 2020, and visited his ancestral village Varad in Maharashtra in December 2019.

Varadkar, 43, and Sunak, 42, head their governments at a sensitive time, particularly given the continuing passions over the Northern Ireland Protocol, which is part of the withdrawal agreement between the UK and the European Union. Ireland is an EU member-state, while the UK is out of it, still coming to terms with all the implications of Brexit. Both are due to meet soon to arrive at a solution to the vexed protocol, which remains caught in the web of history, geography and politics, raising hackles in London, Belfast, Dublin and Brussels.

The arrangement has proved intractable, given the unique geographic and political situation of Northern Ireland: it is part of the island of Ireland, next to Ireland (an EU member-state), but within the jurisdiction of the UK, which has implications for checks on the movement of goods from Britain to Northern Ireland, since the UK is now a third country, outside the EU. There is no land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, and there are several stakeholders in the row: Ireland, the Northern Ireland assembly, EU, the UK, as well as interests of the United States.

As prime minister of an EU member-state, Varadkar needs to protect Ireland and the EU's interests, while Sunak needs to ensure the UK's sovereignty in Northern Ireland. Due to the impasse, the local government (Executive) in Northern Ireland has stalled. As he said during last week's visit to Belfast, there are parts of the protocol which threaten Northern Ireland's place within the UK: "I am not going to give a running commentary on the negotiations, it wouldn't be appropriate. What is of paramount importance to me is protecting Northern Ireland's place in the union. The protocol, clearly there are areas of it which threaten that. I want to resolve those and I want to protect Northern Ireland's place in the union. That is what I am setting out to do. If we can do that, we can get the Executive up and running, that is what people need and deserve."

Varadkar and Sunak are expected to meet soon to try and resolve the issue, but the former has already indicated that the protocol as it stands is "a little too strict", raising hopes of a resolution. The EU has offered some compromises in the recent past, but more are expected. Varadkar indicated earlier this year that there is room "for more flexibility" in the Brexit arrangements that have cast a shadow over Anglo-Irish relations: "One thing that I would concede is that perhaps the protocol as it was originally designed was a little too strict. The protocol is not being fully implemented and yet it is still working. I think that demonstrates that there is some room for further flexibility, for changes that hopefully will make it acceptable to all sides".

Zooming out from the present, this is also a larger historical moment: India and Ireland were colonies of Britain; Ireland became independent in 1922, India in 1947; many Irish were also involved in the British Empire. Portugal was the first European power to

colonise parts of India (1505), and the last to leave (in 1961). But now descendants of Indian immigrants are in position to rule and resolve key issues plaguing the UK and Ireland. The backstory of both Varadkar and Sunak are similar in some ways, but also different, and being of similar age and outlook may be an advantage in efforts to resolve the Northern Ireland conundrum.

Costa visited his ancestral house in Margao in 2017, when he was also presented the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Besides the historical links with Goa, the Costa-led government signed an agreement with India in September 2021 on the recruitment of Indian citizens to work in Portugal. The bilateral instrument facilitates legal and safe labour migration flows between the two countries, establishing the procedures for admission of Indian citizens to work, under an employment contract. It applies to the recruitment for any work activity and regardless of the duration of the employment contract, benefiting Indian workers with the same rights guaranteed by Portuguese law.

Anecdotal and other evidence suggests that the number of Indians in Portugal has surged in recent years, including workers as well as high net worth individuals, who access the citizenship by investment (golden visa) route.

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List of the 12 Best European Countries to Live for Indians

https://visa2fly.com/blog/best-european-countries-for-indians

Have you ever dreamt of living the London life as you enjoy its urban lifestyle spending time at a coffee house or bookstore while working on your dreams?
Living and working in a European country is a dream shared by many Indians who aspire for a better living standard and quality of life. With top economies of the world offering various benefits to skilled professionals in order to combat their labor shortages, Indians

are moving out to foreign countries on a much higher scale with a desire to spend their lives in the best European countries to live.
According to reports, about 32 million people of Indian origin and 13.45 million non-resident Indians make up the Indian diaspora all around the world. Indians often choose to spend their lives in many European countries like the UK, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and Spain among others, after revoking their Indian citizenship. However, the question remains: which are the best European countries to live for Indians?

12 best European countries to live in for Indians

Read below to find out more about the best European countries to live in for Indians and the benefits they offer:

Germany

Ranked 13th among the World Happiness Index 2022, Germany is one of the top economies of the world which provides many career options to Indians.
A hub of leading Global conglomerates, it is a dream destination for engineers along with job opportunities in other fields as well. Providing facilities like healthcare, paid leaves, and a variety of experiences, the country is among the best European countries to live for Indians.
Benefits: Enriching culture and diversity, work-life balance, healthcare, generous paid leaves
Average Salary: 47,400 EUR

Denmark

Who doesn't want to live in a safe as well as happy environment? Denmark is one of the safest and happiest countries to spend your life in.
With a high standard of living, the country is all for promoting work-life balance and social welfare causes and has the least income inequalities in Europe, which remains a big concern in India. According to the European Investment Bank Report, Denmark is among the top productive countries in Europe.
Benefits: Greater employee satisfaction, higher average salaries, lesser working hours compared to other countries
Average Salary: 71,820 EUR

Sweden

Sweden was ranked 7th in the World Happiness Index Report 2022 and is one of the best European countries to live for Indians owing to its culture and work-life balance.

The country is a great place to work if you have a knack for start-ups due to its growing and expanding market and an understanding of global operations.
Though the country has a competitive corporate culture, it provides a healthy job market along with vast opportunities having the 7th highest employment rate globally.
Benefits: Higher employment rates, healthy working environment, social security benefits, overtime compensation for over 40 hours of work time
Average Salary: 49,014 EUR

The Netherlands

Do you seek to become a successful entrepreneur and are looking for an ideal place that can provide you with the best initiatives as well as social security and work-life balance to live a happy and fulfilling life?
If so, the Netherlands is the place for you. Ranked 5th on the World Happiness Index 2022, it is among the best countries to live for Indians while having a strong economy. The country also promotes sustainable energy with the aim of a cleaner and healthier environment thus seeking employees in the energy and tech sectors.
Benefits: Since you need to be sponsored by a company to work in the Netherlands, there will be less expenditure on your part as it covers many benefits. The country is more suitable for long-term employment and also invests in many investor support programs.
Average Salary: 38,500 EUR

UK

The UK has a reputation for being one of the best European countries to live not only for Indians but even for Americans. The country offers competitive benefits, employment opportunities, space to grow, social and health benefits as well as a well-established economy for Indians to work and live a prosperous life.
A hub of education, it is home to world-renowned universities like Oxford and Cambridge universities that provide global exposure to the best employment prospects. With English as the official language of the country, Indians naturally find it easier to settle in the UK.

Benefits: No language barrier, inclusive of diversity and culture, competitive salaries with social security benefits, world-class educational infrastructure with practical and theoretical exposure

Average Salary: 31,461 Pounds

Norway

Would you consider living among the Scandinavian beauty, enjoying its cosmopolitan lifestyle? If yes, then Norway could be your home! The country ranked as the 6th best according to the World Happiness Index 2022.

While it provides potential growth in the energy sector, the country also offers a large number of opportunities in other sectors like IT, engineering, and telecommunication. Owing to all the benefits it offers to the employees, it is one of the best countries to work in all over the world.

Benefits: Pension and retirement benefits, paid paternity and maternity leaves, insurance, educational structure

Average Salary: 50,934 EUR

Portugal

Living in a European country can be pretty expensive for an Indian employee. What if we tell you that this European country is one of the easiest countries in Europe to settle in due to its affordability?

Portugal was ranked among the most peaceful countries in the world in 2020 and also one of the best countries for the working class providing excellent education, vast job opportunities, favourable climate, and economic development.

Benefits: Affordable and inexpensive, fixed bonuses, low crime rates, government aid by contributing to social security

Average Salary: 33,800 EUR

Switzerland

Offering higher salaries than most European countries, along with providing a lavish lifestyle with scenic beauty that puts the mind at ease, Switzerland is one of the best European countries to live for Indians.

A platform of rigorous competition, the country strives to balance between high-earning prospects and a healthy lifestyle. One can easily land a good position with proficiency in English in sectors like pharmaceuticals, engineering, technology, banking, and finance.

Benefits: Higher salaries, better living standards, the hub of tourism and experiences, competitive market

Average Salary: 1,05,000 EUR per 45 hours a week

Finland

Even while working at the best company holding the best position with world-class facilities, a person desires happiness the most in his life.

Ranking as the top country on the World Happiness Index report 2022 consequently for the fifth time, Finland can be considered one of the best European countries to live for Indians. In fact, Finland proudly offers equal pay and employment opportunities to men and women alike and is one of the most gender-equal societies in the world.

Benefits: Equal pay and opportunities for men and women, excellent healthcare and security, government initiatives to ensure the wellness of the people

Average Salary: 43,440 EUR

Ireland

According to reports, Ireland granted the highest number of work permits to Indian nationals in the first quarter of 2023.

With a population of merely 5 million, the country employs a large number of foreign nationals to fill the gaps created by labour shortages in various sectors providing competitive salaries and benefits in order to ensure a healthy lifestyle for the workers. However, you will need a permit in order to work in Ireland.

Benefits: Less competition from the indigenous people, employee benefits, quality of work and life, no language barrier

Average Salary: 49,200 EUR

France

With its rich and welcoming culture, France is among the top countries to settle in as it offers a unique and urbane lifestyle. The country is a hub of world-renowned education with lots of opportunities in research and humanities subjects along with English-taught courses that have made it easier to live in France.

Moreover, France is known for its technological advancements and was ranked 12th on the Global Innovation Index 2022, thus providing many opportunities in this field for tech junkies.

Benefits: Welcoming culture and rich heritage, educational hub, research and tech opportunities

Average Salary: 39,800 EUR (Net per year)

Spain

Not just for a luxurious trip, but Spain is an ideal country to work and love as well. With world-class healthcare and lower living costs, Spain has attracted many people all over the globe who have built a home and income over there.

The inclusivity and welcoming culture of the Spanish people have accepted these expats as their own making it one of the best countries to live for Indians. However, it is beneficial if you are fluent in Spanish to land great jobs in the country.

Along with opportunities in the automotive, pharmaceutical, and fashion sectors, Spain is seeking IT professionals to meet its shortage in the current scenario.

Benefits: Great healthcare benefits, rich culture and tradition, lower living costs compared to other European countries

Average Salary: 45,000 EUR per 40 hours a week

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Some Important Web Links

01] Indian Diaspora in Europe [10 Pages]

https://egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/27460/1/Unit-10.pdf

02] DEVELOPING A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR POLICYMAKING ON INDIA-EU MIGRATION [40 Pages]

https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/EthnicityandDiasporicIdentity.pdf

03] Indian Diaspora in Europe

https://compass.rauias.com/international-relations/diaspora-in-europe/

04] Indian Diaspora in Germany [80 Pages]
https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/53694/file/ICMPD-Indian_diaspora_in_Germany.pdf

05] Europe's first Indian immigrants

https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Europe%E2%80%99s-first-Indian-immigrants/article12441164.ece



Impacts of Eastern European migration

Indian Australian Diaspora

High Commission of India
Canberra, Australia
Concurrently accredited to Nauru

Indian Community in Australia

https://hcicanberra.gov.in/page/indian-community-in-australia/

There is a rapidly growing Indian community in Australia. According to 2021 census, about 9,76,000 in Australia trace Indian ancestry. Indian diaspora is the second largest and fastest growing diaspora in Australia. Indian students numbering 1,22,391 (September 2023) form the second largest cohort of foreign-born students in Australia.

According to Australian records, a small group of Indians arrived in Australia in the years 1800-1816, sent as convict labourers by British colonial authorities. During the first 60 years of the 19th century, most of the Indians who arrived in Australia were recruited as labourers by the British Government; they later settled down in Australia. In the last four decades of the 19th century, many Indians, particularly Sikhs and Muslims from Punjab, settled on the northern coast of New South Wales as agricultural labourers, hawkers or traders. There were also several Indians from the Punjab and North West Frontier Province who ran the 'camel trains', which were the main means of transport into the interior of Australia before the road and rail networks were developed. They would transport goods and mail by camels over the outback and were collectively known as Afghans, abbreviated by Australians to "Ghans". Indians also took part in the gold rush in the Victorian gold fields. Several Sikhs also came to work on the banana plantations in Southern Queensland and through their hard work and enterprise, came to own their own plantations.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Australian records indicate the presence of around 6500 - 7000 Indians in Australia. This figure continued to remain the same until after the end of World War II. After India's independence in 1947, a large number of Anglo - Indians migrated to Australia.

The next period of immigration from India began after 1966, with the influx of teachers, doctors and other professionals from India. Large numbers of Indian software professionals began arriving in Australia from the eighties. Persons of Indian origin also came here from other countries.

In all States and major cities, there are associations/organizations of Indians. There are also umbrella federations of Indian associations in the States/Territories. There are also several ethnic publications, Indian language programmes on radio, Indian language schools, and Indian dance schools in all major cities.

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Australian Government

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Australia's Indian Diaspora
A National Asset - Mapping the Community's Reach into the Australia-India Economic Relationship

https://www.dfat.gov.au/IndianDiaspora

Australia and India benefit from a long-standing relationship, with deep people-to-people links. As India celebrates its 75th anniversary of independence in 2022, a generation of skilled migrants, professionals and students make the Indian diaspora Australia's fastest growing large diaspora. As of 2020, Indian migrants became the second-largest group of overseas-born residents, at over 721,000.

Indian diaspora communities are active across all aspects of Australian life, including in business, politics, the judiciary, government, civil society, academia, science, the arts and sport. They are recognised for being rich sources of dynamism and enterprise. As Australia's strategic and economic ties with India continue to gain ground, a range of Indian diaspora networks have demonstrated their readiness to contribute their expertise and entrepreneurialism to the economic relationship. Many groups have the connections, language skills and know-how relevant to understanding India's complex markets and influencing Australia's perception within them.

The focus of this first-of-its-kind report is to develop a better understanding of the Indian diaspora's reach into the Australia-India economic relationship. The research presented will inform further engagement and collaboration with Indian diaspora networks as well as the consideration of diaspora engagement strategies to better target engagement and grow ties between Australia and India.

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Indian Diaspora in Australia Collecting Project

National Library of Australia staff looking at an album of paintings of Indian native costume on mica.

https://www.nla.gov.au/news-and-media/media-releases/2024/indian-diaspora-australia-collecting-project

The National Library of Australia is calling on Australians with Indian heritage to add their story and experiences to the national collection.

Australians with Indian heritage are Australia's fastest growing migrant group, comprising over 750,000 people in 2022. Indian diaspora communities have made very significant contributions to many aspects of Australian society.

The Indian diaspora in Australia collecting project will capture diverse stories and voices through multiple formats, including recorded interviews, books, newsletters, newspapers, photographs, and personal archives.

Director of Curatorial and Collection Research at the National Library, Nicki Mackay-Sim, said 'We're calling on Australians with Indian heritage to help the library build a collection about their lives and experiences, work and organisations. We're interested in getting to know communities. To learn about what's important to them and to record their stories.'

The library is looking to connect with Australians whose heritage can be traced to the Indian subcontinent, including individuals who have Indian heritage but have migrated to Australia from countries as diverse as Singapore, Fiji, Malaysia, from within Africa, or a range of other places.

If you have items to donate or want to tell your story, the library would like to hear from you. The stories captured will become a part of the national collection and will enable Australians to understand their diverse social, cultural and intellectual histories.

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Australia's Indian diaspora

'Very aspirational and ambitious'

The Malabar jewellery store opening in Harris Park, Sydney.

Indian Australians

Ratha Yatra procession in Brisbane

Total population
783,958 by **ancestry** (2021 census) (**3.1%** of the Australian population) **721,050** born in India (2020)
Regions with significant populations
Melbourne, Sydney, Perth, Brisbane, Adelaide, Woolgoolga and Regional Victoria
Languages
• **Australian English** • Indian languages
Religion

- **Predominantly**:

Hinduism

Minorities:

Christianity • Islam • Sikhism • Buddhism • Jainism • other Indian Religions • Irreligion

Related ethnic groups

- Punjabi Australians
- Indian New Zealanders, British Indians, Indian Canadians, Indian Americans, Overseas Indian Diaspora, Bangladeshi Australians, Pakistani Australians, Sri Lankan Australians

Pre-history migration of Indians (2300 BCE–2000 BCE)

A study of Indigenous Australian DNA has found that Indigenous Australians may have mixed with people of Indian origin about 4,200 years ago. The same study showed that flint tools and Indian dogs may have been introduced from India at about this time. A 2012 paper reports that there is also evidence of a substantial genetic flow from India to northern Australia estimated at slightly over four thousand years ago, a time when changes in tool technology and food processing appear in the Australian archaeological record, suggesting that these may be related. One genetic study in 2012 by Irina Pugach and colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology has suggested that about 4,000 years before the First Fleet landed in Australia (in 1788), some Indian explorers had settled in Australia and assimilated into the local population in roughly 2217 BC. The study by the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology found that there was a migration of genes from India to Australia around 2000 BCE. The researchers had two theories for this: either some Indians had contact with people in Indonesia who eventually transferred those genes from India to Aboriginal Australians, or that a group of Indians migrated all the way from India to Australia and intermingled with the locals directly.

Kindly visit these Web Pages

01] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Australians

02] https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/how-little-india-became-a-new-force-in-australian-politics-20240212-p5f4d2

03] https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Bangalore/indian-community-is-australias-second-largest-and-fastest-growing-overseas-group/article67882854.ece

AUSTRALIAN GOVT ENSURE SAFETY OF
STOP RACIST ATTACKS ON INDIAN STUDENTS
TAKE STRICT ACTION AGAINST HOOLIGANS
AUSTRALIA
GOVT. ENSURE SAFETY OF

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Indian South American Diaspora

India turns to Latin America

Author:

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The corridors of New Delhi's South Block, which houses the offices of India's prime minister and foreign minister, are buzzing with chatter about a rare topic in recent days: Latin America.

That is thanks to Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar's recent visit to four countries in the region, Guyana, Panama, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Latin America has received this much attention from India perhaps only twice before, during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to eight countries in the region in 1968, and again last August, during Jaishankar's visit to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

In fact, to most Indian diplomats, the acronym LAC, a common abbreviation for Latin America and the Caribbean, instead stands for the Line of Actual Control between India and China.

Equally notable is that India has been in the news lately in Latin America, including in Guyana, Panama, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Coverage of the first-ever visit of an Indian foreign minister to these countries produced generally optimistic commentary about the possibility that it signalled a change in policy in New Delhi. Before Jaishankar's recent travels, the last time an Indian foreign minister had made a similar journey to Latin America was two decades ago.

> Jaishankar said India's ambition to become a global power required a footprint in Latin America."

India's apparently increased interest in Latin America reflects the priorities of the foreign minister, a former career diplomat. In a speech in February at an India-Latin America conference in Delhi, Jaishankar **said** India's ambition to become a global power required a footprint in Latin America. His counterparts in the region have welcomed the interest of one of the world's largest nations. In seven of the eight countries he visited, Jaishankar met with heads of state.

Though the foreign minister's visits did not produce immediate outcomes, the trip should be seen as the beginning of a broader, high-level dialogue between India and the region. Indeed, during his travels, Jaishankar met with nearly two dozen ministers, including at the India-CARICOM summit in the Caribbean and the India-SICA meeting in Central America. Those discussions will likely lead to deeper engagement between India and Latin America, and catalyze greater trade and investment.

The main driver of this new relationship will be economics. One of the highlights of Jaishankar's trip was the Latin America-India Business Forum, held in Panama, which brought together business leaders from India and Latin America, as well as representatives of the CAF development bank and the Confederation of Indian Industry. Despite little political engagement, there is already substantial trade between India and the region; last year, trade hit a record $50 billion. Moreover, there is an enormous possibility to expand Indian trade and investment, including in Central America.

> For India, a greater presence in Latin America reflects a national drive for global influence and a seat at the table alongside major powers."

That said, India's new political interest in the region is also significant. For India, a greater presence in Latin America reflects a national drive for global influence and a seat at the table alongside major powers. For Latin America, engagement with India promises new partnerships, not only for trade and investment, but also for diplomatic support as the region navigates an increasingly complex international environment.

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Ministry of External Affairs

Government of India

Latin American Politics and International Relations

Author:

R. Viswanathan, Ambassador (Retd.)

Venue: Jadhavpur University

Date: July 20, 2022

https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?891

Latin American politics and international relations are more colourful, eventful, exciting, explosive and different from other parts of the world. The history of Latin American politics is filled with dramas, comedies and tragedies. The region is known for crazy caudillos, bloody military coups, brutal dictators, glorious revolutions, fierce guerilla wars and ideological competition between Marxism, Maoism, Leninism and Trotskyism. In fact, Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico City in 1941.

A Bengali revolutionary MN Roy had added to the colour of Latin American politics. He was a founder of the Communist Party of Mexico before he came back to found the Communist party of India. He spent over two years in Mexico from 1917 to 1919. He was very active in the Mexican leftist politics besides writing articles and books. When he travelled to Russia for a Communist conference, the Mexican government had given him a diplomatic passport with the false name of Roberto

Vila Garcia to avoid the British and American harassment due to his communist activities. Roy called Mexico as 'the land of his rebirth'. Today, the house where he stayed in Mexico city has been converted into a vibrant bar/night club with the name MN Roy.

The politics of Latin America has evolved in four stages:

First- Era of caudillos and oligarchs from the 1920s to 1950. There were constant power struggles and civil wars with occasional democratic periods.

Second - Era of cold war politics 1950-1980. In the name of the war on communism, hundreds of thousands of leftists were hunted, detained, tortured and killed by the military dictatorships supported by the US. The 1954 overthrow of the democratically elected leftist president Arbanz of Guatemala and installation of a military dictatorship, had made the Latin Americans angry. The 1959 Cuban Revolution was an inspiration to leftists in the region who took to arms to overthrow right-wing dictatorships and bring about a utopian state. The iconic leaders Fidel Castro and Che Guevara had impact and influence around the world, going beyond Latin America. The 1973 overthrow of the leftist government of Allende followed by the brutalities the Pinochet dictatorship was a shock to the region. The success of the Sandinista Revolution in 1979 and the overthrow of the US-backed Somoza dictatorship was yet another moment of celebration of the Left.

Third- Transition period 1980-1990 when the military dictatorships ended and democracies were restored. But the fragile democracies were subjected to imposition of neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus. This had worsened the poverty and inequality in the region.

Fourth- Era of Pink Tide since 2000. In the elections held in the first decade of the century, the people voted for leftist leaders like Lula, Lugo, Vasquez, Correa and Chavez who had agendas for the poor. The high commodity prices and global demand had certainly helped the leftist governments who had brought down poverty levels. However, some leftist governments were voted out in the second decade because of issues of corruption and abuse of power. Rightists were elected in some countries such as Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. But in the last few years, the Left has bounced back. Mexico and Colombia have elected leftist governments for the first time in the last seven decades. In Brazil, Lula is expected to come back to power in the October 2022 elections. This will complete the Latin American circle of the left. This is the first time that the seven largest and most important Latin American countries with the biggest markets – Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela - will all be ruled by leftist governments. This is unprecedented in the history of the region.

The democracies of the region have now become more stable and stronger. Political power has moved out of the barracks and oligarchic mansions to the

streets. Top-down politics has given way to bottoms-up. It is the new empowered masses who matter the most in the elections and who drive the political and economic agenda of the region. Obviously, they elect those leaders and parties who have the agenda for their welfare. If the elected presidents fail to fulfil their promises, the masses vote them out in the next elections. In a few cases, the masses have brought down elected presidents through agitations and protests even before the completion of their terms. This had happened in Brazil in 1992, in Argentina in 2002, in Bolivia in 2003 and 2005 and in Ecuador in 2000 and 2005. The student agitations in Chile in 2011-12 and the Brazilian protests in 2013-14 have given a shock and clear signal to the governments and the political parties that they needed to be responsible and accountable. This is good for the long-term stability of democracies in the region.

The democracies have become more inclusive and representative. Previously excluded sections of the society have now come to power. The most emblematic of this is the election of Evo Morales as the President of Bolivia in 2005 and his re-election in 2009 and 2014. This is the first time in the history of Bolivia and in South America, a native Indian has become President. Although 60% of the Bolivians are native Indians, they were kept outside the political and economic positions in the last five hundred years. The election of Morales is a moment of pride and honor for the 40 million native Indians in Latin America. Another important example was the election of Lugo Fernandez, a catholic bishop without political background and a complete political outsider, as president of Paraguay in 2008. It was historic since he was able to defeat the money and muscle power of the traditional oligarchic Colorado party.

The Latin American leftist presidents are a challenge to the traditional hegemony of US. The Latin American leaders had started integration of the region with formation of regional groups such as CELAC and UNASUR to acquire collective strength vis a vis the US which had treated the region as its ' backyard'. In the second Pink Tide, even the traditional pro-US countries Mexico and Colombia have elected leftist presidents. The Mexican President Lopez Obrador has discontinued the pro-American policies of his predecessors and boycotted the recent Summit of the Americas hosted by President Biden to show his opposition to the US policy of isolation of the leftist-ruled Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. So, the US will become isolated in the Americas for the first time. This should hopefully make the Americans to give up on their failed policies of interventions and devise a new constructive and positive agenda for the region. The Chinese are quietly increasing their clout in the region with billions of dollars of investment, credit and trade while the US continues with its relentless policy of lecturing and bullying the region on democracy, human rights, migration, drug trafficking and corruption.

Costa Rica has made history in the world by having abolished its armed forces in 1948. It is a civilisational advance. The country proclaims proudly that they spend their money on education and healthcare instead of arms. Oscar Arias, the former president and Nobel Peace Prize winner said ¨ Our children walk with books under

their arms rather than guns on their shoulders. We are an unarmed people, whose children have never seen a fighter or a tank or a warship. We are a people without arms and we are fighting to continue to be a people without hunger. My country is a country of teachers and peace. We discuss our successes and failures in complete freedom. We believe in dialogue, in agreement, in reaching a consensus, in convincing our opponents, not defeating them. We prefer raising the fallen to crushing them, because we believe that no one possesses the absolute truth". Costa Rica has remained as a beacon of solid and vibrant democratic stability and maturity in Latin America in the last seven decades. The country has held regular elections every four years and peaceful transfer of power in the last sixty years. This is remarkable and distinct in the contemporary history of Latin America where many countries had suffered military dictatorships, civil wars and interruption of democracies.

The resurgent pink tide in Latin America is good news for India since the leftist governments, in general, seek closer cooperation and partnership with India to address common developmental challenges in a democratic way. They are keen to import more Indian generic medicines to reduce the cost of health care. They invite Indian IT companies to open more software centres in the region to help with employment and skilling of their human resources. India's success stories in poverty alleviation, affirmative actions for empowerment of underprivileged and emergence as an IT powerhouse resonate more with the leftist leaders. Latin America has emerged as a source of energy and food (especially edible oil and pulses), fitting in with India's strategic policy of diversification in energy and food security. The leftist governments would be more willing to collaborate with India in UN, WTO and other multilateral fora in the spirit of South-South solidarity. So it is time for India to intensify its engagement with the region.

India's exports to Latin America reached a record high of 18.89 billion dollars in 2021-22 (April-March), according to the Commerce Ministry of India. The exports have increased by an impressive 48% from 12.74 billion dollars in 2020-21.

India's exports of 552 million dollars to the distant Guatemala (population 11 million) are more than twice that of the exports of 198 m to the neighbouring Cambodia with a population of 16 million.

Exports of 318 m to the remote Honduras (population 10 m) are more than the exports of 235 m to nearby Kazakhstan with a population of 19 m.

Exports to Brazil (6.48 bn) are higher than to the traditional trade partners such as Japan (6.18 bn) and Thailand (5.7 bn)

Exports to Mexico (4.43 bn) are more than the exports to Canada (3.7 bn) and Russia (3.2 bn).

Car exports to Latin America were 1793 million dollars. This was 30% of India's global car exports of 5.92 bn dollars. Mexico was the second largest global market for Indian cars with 941 m. Other major destinations:Chile 337 m and Peru 115 m

Exports of motor cycles were 909 million dollars. This is 30.5 % of India's global exports of 2.99 bn. India was the second largest supplier of motorcycles to Latin America. Major destinations were Colombia 309 million dollars, Mexico 174 m, Guatemala 103 m and Peru 43 m. Colombia was the second largest global market for Indian motorcycles after Nigeria. Some years back Colombia was the # 1 destination. Indian brands are market leaders in Colombia and Guatemala.

Pharma exports increased to 1486 million dollars from 1196 m last year. India ranked as #6 supplier of pharmaceuticals to the region.

Latin America is a substantially large market with 19 countries, population of 620 million and GDP of 6 trillion dollars. The Indian exporters are still in the stage of discovery and exploration of the huge potential of the region. There is good scope to increase India's exports to 50 billion dollars by 2030.

The Latin Americans seek to reduce their overdependence on China with which there is a huge trust deficit. As part of their diversification strategy, they attach importance to the large growing market of India which was the 7th largest destination of their global exports in 2021. They exported more to India than to their traditional trade partners such as Germany, France or UK. India was the #1 destination of Latin American exports of vegetable oil, #3 for gold, #4 for crude oil and #8 for copper.

China has 400 billion of dollars of trade with Latin America. It has given a credit of 160 billion dollars and invested over 110 billion dollars. China has over 60 Latin America study centres besides hundreds of Spanish and Portuguese language institutes. In India there is a need for more Latin America study centres and language institutes. The Jadavpur University, which has one of India's oldest Department of International Relations, could consider setting up a Latin America Study Centre and also include Spanish and Portuguese language courses. The students of International Relations of the University could consider joining Indian Foreign Service through the civil service examination.

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Relationship between India, countries of Latin America critical element of India's foreign policy

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/relationship-between-india-countries-of-latin-america-critical-element-of-indias-foreign-policy/articleshow/99993447.cms?from=m

The flourishing relationship between India and countries of Latin America has become a critical element of India's foreign policy.

The relationship's primary aims include enhancing India's energy security, broadening economic opportunities, fostering diaspora ties, promoting regional cooperation and deepening people-to-people contact.

Latin America is home to several oil-rich nations, such as Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and India is seeking to diversify its sources of oil and gas. Given the current geopolitical climate and the associated risks, these nations provide an attractive alternative for India to diversify its energy portfolio.

India is also exploring the possibility of investing in the renewable energy sector in the region, seeking to capitalize on the vast potential for growth in the area of energy security.

In terms of economic opportunities, the prospects for cooperation between Latin America and India are promising. The Caribbean region, with a population of over 40 million, is a rapidly growing market where India is seeking to expand its trade and investment, especially in sectors such as tourism, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.

A joint business council's establishment to promote trade and investment is also under consideration.

Countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname, have a substantial Indian diaspora with strong historical and cultural ties to India, which India seeks to engage more closely.

India's engagement with regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) is also a key component of its outreach to these countries. These organizations provide a platform for India to engage on a wide range of issues, including climate change, security, and regional integration.

External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar's recent visit to four countries in the region, Guyana, Panama, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, was of utmost significance, particularly as it was the first visit to these countries by an Indian Foreign Minister.

The visit emphasizes the strategic importance of these nations in India's foreign policy goals and highlights the range of issues discussed, including mining, energy, climate change, and trade.

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Some useful Web Pages:

01] https://theprint.in/diplomacy/how-india-is-boosting-its-strategic-economic-ties-with-distant-latin-america-caribbean/1859779/

02] https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/indias-rising-presence-in-latin-america/

03] https://www.economist.com/international/2023/06/12/indias-diaspora-is-bigger-and-more-influential-than-any-in-history

04] https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/1999/04/win-it?lang=en

05] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinduism_in_South_America#:~:text=There%20are%20about%20320%2C000%20Hindus,some%20others%20in%20French%20Guiana.

06] https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/india-migration-report-2010-2011/indian-migrants-in-the-global-south-in-the-americas-the-caribbean-and-central-and-south-america/A325205E193A4CB2E248730CDE228211

07] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/relationship-between-india-countries-of-latin-america-critical-element-of-indias-foreign-policy/articleshow/99993447.cms?from=mdr

(☺)(☺)(☺)(☺)(☺)

European Americans

Largest white alone or in any combination group by county in the 2020 United States census.

tal population

133 million European-diaspora Americans
41% of total U.S. population (2017)[1][a]
(as opposed to **235.4 million** Americans identifying as White in combination with other races and **204.3 million** self-identifying as white)[2]
61.6% of the total U.S. population (2020)

Regions with significant populations

Contiguous United States and Alaska
smaller populations in Hawaii and the territories

Languages

Predominantly English, but also other languages of Europe

Religion

Predominantly Christianity (Mainly Protestantism and Roman Catholicism);
Minority religions: Judaism, Mormonism, Islam, Neo-Paganism, Scientology, Irreligion, Atheism

European Immigrants in the United States

A celebration for the Feast of San Gennaro in New York's Little Italy.

Authors:
Feyisayo Oyolola and Jeanne Batalova

Published on 11 Jan 2024

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/european-immigrants-united-states-2022

Europe has been a major source of North American immigration and population growth for more than five centuries. However, Europeans' prevalence among U.S. immigrants began to wane in the second half of the 20th century. Significant changes in U.S. immigration policy in 1965 opened pathways for non-European immigrants, bright economic opportunities in post-World War II Western Europe made emigration less attractive, and Communist governments in most Eastern Europe countries erected barriers to emigration, all of which led to a significant drop in both the numbers and share of European immigrants in the United States. Whereas in 1960 Europeans constituted 75 percent of all U.S. immigrants, their share fell to 22 percent by 1990. While the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to a rise in immigration primarily from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the proportion of European immigrants in the United States has continued to fall.

Europeans comprised 10 percent, or slightly more than 4.7 million, of the 46.2 million immigrants living in the United States in 2022, according to the most recent U.S.

Census Bureau data. Europeans represent the third-largest region-origin immigrant group after those from the Americas (52 percent) and Asia (31 percent). Recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked new movements to the United States, with Ukrainians and Russians alike seeking refuge and opportunity. This trend highlights how geopolitical events continue to influence migration patterns.

Europeans are more likely than other immigrants to have strong English skills and to be naturalized U.S. citizens. Compared to immigrants overall and the U.S. born, European immigrants are more likely to hold a bachelor's degree and have a higher income. European immigrants also tend to be considerably older than the overall foreign- and native-born populations. While most Europeans who became lawful permanent residents (LPRs, also known as green-card holders) in fiscal year (FY) 2022 did so through family reunification channels, nearly one-third were sponsored by U.S. employers.

This Spotlight provides information on the European immigrant population in the United States, focusing on its size, geographic distribution, and socioeconomic characteristics.

Definitions
The U.S. Census Bureau defines the "**foreign born**" as individuals who had no U.S. citizenship at birth. The foreign-born population includes naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees, legal nonimmigrants (including those on student, work, or other temporary visas), and people residing in the country without authorization.
The terms "**foreign born**" and "**immigrant**" are used interchangeably and refer to those who were born in another country and later emigrated to the United States.
The U.S. Census Bureau defines European subregions as:

Eastern Europe, which includes Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. In this Spotlight, Czechoslovakia is reported together with or separately from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, depending on the original data source.
Northern Europe, which includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Southern Europe, which includes Andorra, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, San Marino, and Spain.
Western Europe, which includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

Click on the bullet points below for more information:

- **Size of Immigrant Population over Time**
- **Subregions and Countries of Origin**
- **Distribution by U.S. State and Key Cities**
- **English Proficiency**

- **Age, Education, and Employment**
- **Income and Poverty**
- **Immigration Pathways and Naturalization**
- **Unauthorized Immigrant Population**
- **Health Coverage**
- **Diaspora**
- **Top Global Destinations**
- **Remittances**

Size of Immigrant Population over Time

The European immigrant population has mostly declined over the last four decades, except for during the post-Cold War period between 1990 and 2000. It decreased by 16 percent between 1980 and 1990, and then increased by 13 percent from 1990 to 2000. The downward trend subsequently resumed at a more moderate rate, with a decrease of around 2 percent from 2000 to 2010 and then again from 2010 and 2022.

Figure 1. European Immigrant Population in the United States, 1980-2022

Sources: Data from U.S. Census Bureau 2010 and 2022 American Community Surveys (ACS), and Campbell J. Gibson and Kay Jung, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-2000" (Working Paper no. 81, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, February 2006), available online.

Subregions and Countries of Origin

Between 1990 and 2010, the number of Eastern European immigrants increased significantly due in part to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia (see Figure 2). This growth began to taper off with enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007; when many Eastern European countries joined the bloc, their nationals had easier access to other Member States and felt less pull to migrate to the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S. population of Europeans from other parts of the continent continued to decrease.

Figure 2. European Immigrants in the United States, by Subregion of Birth, 1960–2022



Note: The increase in Eastern European immigration from 1990 to 2010 is particularly noteworthy, given that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the U.S. Census Bureau reclassified some former Soviet republics such as Armenia and Kazakhstan as part of Asia rather than Eastern Europe.

Sources: Data from U.S. Census Bureau 2010 and 2022 ACS and Gibson and Jung, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-2000."

In 2022, Eastern European immigrants accounted for the largest share of Europeans in the United States, at 46 percent (see Table 1). They were followed by Western and Northern Europeans, who each made up about 19 percent. The top origin countries were the United Kingdom, Germany, Ukraine, Russia, and Poland, together representing 51 percent of all European immigrants.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 led to Europe's largest displacement crisis since World War II and forced millions of Ukrainians to flee their country. While the overwhelming majority settled in countries across Europe, as of end of 2023 more than 186,000 were estimated to have arrived in the United States by seeking entry at the U.S.-Mexico border or participating in a special humanitarian parole program called Uniting for Ukraine. Russians previously comprised the largest group of Eastern Europeans in the United States, but in 2022 they were overtaken by Ukrainians.

Table 1. European Immigrants by Subregion and Country of Origin, 2022

Region and Country	Number of Immigrants	Percent (%)
TOTAL	**4,729,000**	**100%**
Eastern Europe	**2,199,000**	**46%**
Ukraine	427,000	9%
Russia	398,000	8%
Poland	374,000	8%
Romania	158,000	3%
Albania	106,000	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	100,000	2%
Belarus	79,000	2%
Bulgaria	70,000	1%
Czechoslovakia (inc. Czech Republic and Slovakia)	62,000	1%
Hungary	60,000	1%
Moldova	56,000	1%
Serbia	46,000	1%
Croatia	37,000	1%
Lithuania	30,000	1%
North Macedonia (Macedonia)	27,000	1%
Latvia	24,000	1%
Other Eastern Europe	144,000	3%
Western Europe	**909,000**	**19%**
Germany	537,000	11%
France	182,000	4%
Netherlands	79,000	2%
Switzerland	39,000	1%
Austria	35,000	1%
Belgium	34,000	1%
Other Western Europe	3,000	0%
Northern Europe	**901,000**	**19%**
United Kingdom	677,000	14%
Ireland	112,000	2%
Sweden	42,000	1%
Denmark	26,000	1%
Norway	22,000	0%
Other Northern Europe	22,000	0%
Southern Europe	**702,000**	**15%**
Italy	295,000	6%
Portugal	160,000	3%
Spain	126,000	3%
Greece	116,000	2%
Other Southern Europe	6,000	0%
Other Europe	**17,000**	**0%**

Distribution by U.S. State and Key Cities

Immigrants from Europe were highly concentrated in New York and California (15 percent and 14 percent, respectively) in the 2017-21 period. The next three most populous states—Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey—were home to approximately 22 percent of the European population collectively. The top five counties for European immigrants were Cook County, Illinois; Kings County, New York; Los Angeles County, California; and Queens and New York counties in New York. Together these counties accounted for 17 percent of European immigrants in the United States.

Figure 3. Top States of Residence for European Immigrants in the United States, 2017-21



Note: Pooled 2017-21 ACS data were used to get statistically valid estimates at the state level for smaller-population geographies. Not shown is the population in Alaska, which is small in size; for details, visit the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Migration Data Hub for an interactive map showing geographic distribution of immigrants by state and county, available online.

Source: MPI tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's pooled 2017-21 ACS.

Click here for an interactive map that highlights the states and counties with the highest concentrations of immigrants from Europe and other regions and countries.

The greater New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas were home to 30 percent of European immigrants in the United States as of the 2017-21 period. Around 4 percent of all residents in the greater New York and Chicago metro areas were born in Europe (see Table 2).

Figure 4. Top Metropolitan Destinations for European Immigrants in the United States, 2017-21



Note: Pooled 2017-21 ACS data were used to get statistically valid estimates at the metropolitan statistical-area level for smaller-population geographies. Not shown are the populations in Alaska and Hawaii, which are small in size; for details, visit MPI's Migration Data Hub for an interactive map showing geographic distribution of immigrants by metro area, available online.

Source: MPI tabulation of data from U.S. Census Bureau pooled 2017-21 ACS.

Click here for an interactive map that highlights the metro areas with the most immigrants from Europe and other regions and countries.

Table 2. Top Concentrations of European Immigrants by U.S. Metropolitan Area, 2017-21

Metropolitan Area	Immigrant Population from Europe	% of Metro Area Population
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area	864,000	4.3%
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Metro Area	360,000	3.7%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area	224,000	1.7%
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH Metro Area	156,000	3.2%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL Metro Area	143,000	2.3%
San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA Metro Area	131,000	2.8%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD Metro Area	115,000	1.9%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area	115,000	1.8%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA Metro Area	112,000	2.8%
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI Metro Area	86,000	2.0%

Source: MPI tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau pooled 2017-21 ACS.

English Proficiency

Europeans are much more likely to be proficient in English and speak English at home than the overall foreign-born population.

In 2022, approximately 25 percent of European immigrants ages 5 and over reported speaking English less than "very well," compared to 46 percent of all foreign born in the United States. Immigrants from Eastern Europe were the most likely to have limited English proficiency (38 percent), followed by those from Southern Europe (33 percent) and Western Europe (9 percent), while Northern Europeans were the least likely (2 percent).

At the country level, immigrants from Ukraine were the most likely to have limited proficiency in English (49 percent), followed by those from Belarus and Albania (44 percent each). Meanwhile, less than 10 percent of immigrants from Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United Kingdom reported having limited proficiency in English. In many European countries, English is a lingua franca for business and education, or a native language.

Overall, European immigrants were twice as likely to speak only English at home compared to all immigrants (35 percent versus 17 percent, respectively).

Age, Education, and Employment

European immigrants tend to be significantly older than the overall foreign- and native-born populations. The median age of European immigrants in 2022 was approximately 54 years, compared to 47 for all immigrants and 37 for the U.S. born. European immigrants were much more likely to be seniors (ages 65 and over) than the foreign- and U.S.-born populations (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Age Distribution of the U.S. Population by Origin, 2022



However, age distribution varies considerably by origin country. Eastern European immigrants are overwhelmingly of working age (18 to 64 years old), particularly those from Bosnia and Herzegovina (87 percent), Bulgaria (83 percent), Albania (81

percent), and Belarus (77 percent). In contrast, a significant proportion of the foreign born from several countries were 65 or over, including those from Italy (54 percent), Greece (50 percent), Germany (46 percent), the Netherlands (42 percent), and Portugal (41 percent).

Europeans ages 25 and over have much higher educational attainment rates than the native- and overall foreign-born populations. In 2022, approximately 47 percent of European immigrant adults had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to about 36 percent of the U.S. born and 35 percent of all immigrants (see Figure 6). Among Europeans who arrived between 2020 and 2022, 68 percent held at least a four-year college degree, a rate much higher than that of all immigrants arriving in that period (48 percent).

Click here for data on immigrants' educational attainment by country of origin and overall.

Figure 6. Educational Attainment of the U.S. Population (ages 25 and older) by Origin, 2022



Source: MPI tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau 2022 ACS.

The educational attainment of European immigrants can be explained by the high levels of education in origin countries as well as the channels through which they enter the United States. Many arrive as international college students or high-skilled temporary workers on H-1B visas, who later apply for a green card.

In the 2022-23 school year, approximately 90,000 international students from Europe studied in the United States, comprising about 9 percent of all 1.1 million international students. The top European origin countries were the United Kingdom (11,000), Germany (10,000), France and Spain (9,000 each), and Italy (6,000).

Several European countries were among the top 20 countries of origin for immigrants receiving coveted H-1B visas in FY 2022. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy jointly accounted for slightly more than 1 percent of the 442,000 petitions for initial and continuing employment that were approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Most H-1B petitions (73 percent) went to Indian nationals.

Reflecting their older average age, European immigrants participate in the labor force at a lower rate than both the native- and overall foreign-born populations. In 2022, about 59 percent of Europeans ages 16 and over were in the civilian labor force, compared to 67 percent of all immigrants and 62 percent of the native born. More than half of all Europeans were employed in management, business, science, and arts occupations, a much higher share than the overall foreign- and native-born populations (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Employed Workers in the Civilian Labor Force (ages 16 and older) by Occupation and Origin, 2022



Source: MPI tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau 2022 ACS.

Management, business, science, and art occupations were the primary occupational group for immigrants from all European countries for which data were available, although the share of workers in those occupations varied. Approximately 72 percent of immigrants born in France worked in those occupations, compared to 48 percent of Ukrainians and 36 percent of immigrants from Portugal and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second most common set of occupations was sales and office for most European groups, although immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina were more likely to work in production, transportation, and material moving occupations, and those from Albania were more likely to work in service occupations.

Income and Poverty

European immigrants tend to have significantly higher incomes than the native born and immigrants overall. In 2022, households headed by a European immigrant had a median income of $86,000, compared to $75,000 for both all immigrant and U.S.-born households.

In 2022, 10 percent of Europeans were living in poverty, compared to 12 percent for the native born and 14 percent for immigrants overall. Poverty levels varied by country of origin; 14 percent of immigrants from Russia and Ukraine reported living in poverty, as did 7 percent of those from the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands. (The U.S. Census Bureau defines poverty as having an income below $29,700 for a family of four in 2022.)

Immigration Pathways and Naturalization

European immigrants are more likely than the overall foreign-born population to be naturalized U.S. citizens. About 67 percent of European immigrants in the United States had acquired U.S. citizenship as of 2022, compared to 53 percent of all immigrants. Immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina (84 percent), Romania (80 percent), and Greece (77 percent) were the most likely to be naturalized citizens, while those from Spain (45 percent) and France (53 percent) were the least likely.

In general, Europeans have resided in the United States longer than other immigrants. The largest share, approximately 57 percent, arrived prior to 2000 (see Figure 8). However, a sizeable share of Spanish (47 percent), French (41 percent), and Albanian (39 percent) immigrants arrived since 2010, compared to 9 percent of those from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Figure 8. Europeans and All Immigrants in the United States by Period of Arrival, 2022



Just like the overall immigrant population receiving a green card in FY 2022, most Europeans became permanent residents through family reunification channels. In FY 2022, 51 percent of the roughly 76,000 Europeans who became LPRs did so as

immediate relatives of U.S. citizens or through other family-based pathways. Europeans were slightly more likely than the overall immigrant population to have obtained a green card through employment channels (30 percent versus 27 percent), and they were more likely to have received a green card as the result of the Diversity Visa lottery (12 percent versus 4 percent; see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Immigration Pathways of European and All Lawful Permanent Residents in the United States, 2022



Notes: Immediate Relatives of U.S. Citizens: Includes spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens. *Family-Sponsored Preferences*: Includes adult children and siblings of U.S. citizens as well as spouses and children of green-card holders. The Diversity Visa lottery was established by the Immigration Act of 1990 to allow entry to immigrants from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States. The law states that 55,000 diversity visas in total are made available each fiscal year. Individuals born in every European country were eligible for the 2025 lottery. Percentages may not add up to 100 as they are rounded to the nearest whole number.
Source: MPI tabulation of data from Department of Homeland Security (DHS), "Table 10D: Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Broad Class of Admission and Region and Country of Birth: Fiscal Year 2022," updated August 21, 2023, available online.

Pathways to permanent residency vary by country of origin. In FY 2022, a greater share of new green-card holders from France (57 percent) and Finland (52 percent) gained legal permanent residence via employment-based preferences than those from Albania (5 percent) and Montenegro (6 percent). At the same time, 22 percent of new LPRs from Moldova and 18 percent each from Kosovo and Ukraine obtained a green card by adjusting their status from refugee or asylee. A significant share of Eastern Europeans received a green card through the Diversity Visa lottery, including those from Belarus (38 percent), Kosovo (27 percent), and Moldova and Albania (24 percent each).

Unauthorized Immigrant Population

Although most European immigrants in the United States are legally present, approximately 599,000 were unauthorized in 2021, according to Migration Policy

Institute (MPI) estimates, comprising 5 percent of the overall estimated 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants.

Click here for an overview of the 2021 unauthorized immigrant population in the United States.

About 3,300 unauthorized European immigrants were active recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in September 2023, out of 544,700 overall DACA holders, according to USCIS. DACA offers protection from deportation and work authorization to unauthorized immigrants who arrived as children and meet other requirements. The European origins for the largest number of DACA recipients were Poland (890 recipients), the United Kingdom (350), Portugal (340), Italy (250), and Albania (200).

Health Coverage

European immigrants are more likely to have health insurance coverage than the overall foreign-born population and have a similar uninsured rate as the native born (see Figure 10). Immigrants from Ukraine and Bulgaria (about 12 percent each) had much higher rates of uninsurance than those from Italy and the Netherlands (3 percent each) as of 2022.

Figure 10. Health Coverage for European Immigrants, All Immigrants, and the U.S. Born, 2022



Note: The sum of shares by type of insurance is likely to be greater than 100 because people may have more than one type of insurance.

Source: MPI tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau 2022 ACS

Diaspora

Many U.S. diaspora communities trace their lineage back to European countries. The German diaspora was the largest in the United States as of 2022, with nearly 42 million individuals who either reported German ancestry or were born in Germany. After the

Mexican diaspora, the United Kingdom and Ireland were ancestral homes to the third and fourth largest diaspora groups (comprised of 38 million and 33 million individuals, respectively), and those with roots in Italy (16 million), Poland (8 million), and France (6 million) were also among the ten largest.

Click here to see estimates of the top 35 diasporas groups in the United States in 2022.

Top Global Destinations

Of the 63.3 million global migrants from Europe, 70 percent resided elsewhere within Europe, followed by about 11 percent each in Asia and Northern America, 5 percent in Oceania, and 2 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to United Nations Population Division estimates from mid-2020. Within Europe, the top destination country was Germany, home to 14 percent of all international migrants from Europe. Outside Europe, the United States was the leading destination for migrants from Europe (7 percent), followed by Kazakhstan (5 percent) and Australia (4 percent).

Click here to view an interactive map showing where migrants from countries from Europe and other regions have settled worldwide.

Remittances

Remittances sent to Europe have grown rapidly since 2000. In 2022, global remittances sent via formal channels by European migrants and their descendants from all over the world equaled nearly U.S. $190.7 billion, down 4 percent from $198.7 billion in 2021 but nearly five times higher than 2000 ($38.7 billion).

For many European countries, remittances accounted for a tiny share of gross domestic product (GDP). However, remittance dependence was higher in Kosovo (17 percent of GDP), Moldova (14 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (10 percent), and Albania (9 percent).

Figure 11. Annual Remittance Flows to Europe, 2000-22



Source: MPI tabulations of data from the World Bank Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), "Remittance Inflows," June 2023 update, available online.

Click here to view an interactive chart showing annual remittances received and sent to various European countries.

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Introduction. Memory, Identity, Belonging: Narratives of Eastern and Central European Presence in North America

Authors:
Izabella **Kimak** and Mateusz **Świetlicki**

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1Ever since the beginning of migration of Eastern and Central Europeans to North America on a massive scale at the turn of the twentieth century, this group of new-comers faced the exclusionary nativist rhetoric, similarly to other ethnic groups before and after them—a rhetoric that posited them as the Other and a threat to the established communities (cf. Zecker; Sojka; Pula; Gladsky). Unlike immigrants of color, though, the subsequent generations of white Eastern Europeans could quickly assimilate (cf. Kostash). Yet, they risked losing their distinctive cultural heritage, especially considering the inaccessibility of their homelands during the Cold War. Sometimes, as was the case with Ukrainian Canadians, the new country, especially the prairie, started to function as a symbolic replacement of the old country, consequently bringing the question of the role of Eastern and Central Europeans not only as Others but also as colonizers of Indigenous lands (cf. Ledohowski; Świetlicki).

2Naturally, over the last century or so, Eastern and Central European diasporas in North America underwent numerous transformations, most notably after the influx of post-World War II immigrants, and more recently, with new generations of Americans and Canadians of Eastern and Central European descent coming to the fore (cf. Bukowczyk; Drewniak; Grekul; Kulyk Keefer; Kozaczka; Satzewich; Suchacka; Suchacka and Lutz; Majewski; Zaborowska; Trzeszczyńska). Many young representatives of the diasporas have only a tangential relation to their heritage. Hence in their collective memory, the countries of their ancestors sometimes function as simulacra, imaginary lands bearing little resemblance to both past and

contemporary Eastern Europe (cf. Świetlicki). The current war in Ukraine has already generated a new wave of refugees coming to North America in search of peace. Their presence is yet another thread in the complex tapestry that Eastern and Central Europeans have formed and continue to form in North America.

3 The aim of this collection is to demonstrate the various representations of Eastern and Central Europe in North America. The contributions by individual authors from Europe and the USA address the multi-faceted experiences of immigrants from the region in the US and Canada—both from a historical and contemporary perspective—in a variety of narrative forms created by diasporic and mainstream authors: novels, memoirs, graphic novels, and TV shows. The scholarly analyses that comprise the major part of this volume are followed by an interview with one US-American writer of Eastern European background who reflects on the struggles generated and the creative possibilities offered by one's identity as an Eastern European American.

4 In "From Nostalgia to *locus amoenus*: Polish Migrants' Memoirs in Canada and the Idea of Home, Identity and Belonging," this volume's opening article, Dagmara Drewniak studies *Zwyczajna przeprowadzka / An Ordinary Move: Memoirs of Polish Immigrants* (2014), a bilingual collection of verse and prose. In her sophisticated examination of this volume, Drewniak demonstrates the changing approaches of immigrants towards their understanding of home, belonging, and identity, while focusing on the collection's transcultural character.

5 In her article titled "The Image of Central European Immigrant in Popular Fiction and Its Adaptations: A Case Study of the *Detective Murdoch/Murdoch Mysteries* Series," Biljana Oklopcic discusses the use of ethnic stereotypes as a key component of genre writing, in this case crime fiction, as a starting point for her analysis of Central European immigration to Canada in the 19th century as represented in Maureen Jennings's *Detective Murdoch* series. Jennings' depictions are further juxtaposed with those present in the adaptation of the novels into a contemporary Canadian TV series *Murdoch Mysteries* (2008-), which broadens Jennings' repertoire of mostly German immigrants to include male, female, and LGBTQ+ characters from the Austro-Hungarian empire.

6 The question of gender roles and stereotypes attributed to Eastern European women in the American imaginary is also explored in Martyna Bryla's article "Gendered Geographies of the European East in the American Cold-War Literary Imaginary." Studying texts by such Anglophone authors as Patricia Hampl, Eva Hoffman, Philip Roth, Joyce Carol Oates, and John Updike, Bryla argues that although they associate Eastern Europe with the figure of a man, either a conformist or a dissident, the way these authors present women exposes or questions Western fears and fantasies.

7 Mateusz Świetlicki, in his article titled "Trauma, Romance, and the Diasporic Memory Keepers of the Holodomor in Erin Litteken's *The Memory Keeper of Kyiv*," uses Litteken's debut novel as a case study to demonstrate the validity of popular fiction, in this case trauma romance, to spread knowledge of historical events—here the Holodomor orchestrated by Stalin in Soviet Ukraine—that would otherwise be

unknown to mainstream North American audiences. In his nuanced reading of the novel, Świetlicki points to the intergenerational transmission of trauma and signals the importance of bearing witness to the traumatic events the characters have experienced for the sake of their personal, familial, and collective well-being.

8The links between Ukraine and North America are also explored in Marta Koval's "Mosaic of History and Memory in Alexander Motyl's Novel *Fall River*," an article devoted to a family saga by Alexander Motyl, one of the best-known Ukrainian American authors. Applying the theoretical background of memory studies, especially the work of Astrid Erll and Paul Connerton, Koval examines the role of remembering and forgetting in the lives of Motyl's transcultural characters. Moreover, she skillfully demonstrates the potential of historical fiction set in Central and Eastern Europe in introducing American readers to the complexity of the ethnic dynamics in the region.

9In an article titled "Nomadic Memory in Aleksandar Hemon's Memoirs," Rubén Peinado-Abarrio analyzes two recent memoirs by Bosnian-American author Aleksandar Hemon, *My Parents: An Introduction* and *This Does Not Belong to You*, published in 2019 in one volume. Contextualizing Hemon's non-fiction within the notion of nomadic memory articulated by posthumanist thinker Rosi Braidotti, Peinado-Abarrio convincingly argues that Hemon's memoirs are instances of remembering in a minority-mode. Using real events from his family's life, especially the forced migration of his parents from war-torn Bosnia, Hemon construes a migrant as a subject-in-becoming affected by the complex workings of non-linear and transgenerational memory.

10The transgenerational and transcultural dimensions of memory are also explored in Anastasia Ulanowicz's article entitled "Traumatic Peregrinations: Intergenerational Memory and Migration in Nina Bunjevac's *Fatherland*." Ulanowicz uses Astrid Erll's concept of "travelling memory" in her examination of the intergenerational movement of traumatic memories in Nina Bunjevac's graphic novel *Fatherland: A Family History* (2014), a multimodal narrative based on the author's father's collaboration with Serbian nationalists and its impact on his family's three generations.

11Alexandra Glavanakova presents partial results of her wider research into representations of Bulgaria in US-American culture in an essay titled "Migrating Literatures: Bulgaria in the American Imaginary." Using the example of four novels—two by Elizabeth Kostova and two by Garth Greenwell—Glavanakova corroborates her major claim that a substantial part of American literary and cinematographic references to Bulgaria can be argued to subscribe to the discourse which she terms, following other scholars, Balkanism – as a problematization of Edward Said's notion of Orientalism. Glavanakova shows how Bulgaria functions in the texts under study as the Other not only of the US, but also of Western Europe.

12Annika M. Schadewaldt turns her scholarly gaze upon Vladimir Nabokov's novel *Pnin* in her article titled "Imitation, Mimicry, and the Performance of Americanness in Nabokov' *Pnin*." The author draws attention to Nabokov's well studied interest in science to show how mimicry and imitation are deployed within the narrative logic of *Pnin* to indicate the precarious position of an Eastern European

migrant in the United States, given the impossibility of Russian émigré Pnin's perfect performance of Americanness.

13Finally, in his conversation with Izabella Kimak, Polish American writer John Z. Guzlowski reminisces about his growing up in the area of Humboldt Park in Chicago as a child of immigrants from Poland who had entered the United States as Displaced Persons in 1951. Guzlowski repeatedly uses the WW2 experiences of his parents and their subsequent life as immigrants in the US as literary material for his poetry and prose. The interview centers on questions of what it means to be a Pole—and a Polish American writer—in the contemporary US.

14Taken all together, the texts create a complex tapestry of narratives of Eastern and Central European presence in North America, one whose diversity points to the complex histories of various groups that share not only Eastern/Central European origin but also a common interest in questions of memory, identity, and belonging.

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Other Important Web Links:

01] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Americans

02] https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Americans

03] https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/10cpzw4/the_diaspora_in_america_of_each_european_country/

04] https://www.quora.com/Does-the-European-diaspora-exist

05] https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/european-immigrants-united-states-2016

06] https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/08/28/why-europe-is-a-magnet-for-more-americans

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African American Diaspora

It Matters How We Define the African Diaspora

The explicit incorporation of the African Diaspora into U.S.-Africa policy risks segmenting the community into old and new, with important domestic and international consequences.



U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris tours the Cape Coast slave castle during her week-long trip to Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, in Cape Coast, Ghana on 28 Mar 2023.

https://www.cfr.org/blog/it-matters-how-we-define-african-diaspora

Vice President Kamala Harris' visit to three African countries this week—Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia—is part of the Biden administration's efforts to supercharge engagement with African countries in the aftermath of the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit.. Arriving first in Ghana, Vice President Harris gave an emotional speech at Cape Coast Castle, Ghana's historic slave trading post, that acknowledged the horrors of the slave trade but also the history of those who survived in the Americas and the Caribbean and rose above daunting odds to build a better future. Speaking to Ghana's President Akufo-Addo, Vice President Harris applauded his leadership in elevating engagement with the African diaspora, a key pillar of the Biden administration's new U.S.-Africa policy.

The elevation of the African diaspora as a tool of soft power in U.S.-Africa policy is generally viewed as a laudable and productive shift in U.S. engagement with Africa. However, a particular construction of the African diaspora has come to the fore with the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit that may encourage fractures and exacerbate cleavages within the diaspora. The explicit incorporation of the African diaspora into U.S.-Africa policy carries the risk of segmenting the community into old and new, with

important domestic and international consequences. U.S. policymakers and the African diasporan constituency would do well to think through the implications of the new U.S. strategy towards Africa and its impact on relationships within the diaspora.

Not widely covered, it was students with the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) Africa Correspondents Corps who reported during the summit on the conflicting definitions and understandings of the African diaspora. While government officials gave an expansive and cohesive definition of diaspora on the record, by the end of the summit some Africanist scholars observed a distinction being made between the "old" and "new" diaspora. In fact, the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit brought into stark relief the emergence of narratives that seek to define the African diaspora as the "new" diaspora, comprised of relatively recent, middle-class, economic migrants, as well as social and economic entrepreneurs. Largely excluded from this new narrative is the "old" diaspora, the descendants of enslaved Africans. Less tarred by America's history of racism and race demonizing, the "new" diaspora fits well with America's own persona of being a land of economic prosperity and opportunity, and a new whitewashed history of capitalism, untethered to its past in slavery and colonialism, that the United States seeks to promote at home and abroad. Furthermore, with a growing political profile, this "new" diaspora is increasingly being courted by Republicans and Democrats alike.

The prioritization during the summit of individual trade deals, social and cultural exchanges, and people-to-people ties suggests the United States is looking to build bilateral relationships with select African markets and countries to counter any continental influence by China in particular. African heads of state played into this approach by coming to Washington each with their own agenda. Such geostrategic cultivation of a U.S. "hub and spokes"-type system of discrete, exclusive alliances with individual African countries is likely to encourage further divisions within the African diaspora as sub-groups see benefits to organizing as Nigerian-Americans, Kenyan-Americans, etc. This will likely have implications on the role and use of diasporas as tools of soft power that historically could be utilized to build multilateral cooperation and engagement. A segmented African diaspora may reinforce a state-centric international system and undermine continental cooperation among African states.

The unleashed tensions within the African diaspora could undo some of the important gains achieved through intra-racial alliances, for example around racial justice and antiracism advocacy and in the coalitions created to elect record numbers of African immigrants to political office. Recent changing demographics within the African diaspora, with one out of ten

now being newer African immigrants, on its own has unleashed positive and negative intra-racial dynamics and transformations within black institutions, including Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), black advocacy groups, and the black church. At Howard University, and other HBCUs for example, student enrollment by the children of African immigrants has ballooned, expanding the diversity across our campuses and enriching our programming. Additionally, it has prompted much needed, and generally constructive reflection on how we build a collective community that celebrates multiple and particular cultural and linguistic histories.

But there's a danger that the new U.S.-Africa strategy may encourage not only siloed identities within the diaspora, but siloed opportunities and programs, some focused on the "old" diaspora, and others on the "new." In fact, this is already happening with the existing White House initiative on HBCUs viewed as a program for the "old" diaspora, whereas the new President's Advisory Council on the African Diaspora courting the "new" diaspora. Both initiatives engage broadly with the aim to increase representation and African diasporan voices in U.S. foreign policy, yet they operate completely separately. As the Biden administration continues to allocate funding and resources based on this "new" and "old" diaspora distinction, it will likely have implications for African and African American Studies programs, and perhaps HBCU enrolments, which have grown significantly in recent years.

As the United States ramps up diaspora engagement in subnational diplomacy, which U.S. cities will be prioritized—Houston with its large African immigrant population over Memphis with its large African American population? The African diasporan constituency already suffers institutionally, relying on disparate and relatively weak advocacy organizations. As the United States prioritizes new networks of mutual cultural and commercial alliances with African constituencies, we need to strengthen historical and strategic alliances within the African diaspora and mitigate against any unintended consequences of the new U.S.-Africa foreign policy.

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On the Many Meanings of Black Diaspora

Louis Chude-Sokei:

"It was accents and curses, uncles and aunties, cousins and endless trips to Western Union."

Author:

Louis Chude-Sokei's writing and award-winning scholarship on the literatures and cultures of the African diaspora appears widely in national and international venues. He is editor in chief of the Black Scholar, the premier journal of Black studies and research, and director of the African American Studies program at Boston University.

https://lithub.com/on-the-many-meanings-of-black-diaspora/

Diaspora was one of those words from my mother's "word of the month" or "word of the week" subscriptions. What made it stick out was that I heard it repeated around the table. The word meant the scattering of a people across different lands and countries and languages. To me, this meaning seemed immediate, oppressively intimate. It wasn't just about the Middle Passage and slavery in the New World. It wasn't even about our more specific migration from Africa to Jamaica to America. It was accents and curses, uncles and aunties, cousins and endless trips to Western Union, and obligations of all kinds. Diaspora was mapped across the plates of ackee and saltfish, fried dumplings, escoveitch fish, and curry goat.

Everyone was there, or I should say *everywhere* was there. Though still in Inglewood, the dining table was a few blocks, a hill, and an entire tax bracket away from where my mother and I lived. It was Jamaicans mostly, but there were also folks from other islands, like Aunt Viola who came from Nevis. She was somehow related to Aunt Carmen in Washington, DC, and her island of birth inspired the same jokes I'd heard in Washington—Nevis being so small that you slept in your swimming clothes because if you turned over at night you might drown or the ones about sand always being in your food or having to leave the island to avoid incest. Like Aunt Carmen, Aunt Viola laughed louder than anyone at these jokes no matter how often they were repeated.

Little island/big island humor was a part of the Caribbean sensibility, and because she had married an African American, she treasured anything that

confirmed her status within that sensibility. Maybe her husband didn't care for foreign blacks. He never came to the table, and when we visited Aunt Viola's house, he descended into the basement. Because of this, we never had to call him uncle. But because his children were always at the table—for a time anyway, before the older ones lost their accents and the younger ones grew confident enough to mock ours—they were still cousins.

Due to my mother's efforts, there were always Nigerians at our gatherings, particularly people she'd known from Biafra or had gotten to know after arriving in America. Our last name and my father's reputation drew many to her. Even a few Hausa people, the ethnic group responsible for the attempted genocide that brought us here in the first place, broke bread with us. In these cases, the war was never really discussed. If ever it was, it wasn't described as a national or personal or ethnic tragedy but an African or a colonial one. That way blame could be evaded and the experience shared.

Much of what our elders discussed at these gatherings was about what had triggered their migration in the first place—colonialism and revolution and independence. I paid more attention to these conversations than most of my cousins because it was likely that my godfather would be mentioned, or my father, and then the adults would all look in my direction with solemn expectation. I was still the first son of the first son, though that seemed a far less portentous state of being than when I first arrived in Jamaica.

At times, it seemed to me that these people at the dining table, as mundane as they may have appeared to most Americans, were heroes too. They had played a part in some great world-building drama that seemed epic by virtue of the fact that so much of it had failed. These elders at the table had experienced things I was beginning to read about. Revolutions, coups, exile, refugees, betrayal, starvation, genocide. Loss—what should have been and almost was—was always the tone of the conversation.

Diaspora was mapped across the plates of ackee and saltfish, fried dumplings, escoveitch fish, and curry goat.

What they had failed at was freedom. That failure brought them to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and turned them into semi-inebriated uncles and embittered aunts struggling to keep control of their children. I can guarantee they'd all expected to end up in London. My mother used to say that we'd turned left over the Atlantic Ocean when we should have turned right.

Eventually, South Africans began to appear at the table. It was the anti-apartheid moment, Africa's last chance, Uncle Owen often said. We

accepted these people, extending the borders of community farther and farther. This wasn't due to any romantic notion regarding common Africanness but because of what those people were not—American—and, of course, their ease with that ratio of spice to food. Not only South Africans, but Ghanaians too and a few Liberians would stop by. It was a diaspora mapped by the sound of accents—West African and Caribbean but also British, Canadian, American, and the cadences of us younger ones ranging all over the map.

There would always be someone with an even more authentic tongue than those who corrected and attacked us for sounding too Yankee (to the Caribbeans) or *oyinbo* (to the Nigerians). If the outside world was where my Jamaican accent was still enough to merit comment and require masquerade, these events were where I was encouraged to keep it alive. That was how we were sure not to disappear into the vortex of American racial meanings and cultural expectations. This was, of course, counter to what Cousin Brian and some of my other cousins thought we should do, but we held our tongues until we were old enough.

What gave our diaspora shape wasn't so much racism, slavery, or the contrastive presence of white Americans. It was the more pressing reality of Black Americans. American blacks inevitably became the topic and the source of most arguments. If Black Americans often seemed fixated on white America, black immigrants seemed fixated on Black America, as if it were the wall between them and the promises of this country. Sometimes the conversation began by someone fresh to the country discussing problems they were having with a coworker, or a schoolmate, or an unruly neighbor. Before questions were asked, the seasoned veterans would share a smirk of recognition, knowing that the person being complained about was not white. It was time to school the newcomer on what really went on in this America and that there were two Americas, two distinct regimes of pain and promise.

Things would usually begin with the newcomer asking a familiar but always loaded question, *What is wrong with Black Americans?* Occasionally, one of us young cousins would attempt to defend or explain those Black Americans to our elders since we were the ones who knew them best and spent most of our time in the crucible of assimilation. These attempts were inappropriate for interrelated reasons. First, we were not to speak back to our elders, a sure sign that we were assimilating in the wrong direction. Second, in speaking on behalf of African Americans, we inevitably slipped into their dialect, which was enough to invalidate our opinions and earn a cuff to the head.

One cousin, Lloydie, had migrated to England as a child and come to stay in Los Angeles in his twenties. Folks in our neighborhood had a very hard time believing his accent wasn't affected. Where our Caribbean or West African accents could elicit laughter, his brought threats of violence. At a local restaurant once, the Black American waitress wouldn't serve us until he started talking in his "real" voice. She had a point to make, stronger than our hunger. We ended up eating somewhere else. A few times we were even threatened by gangbangers on the street who were convinced Cousin Lloydie was talking down to them. Had we not dropped the name of Cousin Brian, we would have been bruised.

There were consolations. Local girls found Lloydie's accent irresistible. Sadly for me, I could never pull off the full English, only the occasional hint of it. That hint didn't come from England, though. It came from my mother, who, no matter how far she'd traveled from Jamaica to England to Nigeria to America, always maintained that type of British accent produced in its colonies. This drew Indians to her when they worked together in hospitals because they recognized it too—*more English than the English,* as the old cliché went. Her accent rendered her less foreign when she arrived in Nigeria in 1963 just after independence. She was no longer a Jamaican woman, something few of them had any knowledge of. She was the much more familiar *English* woman, easier to position and ultimately to accept.

If Black Americans often seemed fixated on white America, black immigrants seemed fixated on Black America, as if it were the wall between them and the promises of this country.

As a colonial product, she manifested a prejudice typical of her generation: there was to be no Jamaican dialect—*patwah*—in the house. This put her at odds with aunts and uncles who only needed to hear Byron Lee or Bob Marley or burn their tongue on Jamaican peppers to start trembling the room with what's now called Jamaican English or just Jamaican. They were from the same class as my mother, but she had grown up on the outskirts of Montego Bay and left before the shift that began in the 1960s to claim the language of the poor as the sound of the nation. She left Jamaica before "the ghetto won," as Great-Uncle Irving would say, meaning before reggae.

My mother was the least likely to accept the blind generalizing about Black Americans common at the dining table. Because of her time with my father, my godfather, and the inner circle of the Biafran secession, a form of racial consciousness had seeped into her colonial British self. Biafrans, at least their leaders, thought of themselves as ultimately fighting an anticolonial war, a war of African liberation. She may have been skeptical of the generalized romantic ideas of African identity spun in Jamaica after she left

the island, but she was also less interested in the what-is-wrong-with-Black-Americans debates here in America.

As a result, she usually chose to employ the abstraction "Black people"—initially as a corrective but eventually as a compromise. *What is wrong with Black Americans?* became *What are the struggles facing Black people? Don't trust African Americans* became *Some Black people can't be trusted.* It was a way of using an imagined global community of blacks to mediate the unpleasant details of personal experience. By the time I began to employ phrases like my mother's in college as I became radicalized in my race consciousness, I did so fully acknowledging that they were products of desperation. Neither of us could tolerate the alternative.

In contrast to the use of racial abstractions was Great-Uncle Irving. He was an expert on Black Americans, he boasted. Evidence of this was the fact that he exclusively dated light-skinned Black American women, many of whom he would take on cruise ships, which is where he spent much of his retirement. Black Americans were just like Jamaicans, he claimed; they needed white people more than any other people because without them they wouldn't exist. But when it came to racism, he argued, there was a special intimacy between Black Americans and whites. We should stay clear of it because there was little room for others in that relationship. They couldn't see or feel anything beyond the wound that had brought them together.

Great-Uncle Irving's accent was the strangest of any of ours. He claimed it was because Angelenos had spoken differently when he first arrived in the 1940s. He sounded like a Jamaican countryman straining to talk like a World War II newsreel or like the men in boxy suits and women with hairstyles so angled that they seemed made of plaster who appeared in black-and-white films. Apparently, he was one of my relatives who'd been dead set against my mother marrying an African and moving to Nigeria back in the late 1950s, so all talk of Africa sent him into a rage. He also made no secret of his hatred for his home country: that's why he'd come to Los Angeles before anyone else had even heard of the place. Everybody else was going to London, some to New York, then to Miami and Toronto. Los Angeles had no snow and was as far away as he could go in America from Jamaicans and damned islands. For a while, it was paradise.

Biafrans, at least their leaders, thought of themselves as ultimately fighting an anticolonial war, a war of African liberation.

My Aunt Joy brought other ideas about accent, identity, and community to the dining table. She was a Yoruba who lived the furtive life of a second

wife in a country where polygamy was illegal and shameful. Her husband never came to these events, living as he did with his senior wife and primary children on one of the best streets in upper-middle-class Baldwin Hills. Aunt Joy found all talk of "blackness" or "Black people" alternately touching and comical. Sad also, because of how obsessed Caribbean people and Black Americans were with skin color and how far they would go to claim and defend something she thought meaningless and exaggerated. White people, well, it was obvious that they were a certain way, but Black people? What did skin have to do with anything? African Americans were Americans. The "African" part was just denial. And if there was anything that linked Jamaicans to Black Americans, it was that their assertions of pride were so relentless that they could only be masks for shame.

Her English was no different than it would have been had she been in a market in Lagos. She was one of the few people I knew who went back to Nigeria every year and had been doing so since the war ended. Sometimes she spoke pidgin, which embarrassed her son. His accent was the most African Americanized of all of ours, which deeply embarrassed his mother.

And there were others, too many to recount, uncles and aunts and cousins and friends—Uncle Tommy from Scotland with his string of white British wives, Jean-Bernard from Haiti with his Senegalese wife who apparently spoke a Parisian sort of French, an uncle from Gabon whose family had sheltered us after we'd left the refugee camps during the war—all coming in waves, going in gusts, some strong enough to have directly shaped my personality and others whose impact was brief but still important. Sometimes it was a fist to the stomach, a crude joke during prayers, a lie I had to bear. Other times it was a story I would claim as my own or fumbled attempts at sex during sleepovers. So many of them in this world of the dining table that was in but not of Inglewood and Los Angeles.

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StudySmarter

African American Diaspora

For hundreds of years, the African diaspora has taken individuals out of Africa and dispersed them around the world. In the United States, the African diaspora has resulted in a large African American population that has helped to shape the country's culture and literature. However, literature

from the African diaspora also includes authors who have arrived in the United States more recently, including Nigerian American, Liberian American, and Ghanaian American writers.

https://www.studysmarter.co.uk/explanations/english-literature/american-regionalism-literature/african-american-diaspora/

Map of the Black African population in the Americas (1901).

History

18th century

The spread of the African-American diaspora began during the 18th century through the escape of slaves from their masters and through the Revolutionary war. During the Revolutionary War, slaves were offered freedom in exchange for their services in both the British and Union Army. Ultimately about 5,000 would serve for the union and another 20,000 for the British during the Revolution. Newly freed African Americans who fought for either side would end up living as freedmen in Nova Scotia Canada, in England, or in British Sierra Leone.

19th century

During the 19th century, the formation of the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1817 would begin the Back to Africa movement with the goal of resettling free African Americans and newly emancipated slaves back to their home country. it would create the colony of Liberia and would

send over 13,000 freedmen. However, the ACS was greatly disliked by both African Americans who believed they were entitled to the same rights as any white man and America was just as much of their country as any white man Between 1800 and 1865 over 30,000 African Americans would escape to Canada through the Underground Railroad to escape life in the south. After the conclusion of the Civil War in 1865, the 13th Amendment was ratified by Congress abolishing slavery in all forms and freeing all persons of color from slavery. Throughout the rest of the 19th and into the 20th century African Americans would flee the harsh realities of the South such as lynching and other racism and would mainly relocate to Canada.

20th century

During the 20th century, African Americans continued to face racism and discrimination being denied work in higher-paying jobs and would be severely restricted through Jim Crow laws. Organized crime stopped African Americans from gaining jobs and homes and threatened the lives of those who tried to give them jobs or sell them land. During this time period, Canada would abolish its immigration policies that discriminated against African Americans and it would prompt more African-American communities to be introduced.

21st century

Today African Americans are still leaving America to escape racism and find an easier way of life outside the U.S. Racism is still more present than ever with police-involved black murders being 350% higher than whites as well as being imprisoned at a much higher rate. Today they search for lives in Africa, the Caribbean, Mexico, and Europe free from the hardships faced in the U.S. Today living outside the U.S offers a lower cost of living and a safer more secure lifestyle and people report feeling less oppressed and more accepted. Today many people migrating will up businesses that will sell vacations and help other African Americans leave the country as well as create their own side hustles and find jobs to help fellow African Americans to make the move. Because the cost of living outside the U.S. is greatly lower it can allow more people to migrate permanently or temporally out of the U.S.

Definition of African American Diaspora

In general, diaspora refers to a group of people who have been dispersed or displaced but remain united by retaining their homeland's beliefs, values, and cultural identity and practice. The African diaspora is a particularly

complex and diverse diaspora that includes individuals dispersed from many different countries for many reasons. Like many African Americans, some have been living outside Africa for generations. Others members of the African diaspora, such as refugees from countries like Sudan, Uganda, and the Congo, may have left Africa much more recently.

In *Perspectives on History*, the American Historical Association's newsmagazine, Colin Palmer offers this definition of the African diaspora:
"The modern African diaspora, at its core, consists of the millions of peoples of African descent living in various societies who are united by a past based significantly but not exclusively upon "racial" oppression and the struggles against it; and who, despite the cultural variations and political and other divisions among them, share an emotional bond with one another and with their ancestral continent; and who also, regardless of their location, face broadly similar problems in constructing and realizing themselves." -Colin Palmer

Technically speaking, all African Americans are part of the African diaspora. However, in terms of literature, many African American writers, particularly contemporary ones, don't feature as many diasporic themes in their work.

Causes of the African American Diaspora

The modern African diaspora is primarily made up of two separate migratory events. The first started with the forced dispersal of African people through the transatlantic slave trade beginning in the 16th century. Between the 16th and 19th centuries, estimates claim that anywhere between 5 and 100 million Africans were sold into slavery and later dispersed worldwide, primarily to the Americas.[2]

The second wave of the modern African diaspora occurred following the abolition of slavery in the Americas and the subsequent movement of freed individuals of African descent. The African diaspora also includes the forced and voluntary migration of African people today due to conflicts and social issues in various African countries.

Characteristics of African American Diaspora Literature

African American diaspora literature has the same fundamental characteristics as diaspora literature more broadly. These include a strong connection to the homeland, in this case, Africa, details of a journey that takes the displaced person away from the homeland, and contrasting the new place of residence with the homeland.

African American diaspora literature also explores further issues, such as the legacy of slavery and issues of racism that are specific to the United States.

Additionally, modern-day African diaspora writers working in the United States often offer critiques of contemporary US society and contrast the experience of African immigrants with that of African Americans.

Depiction of the Homeland

Diaspora communities are unique in that they maintain a strong connection to their home country and culture even if they live in a different place; they retain the feeling that their country of origin is their true home. Many African American writers explore Africa's significance for individuals outside of the continent.

Alice Walker's *The Colour Purple* is an example of African American diaspora literature.

Alice Walker's classic novel, *The Colour Purple* (1982), tells the story of two sisters, Celie and Nettie, living in rural Georgia at the start of the 20th century. Nettie becomes a missionary and travels back to Africa, where she describes learning about the continent to her sister:

> *Did you know there were great cities in Africa, greater than Milledgeville or even Atlanta, thousands of years ago? That the Egyptians who built the pyramids and enslaved the Israelites were colored? That Egypt is in Africa? That the Ethiopia we read about in the Bible meant all of Africa?*
>
> *Well, I read and I read until I thought my eyes would fall out. I read where the Africans sold us because they loved money more than their own sisters and brothers. How we came to America in ships. How we were made to work.*

> *I hadn't realized I was so ignorant, Celie. The little I knew about my own self wouldn't have filled a thimble!" -The Color Purple (Letter 54)*

Celie and Nettie have not maintained a connection to Africa, and much of their ancestral knowledge was lost to the oppression they experienced. Celie states at one point that she "don't know where Africa at" (Letter 50). However, as Nettie learns more about Africa, she immediately feels connected to the continent. She feels that learning about Africa helps her learn more about herself.

A Difficult Journey

A prime example of African diaspora literature in the United States is the slave narratives of the 18th and 19th centuries. Most of these narratives described the enslaved person's voyage from Africa to the Americas.

> *After all the business was ended on the coast of Africa, the ship sailed from thence to Barbadoes. After an ordinary passage, except great mortality from small pox, which broke out on board, we arrived at the island of Barbadoes: but when we reached it, there were found out of the two hundred and sixty that sailed from Africa, not more than two hundred alive. These were all sold, except for myself and three more, to the planters there." - A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture, a Native of Africa, but Resident above Sixty Years in the United States of America, Related by Himself (Chapter Two)*

This example comes from one of the United States' best-known slave narratives, Venture Smith's *A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture, a Native of Africa, but Resident above Sixty Years in the United States of America* (1798). In his account, Smith describes his capture in Africa, subsequent voyage to the Americas, and his life there as an enslaved person.

Depiction of the Host Country

The final characteristic of diaspora literature is the depiction of the host country and, frequently, the comparison of the host country with the displaced person's homeland. The African American literary tradition often involves critiques of US society but not necessarily comparisons to Africa. However, in literature from contemporary African writers residing in the United States, the difference between African and American (and African American) culture is a common theme.

> *During her first year in America, when she took New Jersey Transit to Penn Station and then the subway to visit Aunty Uju in Flatlands, she was struck by how mostly slim white people got off at the stops in Manhattan and, as the train went further into Brooklyn, the people left were mostly black and fat. She had not thought of them as 'fat,' though. She had thought of them as 'big,' because one of the first things her friend Ginika told her was that 'fat' in America was a bad word, heaving with moral judgment like 'stupid' or 'bastard,' and not a mere description like 'short' or 'tall.'" -Americanah (Chapter One)*

The above quote comes from award-winning Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's *Americanah* (2013). The novel tells the story of Ifemelu, a young Nigerian woman who immigrates to the United States. In the United States, Ifemelu begins to experience racism and sees herself as a Black woman for the first time.

Examples of African American Diaspora Literature

Some examples of African American diaspora literature include slave narratives of the 18th and 19th centuries, work by African American writers, and work by African authors living in the United States.

Slave Narratives

Slave narratives are a strong example of early literature from the African diaspora. Works such as *A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture, a Native of Africa, but Resident above Sixty Years in the United States of America* (1798) and *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave* (1845) often emphasize the enslaved person's continued connection to Africa and usually included a description of the Middle Passage, the voyage between Africa and the Americas.

The journey enslaved Africans made from Africa to the Americas became an important feature of the diaspora's literature.

African American Writers and the Diaspora

For many years, African Americans were thought to have lost their culture and connection to Africa during the Middle Passage and subsequent enslavement. However, many writers rekindled a connection to their ancestral homeland during the Harlem Renaissance. Authors like Langston Hughes and Countee Cullen make numerous references to Africa in their work, examining the role of Africa as a homeland in constructing African American identity.

The Harlem Renaissance was an African American art and cultural movement during the 1920s and 30s that was centered in Harlem, New York. The period included an explosion of artistic and intellectual work by Black artists and thinkers in literature, music, dance, fashion, and other art forms. Some of the key writers associated with the Harlem Renaissance include Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, and Countee Cullen.

Can you think of some examples of African American literature that would not be considered diaspora literature? Why or why not?

Modern-Day African Diaspora Writers in the United States

Many African diaspora writers working in the United States are not African American. These include well-known Nigerian writers Akwaeke Emezi and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Liberian American Wayétu Moore, and Ghanaian American Yaa Gyasi. Because these writers have arrived in the United States more recently, their work is quite different from African American writers and usually offers clearer examples of diasporic themes.

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[A] Some Important Videos

01] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8EaFqJMH7RQ

The African diaspora: Driving change on the Continent

It is time to reframe the narrative on African successes and innovation. On December 12, high-level experts and innovators at AfriNEXT—a conference hosted by the Atlantic Council and global development company DAI— will showcase the strong business case for investment in African markets, as well as the importance of situating investments and other partnerships squarely in local contexts. They'll also share perspectives on all that lies

ahead for the African continent, including the rising power of its youth, the impact of digitalization, and the threat of climate change.

Speakers: - Worku Gachou, Head of North American Inclusive Impact & Sustainability, Visa - Melvin Foote, President and CEO, Constituency for Africa - Deniece Laurent-Mantey, Executive Director, President's Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States
Moderated by: - Tonija Hope, Director, Ralph Bunche International Affairs Center, Howard University

02] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yJazq1NeBXg

African American Culture | The Most Stolen Culture in The World?

In part one of this two part episode, our diverse panel discusses reparations, cultural appropriation and exploitation, bridging the gap between the diaspora, bullying, the black caste system and more!

03] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDelfngkrZc
The Greatest African Welcome Black American Diasporas Official Reception to Kenya

04] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1HUpscC6M0
Diaspora Wars Are a Waste of Time | 14 Year Expat in Africa

[B] Some Important Web Links

01] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5318189/
02] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African-American_diaspora
03] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_diaspora#:~:text=The%20term%20most%20commonly%20refers,Haiti%20(in%20that%20order).

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On Conceptualising African Diasporas in Europe

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Abstract

The article argues that there are three senses of the term African diaspora – a continental, a cultural and a racial sense – which need to be distinguished from each other when conceptualising Black African diasporas in Europe. Although African Diaspora Studies is occupied with African diasporas in a racial sense, usually it has conceptualised these in terms of racial and cultural identities. This is also true of the past decades of African Diaspora Studies on Europe. This article makes an argument for a socio-political conceptualisation of Black African diasporas in Europe that includes, but goes beyond, matters of identity and culture.

Keywords: African diaspora; Europe; Black studies; theory; race; diaspora africaine; Europe; Black Studies; théorie; race

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How should we conceptualise African diasporas in Europe? Since its beginnings in the 1960s and 70s, African Diaspora Studies has primarily focused on Black African diasporas, while usually understanding these in terms of racial and cultural identities and communities. However, as I argue in the first section of this article, we should distinguish between continental, cultural and racial conceptualisations of African diasporas – not least when studying and understanding these in Europe. Although so-called Old African Diasporas in the New World, that were created out of the Middle Passage, developed overlapping racial and cultural identities, in contemporary Europe the situation is more complicated. Here we largely find so-called New African Diasporas with more immediate backgrounds in Africa. In the subsequent two sections, I give a rough outline of two waves of African Diaspora Studies on Europe – that both have expanded our understanding of African diasporas to include Europe, but insisted on conceptualisations of African diasporas in terms of racial and cultural identities. The first wave, represented by the works of Stuart Hall and Paul

Gilroy, is marked by an anti-nationalist and anti-essentialist expansion of African Diaspora Studies beyond the US and the New World to also include Black political culture and identity making in the UK, Europe and across the entire 'Black Atlantic' as Gilroy famously termed it. A second wave, represented by the works of Michelle Wright, Gloria Wekker, Fatima El-Tayeb, and others, have called for an expanded understanding of African diasporas in Europe – beyond a focus on those that resulted from the Middle Passage – to include New African Diasporas and a greater multiplicity of Black identities. In the fourth and final section, I make an argument for a (re)conceptualisation of African diasporas in Europe towards a racial and socio-political sense that includes, but goes beyond, matters of identity and culture.

1 Three African Diasporas

There are at least three broad ways in which one can speak of African diasporas: a continental, a cultural and a racial sense.

In a broad *continental* sense of the term, African diaspora refers to all people who have an origin on the continent, irrespective of race, cultural, ethnic, national, or religious background, including North African Arabs, Berbers, and others too. In a European context such a continental sense of the term could be meaningful, for example, when speaking of overlapping social positions of racialisation and identity making of African youth with a background in north, central and western parts of Africa in the segregated Banlieues around French cities. For instance, in pointing out their joint diasporic conditions of not being (fully) part of the French nation, how they tend to be stereotyped and discriminated against in similar ways in French society, live and interact with each other in the same communities, have joint cultural identifications with hip-hop music, and so on (e.g. Slooter 2019; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017; El-Tayeb 2011).

There may be several conceptual advantages of employing such a broad sense of the term. Treating the entire continent of Africa as a single unit transcends geographically dubious – and in other ways conceptually fraught – distinctions between 'Sub-Saharan' and 'North' Africans in terms of history, geopolitics, demographics, the broad range and overlaps of physical appearances of people, ethnic groupings, or cultural expressions on either side of the Sahel. Such a concept of an African diaspora in Europe may encompass the racialised, community- and identity-building overlaps between a wide-range of groups with an immediate or distant background in Africa at large and similar situations in Europe. For example, people with a background in the Mahgreb, Senegal, Swahili Coast, and the Antilles, living in proximity to each other in France. It may serve to ascriptively and analytically 'queer' the African diaspora by acknowledging that the situations, experiences, cultural expressions, and identifications of people with an African background in Europe may not fit neatly into such categories as Arab, Berber, or Black African (El-Tayeb 2011). It may also serve to trouble notions of Black as a category with fixed racial and/or cultural boundaries and conjoined nationalist frameworks that treat such boundaries as descriptively and politically absolute (Gilroy 2000, 1993, 1987). In addition, it may act as a geopolitical term – such as the continental Pan-Africanism that

became dominant in Africa post-WWII and for decades has informed the politics of the African Union as well as its predecessor the Organization of African Unity – which includes all peoples of Africa and then tracks their lives, conviviality, political community-building or lack thereof in Europe (cf. McEachrane 2020; Drake 1975: 10).

Although, using the term African diaspora in this broad continental sense may be useful, it may also lack a need for specificity with respect to cultural, ethnic, linguistic, national, political, religious identity, and race. It may lack the conceptual precision to speak of the diasporic relocations of distinct cultural groups from Africa, such as African Pentecostalism, Senegalese Muslims, Eritrean refugees or Yoruba in Europe. It may also lack the conceptual precision needed to name, describe, analyse and understand the racialised social, cultural, economic, political, legal, historical, and continuing conditions of Africans and people of African descent who may broadly be designated as Black.

In a *cultural* sense of the term, African diaspora refers to members of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, national, political, or religious groups from Africa in other places than their places of origin. Typically, this will mean places outside of Africa. However, it may also refer to other places on the African continent. For example, in Morocco the ethnic group the Gnawa, whose members self-identify as from the Sudan (not the country, but as in the Arabic phrase *Bilad al Sudan – land of the blacks*), are renowned for their spiritual prowess, healing and ceremonial call-and-response music played on large lute-like instruments called Guinbri and who over centuries have become a distinct presence in Moroccan culture and Islamic Sufism (Becker 2011).

A cultural sense of the African diaspora is tied up with a genealogical sense of the term diaspora as the dispersal of an ethnically or otherwise culturally defined people from its homeland. Historically, the term was mostly used for Jewish diasporas. However, today it is widely used for ethnically or other culturally based diasporas. In Diaspora Studies since the 1950s, this understanding of the term has translated into a focus on the ethnic and cultural survival, transformations, hybridity, identities and experiences of diasporas, their relations to their places of origin as well as their places of residency (Cohen 2008).

In a cultural sense of the African diaspora, the emphasis is on the specificities of cultural groups, identities and processes. In this sense, it is relevant to speak of diasporic connections to cultural groups in Africa in terms of continuity, retention, survival, tradition, interconnectivity, networks, exchange, dialogue, translation, hybridity, transformation, and/or identity. Examples of studies on cultural African diasporas in Europe are how Maghrebi Jews and Muslims in the neighborhood of le Sentier in Paris interact, identify with and through each other in a shared sense of 'North-Africanness' via dynamic historical interactions in the Maghreb and postcolonial France (Everett 2020); how African Pentecostal churches in Belgium reproduce and transmute Pentecostal theology from Congo, Cameroon and other African countries in a secularised European context (Bangura 2018); or how African diasporas of artists, students and activists in the neighbourhood of Matonge in Brussels kindled decolonial consciousness in Africa and Belgium while occupying an ambiguous cultural space of not fully belonging to either (Arnaut 2018).

Among the advantages of speaking of African diasporas in terms of cultural groups is that this may allow us to remain true to the subjectivities and identities of diasporic Africans and people of African descent. For example, the identities of members of so-called New African Diasporas in Europe with a relatively recent first- or second-generation immigrant background in Africa, who may retain strong African cultural, ethnic, linguistic, national, political and/or religious ties, connections and identifications (Okpewho and Nzegwu 2009). This may also be concomitant with a subjective point of view among members of New African Diasporas that – although people of African descent may be exceedingly racialised in Europe or elsewhere and the surrounding society may be largely ignorant of their cultural backgrounds – being 'Black' may mean little or nothing to them, be perceived as an alien imposition and reduction, whereas being 'African' may carry with it rich cultural tapestries, meanings and identifications (e.g. Tsri 2016; Fearfull et al. 2010; Okpewho and Nzegwu 2009; Williams 1999).

Among the possible drawbacks of conceptualising the African diaspora in terms of culture is that it could serve to reify its cultural groups and identities into more fixed, monolithic, essentialising or bounded categories than what they are (e.g. Hall 2017; El-Tayeb 2011; Gilroy 1993). Moreover, it could underplay the socio-political significance of race in shaping African diasporas, or presume race as an implicit premise for the sort of African diasporas that are being considered while failing to draw out the rationale and implications of this. In addition, it may fail to consider the ways in which the physical appearances and notions of biological ancestries and kinship of people in fact may play a role in African and African diaspora community building, and self-conceptions of who is and is not African and/or of a specific ethnic or other cultural group.

This brings us to the third, *racial* sense of the term African diaspora. This use of the term refers to people of African descent in the diaspora who may broadly be designated as Black. Here the term Black should be understood as referring to (notions of) physical appearances and ancestry and may be interchanged with alternative terms such as Africans and people of African descent (i.e. when understood in a racially exclusive sense). Since its beginnings in the US academy in the 1960s and 70s, African Diaspora Studies have largely been premised on such a racially conscribed sense of Africa and its diasporas (Falola 2013; Gomez 2005). An advantage of this conception is its focus on the major socio-political and other significances of race, being Black and the presence of Black people in history. Furthermore, it has the conceptual precision needed to name, describe, analyse and understand the racialised social, cultural, economic, political, legal, historical and continuing conditions of Black Africans and people of African descent.

Possible drawbacks include reducing Africa and its diasporas to Black Africans and people of African descent and excluding parts of Africa, Africans and African diasporas who are not Black. Moreover, it may reify race as a biological and/or cultural category and source of identity beyond what is metaphysically or scientifically plausible, as well as ethically or politically appropriate or advantageous.

The racial sense of the African diaspora as Black is largely borne out of New World experiences. Old African Diasporas of the New World became premised on Blackness and race as a result of the targeted trafficking of especially West and Central Africans to the

plantations and the racialised economic, legal, political, social and cultural ordering of people of African descent – in the words of Eric Williams (1994/1944: 7), "Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was born of slavery" (see also Gomez 2005). For instance, it is no coincidence that it was primarily the descendants of enslaved Africans in the New World (for example, Edward Wilmot Blyden, W.E.B. DuBois, Amy and Marcus Garvey) who brought racial Pan-Africanism to Africa and the rest of the world. They were the sons and daughters of communities in the New World who, stripped of African ethnic and cultural particularities and systematically subjugated as Black Africans, had built communities, solidarity, resistance and a quest for liberation on that basis (e.g. Boukari-Yabara 2014).

In African Diaspora Studies, often a racial conception of the African diaspora is used in conjunction with a cultural one. A pioneer of the field, St. Clair Drake, saw the concept of the African diaspora as operating in the "cultural sector" of Pan-Africanism "toward maintaining and reinforcing black consciousness" and "the goal of fostering understanding, solidarity, and cooperation throughout the black world" (Drake 1982: 343). To Drake, African Diaspora Studies was the study of cultural communities, their cultural expressions, experiences and Black consciousness (Drake 1975). Another pioneer, Joseph E Harris – convener of the first and second African Diaspora Studies Institute conference at Howard University 1979 and Nairobi 1981 – stated that the African diaspora concept "embodies the essence of the historical connection between Africans and people of African descent," including "their settlement in adopted lands without the loss of their African identity" and "the physical or psychological return to the homeland – Africa" (Harris 1982: 18).

It is fair to say that the prevalent conjunctions of racial and cultural senses of the African diaspora in African Diaspora Studies largely grew out of a US horizon and the standpoint of the significance of race and culture to enslaved Africans and their descendants in the US and elsewhere in the New World.

Collective identities as Black, African descendant, and having a shared culture, are characteristic of Old African Diaspora communities in the New World as the result of histories and processes of the Middle Passage (e.g. Gomez 2005). These include, for example, the Raizal in Colombia, Afro-Trinbagonians, Haitians, African Americans, or Òrìṣà devotees in Brazil and Cuba. Such identities may have developed out of a multiplicity of African, European, Indigenous American, Asian, and other influences as well as much creativity. Yet, these groups are often with distinct cultural identities, which in turn are African derived and Black. This means that many of these communities, such as African Americans, at least those who are descendants of enslaved Africans to the US, may be accurately described as at once racial, ethnic, and cultural communities.

Furthermore, the politicised US academic milieu in which Black and African Diaspora Studies arose in the 1960s and 70s, made focusing on the cultural expressions of Black people a critical corrective to a social tendency to dismiss, exclude, and inferiorise the humanity and subjectivities of Black people. This was and still is critical especially when considering the forced cultural assimilation of Africans and people of African descent into brutalising racial regimes of chattel enslavement, followed by the racial apartheid of

colonialism and the racial stratification and segregation of postcolonial European settler societies throughout the Americas (e.g. Araujo 2017; Mbembe 2017, 2019; DuBois 1992/1935). Streams of Africans to the New World naturally had an impact on the cultural and identity-formations of African diasporic communities there (e.g. Gomez 2005; Bennett 2003, 2009). However, the forced acculturation of these communities and the near obliteration among them of distinct and intact ethnicities from the African continent, makes such contentious questions as their degree of cultural retention, continuity, hybridity, and creativity inevitable (Beckles 2018; Aondofe Iyo 2006; Morgan 2006). With such contexts in mind, the need to focus on the cultures, subjectivities, and identities of Old African Diasporas in the New World, and the need to develop theoretical frameworks that centres and are truthful to their agency, are critical matters (Asante 2007; Beckles and Shepherd 2007).

Still, when situating African Diaspora Studies in Europe there is an argument to be made that a racial sense of the African diaspora needs to be untangled from a cultural one for a broader socio-political understanding of what it means to be Black in the diaspora.

2 First Wave of African Diaspora Studies on Europe: Politics of Culture and Identity

The trajectory of African Diaspora Studies from the US to Europe is characterised by similar conceptualisations of the African diaspora in terms of race, culture, and identity (e.g. Nassy Brown 2005; Wright 2004, 2015; Hall 1990; Gilroy 1987, 1993). This may seem like an obvious state of affairs. If we are speaking of Black African diasporas and given the idea of diasporas as cultural communities, then it may seem obvious to conceptualise Black African diasporas anywhere in terms of race, culture, and identity (which is also both racial and cultural). This could then serve as a comparative framework for African Diaspora Studies, as it has since its inception into academia in the 1960s (e.g. Ashraf 2009; Harris 1996).

Although the socio-political dimensions of Black African diasporas always have been a part of African Diaspora Studies, they have not been foregrounded, neither in conceptualising African diasporas nor as subject matters. For instance, African Diaspora Studies pioneer St Clair Drake had a keen understanding of the socio-political dimensions of African diasporas and thought that the academic study of them could be put in service of Pan-Africanism. The study of African diasporas in the New World, he thought, should be based on a socio-political understanding of the societies out of which Africans had come, the work settings of the New World, as well as the responses of the New World diasporas to "those structures of world capitalism and of the world religious and political movements that condition the black experience" (Drake 1975: 11). Narrative treatments of Africa and the peoples of the diaspora could be placed within a single unified frame of reference as part of a history of the Black World, within which the geographically scattered peoples of Africa and the diaspora could be referred to as a potentially

organisable "Pan-African Aggregate" (Drake 1975: 11). Still, Drake ended up conceptualising African diasporas as communities with distinct cultures and identities.

Similar may be said of African Diaspora Studies on Europe. It too tends to place Black African diasporas in socio-political contexts, yet mostly conceptualise them in terms of culture and racial and cultural identity (e.g. Nassy Brown 2005; Wright 2004, 2015; Gilroy 2002/1987, 1993; Hall 1990).

This is true of the pioneering work of Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, who may be characterised as belonging to a first wave of African Diaspora Studies on Europe. Both of them contributors to the development of Cultural Studies, they view culture as imbued with politics, including ethics, and vice versa – especially when viewed against the background of racial identity politics, ethnic nationalism, nationhood, and the modern nation-state as a political community. Moreover, they view Black racial and cultural identities as both products of socio-political economic relations and perhaps more importantly sites of political agency, contestation and mobilisation (e.g. Williams 2013; Farred 2009; Gilroy 2002/1987, 1993; Hall 1980, 1993). This is reflected, for instance, in Paul Gilroy's (2002/1987: 206) understanding of Black music around the Atlantic as "built up across the imperial networks which once played host to the triangular trade of sugar, slaves and capital" while serving as a vehicle for Black political culture and consciousness.

For both Hall and Gilroy, much of the socio-political relevance of how they conceptualise the African diaspora stems from their anti-essentialist and anti-nationalist views on it. They both elaborate on the African diaspora in ways that puts the cultural, ethnic, racial, and political boundaries of the modern nation-state into question as well as similarly perceived boundaries of African diasporas.

This is not least true of their anti-essentialist understanding of race and its socio-political trappings. In their view, racialist assumptions of discrete human types with innate psychological and/or cultural characteristics are not merely false. More importantly, they are also morally destructive, when used as grounds for socio-political group-identities and community-building – as shown by modern history of white European identity-making, nationalism, systemic racism, colonialism, enslavement, Nazism, and fascism. It fixates human beings in unequally valued categories to be socio-politically protected, promoted, and institutionalised (e.g. Gilroy 2000a; Hall 1996c, 2017).

Both Hall and Gilroy are principally as well as metaphysically opposed to essentialising racial and cultural identifications as they may arise in Black cultural expressions and identities. Such identifications offer their own entrapments of group-based exclusivity, encampment, and reproduction of categories that are integral to problems of racism (e.g. Gilroy 2000a; Hall 1996b, 2017).

Hall asks us to be mindful of how racialist assumptions may be alive and well in everyday commonsense discourse on racial difference, calling for the end of the innocent notion of the essential Black subject and a recognition that "Black" is a politically and culturally constructed category (Hall 2017: 36, 76).

Gilroy goes as far as to warn against fascist expressions of Black identity-making – including, in the ideologies and styles of such iconic figures and movements as Marcus Garvey, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and the Nation of Islam (NOI) – and calls for anti-racist Black political cultures that demand liberation from more than white supremacy, but "all racializing and raciological thought, from racialized seeing, racialized thinking, and racialized thinking about thinking" (Gilroy 2000a: 40, 2000b).

Likewise, both Hall and Gilroy are anti-nationalist. Hall points out that notions of national culture, which are central to the political identities of modern Western nation-states, confine political community and equality to cultural community, belonging, sameness, and identity, whilst simultaneously misidentifying cultures as geographically bounded, essentialistic and fixed (Hall 1996c, 2017: 90–92, 134–137). Gilroy is not merely fiercely critical of political and cultural nationalism, but of methodological nationalism too. For example, ethnocentric English Cultural Studies that excludes reflections on race and Black agency, confines culture to national borders and indulges in morbid celebrations of Englishness or African Diaspora Studies in the US for being overly limited to the ethnic perspective of African Americans and the cultural and national borders of the US (Gilroy 1993).

Gilroy and Hall's anti-essentialist understandings of race, culture and the nation come together in their conceptualisations of the African diaspora. To them both, the nature of African diasporas offer metaphysical as well as normative challenges and correctives to essentialising notions of race, culture and the nation.

For Hall (2017: 172), diasporas metaphysically and normatively disrupt essentialising notions and politics of culture by being "composed of cultural formations which cut across and interrupt the settled contours of race, ethnos, and nation". While bearing "the traces of particular histories and cultures," they are also the "product of several histories, cultures, and narratives" and "belong to several homes, most of them at least in part symbolic" (Hall: 173). Hence, though their cultural identities are always something they are never just one thing and open up to an understanding of culture as "always open, complex, under construction, taking place in an unfinished game" (Ibid: 173–174).

Gilroy has offered the 'Black Atlantic' as a model for Black African diasporas that defies any notion of Black diasporic culture and identity as bounded by ethnicity, territory, and national borders. Instead, the cultures and racial identity making of the Black Atlantic are governed by complex networks of movement, cultural exchange, and solidarity crisscrossing the Atlantic. These networks have nationally situated 'nodes', as it were. However, ultimately they are informed by transnational modern Atlantic histories of racial

terror and exclusion as well as of Black political struggle, solidarity, imagination, and cultural creativity. It is a model that defies how territory and nature "are being engaged as a means to define citizenship and the forms of rootedness that compose national solidarity and cohesion" (Gilroy 2000a: 111). It serves to untangle political community from ethnicity and the modern nation-state and is antithetical to any form of what Gilroy has termed "ethnic absolutism" – that is, notions of cultures as pure, natural, exclusive, or bounded as a basis for political community, identity, and mobilisation (Williams 2013: 27–28; Gilroy 2002/1987: 206, 1993;).

Although both Hall and Gilroy contextualise Black African diasporas in socio-political and ethical terms, they still end up conceptualising them in terms of culture and identity. From a socio-political and ethical point of view, it may seem to make sense to do so. After all, racial, ethnic, cultural, and national identities – and their cultural representations, mediation, and circulation – may seem to cut to the heart of group-based distinctions, behaviors, and regimes. It may seem difficult to make sense of the social phenomena of racial distinctions, discrimination, and regimes without reference to racial identities. For example, the modern nation-state with its notions of peoplehood, the real and imagined borders of Europe, the racial exclusivity of European colonialism, or the evolution and institutional embeddedness of modern Eurocentric racism would not be what they are without a basis in group-based identities. Therefore, not only from a metaphysical, but from a normative point of view too, it may seem obvious to conceptualise Black African diasporas in Europe and elsewhere in terms of identity.

However, the limitations of conceptualising Black African diasporas in terms of culture and identity should come into view by examining Hall's and Gilroy's own conceptualisations. These have evolved from the vantage point of the Black African diaspora in the UK, in particular as it arose from the post-WWII 'Windrush generation' of Caribbean migrants. Both Hall and Gilroy take interest in how circulating cultural representations and expressions – not least those of popular culture – inform Black identity making in the UK. Their emphasis is on overlapping racial and cultural identifications of the African diaspora, which mostly have grown out of the New World experiences of Old African Diasporas. So-called New African Diasporas of postcolonial African migrants or the great diversity of mostly New, but also Old African diasporas in Europe, do not play any major role in their conceptualisations. For instance, although Gilroy (1993: 1) opens his classic book, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, with the words, "Striving to be both European and black requires some specific forms of double consciousness," his study of Black Europeans may be said to mostly concern the UK.

Given the history of Black cultural formations and identity-making in the New World, and the cultural circulation of African American and Caribbean instances of Black culture and identity, through struggles for liberation from enslavement, Pan-Africanism, civil rights, Black Power, Rastafarianism, poetry, fiction, public intellectualism and not least popular

music such as jazz, Blues, soul, reggae and rap, it may make sense to think of the African diaspora in Europe as a corner of the 'Black Atlantic' (Gilroy 2002/1987, 1993). In addition, it is critical that we understand both Hall and Gilroy as responding to an understanding of diasporas as cultural groups, and especially Gilroy for wanting to expand a US-centered African Diaspora Studies to also include Europe. On the other hand, in expanding African Diaspora Studies to include all people of African descent across Europe, the Black Atlantic or even assumed common denominators of Black identity and culture, may not offer the most inclusive model.

3 The Second Wave of African Diaspora Studies on Europe: Beyond Middle Passage Epistemology

For the past two decades, a growing number of scholars (including, Michelle Wright, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, Gloria Wekker and Fatima El-Tayeb) have questioned the centrality of the Middle Passage and the Black Atlantic to the African diaspora in Europe (e.g. El-Tayeb 2011; Wekker 2009; Zeleza 2005; Wright 2004, 2015). For instance, Michelle Wright has introduced the term 'Middle Passage Epistemology' to describe a stance that tends to give preference to Middle Passage-, African American-, US-, often heterosexual male-centered, totalising and homogenising perspectives on Black identity-formations – a wholly unsatisfactory stance for understanding the African diaspora in Europe (Wright 2009, 2013, 2015).

A common argument against making the Middle Passage and the Black Atlantic central to understanding the African Diaspora in Europe is the large presence in Europe of so-called New African Diasporas – that is to say, more recent migrants from Africa, who in contrast to Old African Diasporas are not descendants of enslaved Africans, for instance via the Middle Passage to the Americas (Okpewho and Nzegwu 2009; Koser 2003; Akyeampong 2000; Elabor-Idemudia 1999). Though New African Diasporas in Europe may be shaped by postcolonial experiences, they do not have the shared histories of the Middle Passage of the Black Atlantic. On the whole, Black African Diasporas in Europe are the result of a variety of historical processes and do not share the same confluences of racial, ethnic, and cultural identities as may be found in the New World.

Although no country in the European Union keeps statistics on race, based on what we can glean from statistics on country of origin it seems fair to assume that the great majority of the African Diaspora in Europe have a first or second-generation background in Africa (e.g. McEachrane 2014a, 2021). In most countries of Europe, we find relatively recent communities with a background in Africa and with a wide variety of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, national, political, and religious backgrounds and identifications. Especially in the UK, France, and the Netherlands, we also find large African diasporas from the Caribbean and other parts of the diaspora (Keaton et al. 2012; Hine et al. 2009).

A critical difference between Old and New African Diasporas is that especially first generation New African Diasporas tend to have less prominent racial identifications and in general no developed cultural or ethnic communities based on race. Characteristically, the first generation of New African Diasporas come with their own cultural, ethnic, linguistic, national, regional, political, and religious identifications that often do not foreground identities as Black. In the words of Handel Kashope Wright (2015: 87–88), oftentimes Africans on the continent are "not particularly Black nor particularly African"; "it is upon leaving Africa and arriving in the diaspora that the supposedly 'Black' African is in fact most urgently interpellated into Blackness and Africanness." It is in the diaspora that the Mende woman from Bo becomes sutured to those identity categories and emerges as "Black and African, a black African woman" (Wright 2015: 87–88). Yet, in many, maybe even most parts of Africa identifications as Black in phenotypical and especially cultural terms tend not to resonate – albeit principally as a taken-for-granted backdrop – and few African languages even have a term for 'Black people' (Wright 2005).

Among other things, this means that when conceptualising the African diaspora in Europe we cannot presume the presence of cultural communities based on identifications as Black or even communities with widespread, shared identities as Black. Given the large presence of New African Diasporas in Europe, the ethnic, cultural, and even racial diversity of African Europeans, with diverse backgrounds and histories as well as their recent presence in relatively large numbers in European countries, mean that we cannot assume to find self-identified national Black communities in Europe and especially not in any cultural sense. Somali's from Somalia, Akan from Ghana or Wolof from Senegal in Norway, Belgium or Italy – though they may recognise commonalities among each other as being phenotypically Black and from Africa – are not likely to see themselves as part of the same Norwegian, Belgian, or Italian Black community, especially not the same Black cultural community. For example, in Sweden, where the majority of people of African descent belong to New African Diasporas, mostly with a first- or second-generation background in the Horn of Africa, there is no widely shared African Swedish racial, ethnic, cultural, historical, social or political identification (McEachrane 2021).

The pronounced heterogeneity of racial, ethnic, cultural, and national identities among Black people in Europe as well as their divergence from the US norm of having a historical background in the Middle Passage, is seen by second wave scholars such as Michelle Wright (2004, 2015) and Fatima El-Tayeb (2011) as a lesson to be learnt about Black homogeneity as a myth. It offers a telling counter-example to notions of Black people as having a natural and cohesive Black identity, being an extended biological and cultural family and/or belonging to an inherent Black African nation – not seldom combined with ideals of heterosexual, cis-gendered Black males as models of Black authenticity and at the helm of Black families, communities and political struggles (El-Tayeb 2011; Wright 2004, 2015).

For Fatima El-Tayeb (2011), the heterogeneity of Black Europe – which to her importantly often includes living in spaces and forming communities with other people of color – offers a healthy challenge to African Diaspora Studies and US-centric assumptions of what it means to be Black as well as racialising perceptions of Europe as white, with narrow ethnic and cultural lenses on its communities of color (El-Tayeb 2011).

For Michelle Wright, the heterogeneity of Black Europe calls for a depiction of African diasporic identity that simultaneously incorporates the diversity of Black identities while connecting them to each other "to show that they indeed constitute a diaspora rather than an unconnected aggregate of different peoples linked only in name" (Wright 2004: 2). While exploring how Black may be defined when there is no one shared quality that justifies the frequent and assured use of the term, Wright points out that in countries like Germany a sense of belonging to a Black community is still being forged (Wright 2004: 185, 2015: 2). It is a sense of community that is simultaneously based on overlapping experiences such as the refusal to understand Afro-Germans as Germans and their location as 'outsiders' to the nation, while recognising its diversity and itself as inherently diasporic, counter-nationalist, and constituted by an open-ended dialogic process of identity-making (Wright 2004: 134, 185, 188, 191, 194–196, 202).

While what may be called a second wave of African Diaspora Studies on Europe has further emphasised the heterogeneous nature of African diasporas in Europe and included a questioning of 'Middle Passage Epistemologies', nonetheless it has remained wedded to an idea of diaspora as constituted by identity and culture.

4 African Diaspora Studies on Europe beyond Identity and Culture

In conceptualising African diasporas in Europe, three critical distinctions need to be made. First, as previously outlined, when speaking of African diasporas we need to parse out whether it is in a continental, cultural or racial sense. This is not least critical for conceptualising the heterogeneity and lived realities of African diasporas in Europe. Given the tendency of African Diaspora Studies from a New World horizon to conflate racial and cultural senses of the term, we need to be especially meticulous in distinguishing between racial and cultural conceptualisations of African diasporas. We should not take for granted that Black African diasporas in Europe have anything in common in cultural terms and can be conceptualised in such terms.

Second, in addition we need to give up presumptions that Black African diasporas in Europe have any shared identities as Black, African or African descendants. Although the terms 'Black', 'African' and/or 'African descendant' may be used – albeit with caution – in a descriptive sense of African diasporas in Europe, such uses should not be premised on any shared racial, cultural or continental identities (or identifications, to emphasise that it is primarily subjective self-identities that we have in mind here). A race-based understanding of African diasporas in Europe, presupposes references to populations with

similar physical appearances and continental origins. Arguably, the term Black is the most precise term to single out a certain race-based segment of African diasporas. However, it is also a term that may be contested as overly racialising, homogenising, reductive, and charged with negative connotations (Tsri 2016). In addition, especially members of the first generation of New African Diasporas in Europe may reject the term Black as a foreign imposition with little or no meaning in Africa, as a self-designating term and a racial or cultural identification (e.g. Okpewho and Nzegwu 2009, Fearfull et al. 2010). Hence, in conceptualising African diasporas in Europe in a racial sense, we should not assume any joint racial or cultural identities nor that 'Black', 'African', or 'African descendant' are appropriate terms.

Third, though it makes sense to continue making a racial sense of diaspora the center of African Diaspora Studies on Europe – given the social salience of race compared to ethnicity or culture more broadly – it should be conceptualised in socio-political terms. It will make for a more cohesive and comprehensive conceptualisation, frame of reference, and common denominator of Black African diasporas in Europe than the current commonplace conceptualisations in terms of identity and culture. Even where people of African descent in Europe do not share a joint identity or culture as Black, Africans, or people of African descent, they will still share similar or overlapping socio-political conditions. For example, having physical features that take on similar social meanings of being racialised as Black with all the connotations that this entails in Europe, including being excluded from, marginalized, or ambiguously included in European nationhood.

Conceptualising Black African diasporas in Europe in terms of social and political meanings and contexts will mean that what is at stake is not social identities per se, but rather social positions. Similarly, members of the diaspora need not have any culture or identity in common to enable us to speak of them in socio-political terms as collectives with shared histories, situations, interests, rights, and/or fates. Such socio-political conceptualisations and analyses will be decidedly structural or systemic by pointing to ways in which societies in a broad sense are organised. Furthermore, they will, implicitly or explicitly, evaluate the contexts, situations and positions of African diasporas in political (and ethical) terms such as equality, dignity, freedom, justice, and rights. Moreover, in contrast to conceptualisations in terms of identity and culture, socio-political conceptualisations will allow for a broader and more inclusive comparative framework for people of African descent across the diaspora. For instance, it may point to how Black people as Black share similar socio-political conditions or circumstances across countries and continents, that their similar physical features and continental origins take on similar meanings and result in similar socio-political positions of subordination and disempowerment (cf. Patterson and Kelley 2000). Or how Black people as Black in the diaspora as well as in Africa, due to similar histories of colonialism, imperialism and transnational racial stratification, may live in similar socio-political (including, socio-

economic) formations or systems with international as well as national dimensions (cf. Itzigsohn and Brown 2020: Chapter 2; McEachrane 2020).

It should be noted that such a socio-political conceptualisation of Black African diasporas in Europe does not exclude racial or cultural identities. For example, it may include considerations of how young African Europeans form Black identities – say, based on a mixture of social positionalities, a sense of being 'African', stylised senses of being 'Black' borrowed from popular culture such as hip hop and Afrobeat, a sense of connection with Black cultural expressions around the world and identification with Black freedom struggles. To a socio-political conceptualisation of Black African diasporas such identifications may be relevant to, for instance, understanding how a sense of belonging to a Black community may arise in practice and what this means in a wider social and political context. Nonetheless, it will not treat such identifications as common denominators, necessary or defining conditions for Black African diasporas in Europe.

Although socio-political conceptualisations of Black African diasporas in Europe are rare and not articulated as such, there are a few examples that may be construed as such. Kwame Nimako and Stephen Small have offered theoretical frameworks for Black Europe that suggest an underlying socio-political conceptualisation (Small 2018; Nimako and Small 2009). Instead of focusing on the racial and cultural identities of Black Europeans, they have sought to outline social and political conditions of Black African diasporas in the EU, including their collective socio-political statuses at the national and EU levels (Nimako and Small 2009). Stephen Small (2018) has sought to define what similar experiences Black people across Europe have by pointing to their similar social and political conditions. For instance, the ambiguous visibility and endemic vulnerability of being over-concentrated at the lower ranks of every major political, economic, and social hierarchy; living in countries where the predominant political and public explanation of such disparities is deficient skills and culture; the endemic othering and racialisation of Black people in the face of mainstream views that race is not relevant to European societies;1 a widespread denial of the relevance of colonial and imperial legacies; and having civil society organisations in their countries that mobilise Black people for Black empowerment and social justice (Small 2018).

There are some African diaspora studies on socio-political forms of Black European collective-making that are not defined by identity and culture, but joint socio-political conditions (e.g. McEachrane 2020, 2021; Thompson 2020; Mudimbe-Boyi 2012). For instance, Elisabeth Mudimbe-Boyi (2012: 21–22) speaks of a frequently self-designated "Black France," which is multinational, multicultural, transcontinental, even multicolor and does not represent a homogenous block, but instead an assemblage of micro societies. Still, "despite their diversity, [they] find themselves similarly positioned in this global orbit

with respect to their origins, France, colonization, political domination, cultural assimilation, and even social marginalization and invisibility" (Mudimbe-Boyi 2012: 22).

Similarly, Vanessa Eileen Thompson (2020), describes a contemporary form of Black French collective solidarity – exemplified by the grass-roots activist group Brigade Anti-Négrophobie (BAN) in the outskirts of Paris. It is a Black collectivism, which seeks to escape both the pitfalls of identity politics and France's official abstract 'race-free' universalism, by recognising and embracing the multiplicities of Black experiences and identifications without subsuming them under a collective Black identity, while taking seriously lived experiences of anti-blackness and simultaneously providing a basis for interracial solidarity based on notions of urban conviviality and collective action (Thompson 2020: 31, 38–40).

Such socio-political Black European collectivism may be seen as a form of pragmatic Pan-Africanism, in line with the practical philosophy of common struggle of the canonical Pan-African conferences in Europe 1900–1945 (McEachrane 2020, 2021). It is a form of collectivism that sets aside caricatures of Pan-Africanism as wedded to racial and cultural essentialism and a joint Black African identity. It can allow for a person of African descent to feel an affinity with other Black people, for example, based on similar physical features, continental origins and social positions; to want dignity, equal rights and justice for Black people; that Black features be affirmed as beautiful and Black people as loveable; that African indigenous cultures and other Black cultural expressions be celebrated rather than inferiorised or maligned; that the histories of Black people be told and from the perspectives and agency of Black people – without for a moment assuming that Black people have or should have any shared racial or cultural identities that sets them apart from other people.

5 Conclusion – from the Black Atlantic to the Black Mediterranean

From the perspective of studying African diasporas in Europe – be it in a racial, cultural or continental sense – a socio-political conceptualisation of Black African diasporas can allow for fuller and more inclusive pictures than insisting that diasporas are a matter of identity and culture. It can include the 'Black Mediterranean' as well as the 'Black Atlantic' (Progilio and Hawthorne et al. 2021). Although the outcomes of the Middle Passage vis-à-vis the Central Mediterranean Route differ with respect to their magnitude of racial horror as well as the racial and cultural identities of Black African diasporas – the socio-political outcomes are continuous. For example, being racialised as Black, finding oneself in socio-political systems based on the privileging and domination of white people politically, legally, economically, culturally and socially or in terms of belonging to the nation be it in the US, Brazil, Italy, or Sweden (McEachrane 2014b, 2018; Mills 2003, 2017).

Socio-politically, the African diasporic processes of the Central Mediterranean Route graft on to those of the Middle Passage. For instance, the racialising and perilous journeys of Eritreans, Somalians, Nigerians, or Senegalese to the coasts of the Mediterranean in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Libya, where some make it onto ramshackle boats to cross the world's most deadly waterway for migrants. Thereafter, only to be detained in Spain, Italy, or Greece, not seldom becoming undocumented migrants trying to scrape by in informal economies or be lucky enough to achieve residency through asylum or otherwise and try to eke out a life from the margins of society. These journeys and their processes convey the global socio-political realities of Black African diasporas, including the public perceptions of Black lives in Europe and North Africa. They bring to the fore the position of the EU as a racialising system, and the contradictory European promise of universal human dignity and rights (Rutazibwa 2020; Zoppi 2020; Patterson 2019; Smythe 2018; Danewid 2017; Sharpe 2016).

Not only does a socio-political conception of Black African diasporas speak to their interconnected conditions. It also speaks directly to the need to understand, evaluate and address them politically.

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Pew Research Center

REPORT <><> MARCH 22, 2018

At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010

Sub-Saharan migration to the United States also growing

https://www.pewresearch.org/global-migration-and-demography/2018/03/22/at-least-a-million-sub-saharan-africans-moved-to-europe-since-2010/

Migrants rescued off the coast of Libya wait to disembark from the supply vessel *OOC Panther* in the Sicilian port of Messina, Italy, in April 2017.

International migration from countries in sub-Saharan Africa has grown dramatically over the past decade, including to Europe and the United States. Indeed, most years since 2010 have witnessed a rising inflow of sub-Saharan asylum applicants in Europe, and lawful permanent residents and refugees in the U.S.

The factors pushing people to leave sub-Saharan Africa – and the paths they take to arrive at their destinations – vary from country to country and individual to individual. In the case of Europe, the population of sub-Saharan migrants has been boosted by the influx of nearly 1 million asylum applicants (970,000) between 2010 and 2017, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of data from Eurostat, Europe's statistical agency. Sub-Saharan Africans also moved to European Union countries, Norway and Switzerland as international students and resettled refugees, through family reunification and by other means.

In the U.S., those fleeing conflict also make up a portion of the more than 400,000 sub-Saharan migrants who moved to the States between 2010 and 2016. According to data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. State Department, 110,000 individuals from sub-Saharan countries were resettled as refugees over this seven-year period. An additional 190,000 were granted lawful permanent residence by virtue of family ties; nearly 110,000 more entered the U.S. through the diversity visa program.

Will the inflow of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and the U.S. continue at the same pace in the years ahead? It is difficult to say. However, the idea of migrating is on the minds of many Africans living south of the Sahara. According to a 2017 Pew Research Center survey in six sub-Saharan countries that have supplied many of the region's migrants to the U.S. and Europe, many say they would move to another country if the means and opportunity presented themselves. And in Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria, more than a third say they actually plan to migrate in the next five years. Of those who plan to move, more individuals plan to move to the U.S. than to Europe in most countries surveyed.

Increases in migrant stocks and inflows are not the same

About 420,000 more sub-Saharan African migrants lived in Europe in 2017 (4.15 million) than in 2010 (3.73 million). And an estimated 1.55 million sub-Saharan African migrants lived in the U.S in 2017, an increase of about a 325,000 from 2010, when an estimated 1.22 million sub-Saharan African migrants lived in the country, according to the United Nations. These populations are also sometimes referred to as *migrant stocks.* They constitute the balance of increases and decreases in the total accumulated population of sub-Saharan migrants for a specified time period.

Inflows, by contrast*,* in this report refer to the annual migration of people born in sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and the United States. Inflows can boost the total migrant stock if inflows to a region or country exceed the combined effects of deaths, outflows and return migration to countries of origin. As a result, in some instances, differences in migrant stocks between two time points can be lower than inflows.

EU countries, Norway and Switzerland received nearly 1 million first-time asylum applications from sub-Saharan Africans between 2010 and 2017, according to data from Eurostat, Europe's statistical agency. (This number removes application counts withdrawn by sub-Saharan Africans between 2010 and 2017 to account for the possible duplication of asylum seekers applying in multiple countries). But asylum applications are not the only way sub-Saharan migrants enter Europe. Some enter, for example, on family or work visas, or as resettled refugees or international students, so the total inflow is likely larger.

At the same time, U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. State Department records indicate that more than 400,000 sub-Saharan Africans entered the U.S. between fiscal 2010 and fiscal 2016 as arriving lawful permanent residents or resettled refugees. (Data from fiscal 2017 were unavailable). A smaller number of sub-Saharan Africans also entered the U.S. as international students or as employees with work visas.


Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and Kenya stand out as origin countries for sub-Saharan migrants living in both the U.S. and Europe
Top countries of birth of sub-Saharan migrants living in the U.S. and the European Union, Norway and Switzerland in 2017, in thousands
U.S.
Nigeria 280,000
Ethiopia 220,000
Ghana 160,000
Kenya 120,000
South Africa 100,000
Somalia 90,000
Liberia 80,000
Zimbabwe 50,000
Tanzania 50,000
Cameroon 50,000
Highlighted countries represent 51%
EU, Norway and Switzerland
Nigeria 390,000
South Africa 310,000
Somalia 300,000
Senegal 270,000
Ghana 250,000
Angola 220,000
Kenya 180,000
D.R. Congo 150,000
Cameroon 150,000
Ivory Coast 140,000
Highlighted countries represent 54%
Notes: See Appendix B for list of countries in sub-Saharan Africa included in this analysis. Estimates rounded to the nearest 10,000.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations data accessed on Dec. 23, 2017.
"At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010."
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Nigeria and Ghana have been major sources of sub-Saharan migrants to both Europe and the United States

More than half (51%) of sub-Saharan African migrants living in the U.S. as of 2017 were born in just four countries: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya, according to migrant population data from the United Nations.[5]

Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya are also major sources of migrants to the EU, Norway and Switzerland. However, compared with the U.S., sub-Saharan migrants to Europe arrive from a more diverse set of origins, with more than half of migrants living in Europe born in South Africa, Somalia, Senegal, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon, in addition to Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya.

Some origin countries of these sub-Saharan migrant populations in the U.S. and Europe have increased more than others. For example, between 2010 and 2017, the total number of Somalian migrants in Europe increased by 80,000 people. Over the same period, the total population of Eritreans living in Europe climbed by about 40,000, according to UN estimates.

In the U.S., between 2010 and 2017, several sub-Saharan migrant populations increased, including those from Nigeria (70,000 individuals), Ethiopia (70,000) and Ghana (40,000).

In terms of destinations, as of 2017, nearly three-quarters (72%) of Europe's sub-Saharan immigrant population was concentrated in just four countries: the UK (1.27 million), France (980,000), Italy (370,000) and Portugal (360,000). In the U.S., migrants from sub-Saharan Africa can be found across the country, with 42% in the American South, 24% in the Northeast, 18% in the Midwest and 17% in the West.[6]

If circumstances permitted, many sub-Saharan Africans would migrate abroad


About half or more in several sub-Saharan African countries would move to another country
% that would live in another country if had the means and opportunity to go
Ghana 75
Nigeria 74
Kenya 54
South Africa 51
Senegal 46
Tanzania 43
Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey. Q140.
"At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010."
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Between February and April 2017, Pew Research Center surveyed in six of the 10 countries that have supplied many of the sub-Saharan immigrants now living in the U.S. Four of these countries – Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Kenya – are also among the top 10 origin countries for sub-Saharan migrants to Europe.

The survey asked respondents whether they would go to live in another country, if they had the means and opportunity. At least four-in-ten in each sub-Saharan country surveyed answered yes, including roughly three-quarters of those surveyed in Ghana (75%) and Nigeria (74%).

The relatively high shares of people in these countries who say they would resettle in another country is generally consistent with findings from other surveys, like Afrobarometer in Nigeria and Ghana, that pose questions about the desirability of migrating. Compared with other world regions, Gallup polls find that sub-Saharan countries have some of the highest shares of people who say they would move to another country.

What's behind the widespread appeal of migrating in some sub-Saharan countries? Multiple factors could be at play. To begin with, while many sub-Saharan African economies are growing, many countries continue to have high unemployment rates and relatively low wage rates. In addition, the job market looks unlikely to improve anytime soon, thanks to high fertility levels that will mean even more people competing for jobs. Against this backdrop, sub-Saharan Africans could see migrating to countries with more – and better paying – jobs as a means of improving their personal economic prospects.


One-in-five or more adults in Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa say they plan to move to another country
% say they plan on moving to another country in the next five years
Senegal 44%
Ghana 42
Nigeria 38
South Africa 22
Kenya 19
Tanzania 8
Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey. Q142.
"At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010."
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Political instability and conflict are other factors pushing sub-Saharan Africans to move. For example, the number of sub-Saharans displaced within their own country nearly doubled to 9 million between 2010 and 2016, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates. Also, the total number of refugees from sub-Saharan countries living in other sub-Saharan countries grew about 2.3 million in the

same period. At the same time, reports indicate that anywhere between 400,000 and a million sub-Saharan Africans are in Libya; some of them have been sold as slaves or are being held in jail-like facilities.

Pressures related to economic well-being and insecurity may help to explain why, beyond a general willingness to migrate, substantial shares of sub-Saharan Africans say they actually *plan to move to another country in the next five years*. Among the six countries polled, the share with plans to migrate ranges from roughly four-in-ten or more in Senegal (44%), Ghana (42%) and Nigeria (38%) to fewer than one-in-ten in Tanzania (8%).

Will all those with plans to migrate in fact leave their home countries in the next five years? If recent history is a guide, the answer would most likely be no. But data from official sources suggest that this will not be for lack of effort.

U.S. diversity visa applicants from sub-Saharan Africa have increased

Number of people participating in the visa lottery, in millions, fiscal 2010-2015



Note: Fiscal year is Oct. 1-Sept. 30. Application period occurs two fiscal years in advance of each year's lottery. Applicants include principal applicants, spouses and children.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. State Department data, 2010-2015, accessed March 1, 2018
"At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010."

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For example, 1.7 million Ghanaians (or 6% of Ghana's population) applied for the U.S. diversity lottery in 2015, even when only 50,000 people *worldwide* are permitted to move each year to the U.S. through this visa program. In the same year, other sub-Saharan African countries, such as the Republic of Congo (10%), Liberia (8%) and Sierra Leone (8%) saw high shares of their populations apply for the lottery. Although the lottery only requires an online application and the completion of a high school diploma for eligibility, the high number of applicants underscores the seriousness with which many sub-Saharan Africans contemplate and actively pursue migrating abroad.

In some sub-Saharan countries, U.S. preferred over Europe as destination

Europe's border statistics show a well-traveled route of migrants from Africa to Europe. But this does not necessarily mean Europe is the top choice of potential sub-Saharan

African migrants. In fact, in several of the countries surveyed by Pew Research Center, those planning to migrate more often cited the U.S., as opposed to Europe, as their preferred destination when asked where in the world they planned to move.

For example, among the 42% of Ghanaians who say they plan to migrate abroad in the next five years, four-in-ten (41%) identify the U.S. as their intended destination, while three-in-ten (30%) name a country in the EU, Norway or Switzerland. Similarly, shares of potential migrants in South Africa (39% vs. 22%) and Kenya (39% vs. 12%) say they intend to migrate to the U.S. over Europe.[7]



Only in Senegal, a Francophone country, do more respondents that plan to move intend to migrate to a European country (49%), as opposed to the United States (24%).

The survey did not ask respondents why they preferred the U.S. or Europe, but it did ask whether respondents were in personal contact with friends or relatives in other countries. People planning to migrate in the next five years tended to identify destinations where they already had friends or family. This finding is generally consistent with studies showing that personal connections influence the decision and likelihood of migrating.

Higher shares of adults in Senegal and South Africa say they have friends or relatives they stay in touch with regularly in Europe than say this about friends or relatives in the U.S. Meanwhile, in Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania, people have friends or relatives they

stay in touch with in Europe and the U.S. at about the same rate. In Kenya, a higher share of people has contacts in the United States.

Since 2010, most years have seen a rising tide of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and the U.S.

Migrant inflows from sub-Saharan African countries into European Union countries, Norway and Switzerland and the U.S.



Note: Asylum applicants to Europe are first-time applicants after the removal of withdrawn applications; they are shown in calendar years. Lawful permanent resident and refugee arrivals to U.S. are shown in fiscal years (Oct. 1 to Sept. 30). U.S. data for fiscal 2017 was unavailable at time of publication. Sub-Saharan African migrants may enter each destination by other than the means displayed in this chart. Consequently, these flow figures are incomplete and likely represent minimums. See report's textbox, "Increases in migrant stock and inflows are not the same." See Appendix B for list of sub-Saharan Africa countries included.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Eurostat data, accessed March 14, 2018, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. State Department data, accessed March 13, 2018.
"At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010."

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01] The African Diaspora in France
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/the-african-diaspora-in-france/

02] Europe faced migration resurgence from Africa in 2023
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Diasporic Literature

DIPLOMACY & BEYOND PLUS
A JOURNAL OF FOREIGN POLICY & NATIONAL AFFAIRS

At Home, Away from Home

Literatures of the New Indian Diaspora

Author:
Dr Sireesha Telugu

"Literature from the Indian Diaspora functions as a substitute for the homeland on a global platform, and it traverses across historical periods and geographies"

https://diplomacybeyond.com/at-home-away-from-home-literatures-of-the-new-indian-diaspora/

"You are still young. Free," he said… "Do yourself a favor. Before it's too late, without thinking too much about it first, pack a pillow and a blanket and see as much of the world as you can…"

<<< *The Namesake*, Jhumpa Lahiri, 2012

'Diaspora' is a journey that negotiates a physical detachment from, and a psychological attachment towards, the homeland. The term 'diaspora' was originally used to describe the dispersion of Jews from Babylon in the 6th Century BC, and later was used to refer to all migrants who left their homeland to go to another country for various reasons. Today's use of the term associates it with this conscious choice. However, it also encompasses the psychological connection to the *home*, away from 'home'.

Indian immigrants are spread around the world and form an integral part of the global diaspora. The job market that has opened up as a result of globalization has made the potential of Indians more visible and functional. There have also been social and cultural exchanges. It is in this context that the literatures emerging from the diasporic people assume significance. The literature of the Indian diaspora is a body of writing produced by people who identify themselves as being of Indian origin, but also belonging to foreign lands.

Diaspora and Literature

Diaspora plays a significant role in literature, especially in Indian Writing in English. Literature from the Indian diaspora functions as a substitute for the homeland on a global platform, and it traverses across historical periods and geographies. It explores questions of representation, and delves into the experiences of dislocation, marginalization, and acculturation that are usually associated with migration to a foreign land. Simultaneously, it probes into the very idea of a 'home', and into the notion of *belonging*. It also draws upon a variety of perspectives from literary and digital cultures to evaluate issues such as gender, politics, generational conflict, race, class, and transnational encounters. An intersectional web of exploration is carried out through these texts, with authors questioning the very basis of their cultural identities.

Diaspora literature in English is largely associated with writers like V.S. Naipaul, Anita Desai, Jhumpa Lahiri, Bharati Mukherjee, Rohinton Mistry, Kiran Desai, Meena Alexander, Salman Rushdie, and also with the more recent Benyamin, Deepak Unnikrishnan and many more. "Being in diaspora means living in a cross-cultural context, in which change, fusion, and expansion are inevitable…those aware of the complexities…produced a number of voices in recent years that echoed through the medium of literature" (*Writing Diaspora: South Asian Women, Culture and Ethnicity*, Yasmin Hussain, 2005). Literature is one of the most prominent mediums through which migrant experiences are transmitted from one generation to the next. Literary texts carry a perception of history that links them to the past, whilst also carrying an insight into the future. This creates transnational identities.

Recent Indian Diasporic Literature in English

Literature by the Indian diaspora in English has gained a reputation both in academics and popular culture, and there is no dearth for this kind of writing being adapted into films. Thus, even the diasporic cultural texts (film

s/documentaries) offer possibilities of exploring the diasporic cultural identities. According to Stuart Hall, "there are at least two different ways of thinking about cultural identity…one in the term of shared culture and second of what we are" (*Cultural Identity and Diaspora*, Stuart Hall, 1990). This insight explains the diasporic narratives that represent the struggles of balancing the 'home' and the values of the new and adopted land. Novels like *The Namesake* projects the disparities between cultures and the attempt of the migrant families in equally managing the diverse and sometimes opposing traditions. Jhumpa Lahiri, a second-generation diasporic writer, portrays characters that are caught between these irreconcilable differences, and which seek to land on a sense of equilibrium or balance between their Indian-ness and American-ness.

The novel opens with Ashima Ganguly, standing in her Central Square apartment in Cambridge, on a winter afternoon, preparing a snack to satisfy her hunger pangs.

> *"On a sticky August evening two weeks before her due date, Ashima Ganguly stands in the kitchen of a Central Square apartment, combining Rice Krispies, Planters peanuts and chopped red onion in a bowl."*

These opening lines of Lahiri's *The Namesake* introduce the protagonist's attempts at balancing the West and the East. The readers might notice that the Indian street snack is prepared with "Planters" peanuts but not any ordinary ones. The writer's mention of the peanut manufacturing company is a way to introduce the readers to the experience of the East meeting the West. While food represents the cultural amalgamation, Ashima mixing it with Planters peanuts and Rice Krispies symbolizes a diasporic assimilation of the two cultures. As Amartya Sen opines: "Modern Indians see themselves as global citizens, and they aspire to make use of the 'best of both worlds.' While they retain a sense of affiliation and companionship with India and Indians, they find no contradiction in being loyal citizens of the country they have emigrated."

(*The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity*, Amartya Sen, 2006).

Ashima persistently attempts to create this 'best-of-both-worlds' in every move of hers. She wishes for Gogol, her son born and brought up in the US, to be an Indian in thought and an American in outlook. She teaches him Tagore, to acquaint him with the Bengali culture, whilst also making him learn English to help him assimilate into his country.

Later in the novel, we see Ashima trying to balance her new world both by maintaining her traditions and as well as adapting to new changes. Eventually, Ashima takes up a job in the library, gains poise and confidence as an independent woman, and picks up the responsibility of maintaining her home and settling her children's lives. And finally, she understands that this 'diaspora' is a fluid kind of space that lives by accommodating new changes. This is the space that helps immigrants like her family create hybrid and novel diasporic identities.

You Are What You Wear by Jennifer Baumgartner helps readers understand that one's physical and psychological identities are interrelated. Most often, people are identified through the clothes they wear, that reveal their national or cultural distinctiveness. Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni uses the metaphor of clothing to describe the transformation of a newly wedded wife from a typical, shy young woman, into a bold and strong character. Her short story "Clothes" in *Arranged Marriage* reflects the character's view of a modern world after an exposure to the West. Sunita's changing fashion at different stages of her life symbolizes her changing characteristics, revealing that this is her choice of adopting a hybrid modernity, which attempts to give space to both the Indian and the adopted foreign.

"The T-shirt is sunrise-orange-the colour, I decide, of joy, of my new American life. Across its middle, in large black letters, is written Great America."
(*Arranged Marriage*, Chitra Divakaruni, 1995)

Diasporic mobility towards modernity is the choice of the New Diaspora in contemporary times. This is because their choice of migration is voluntary and the New Diaspora is formed mostly from the educated elite, who work for better companies and are socially better placed. These migrants try to assimilate into new cultures and create transnational identities. These kind of migrational communities help in country's mobility towards globalization and modernization.

Anurag Mathur's *Inscrutable Americans* uses humour to mock the 'half-baked' Indians in modern America. A reading of this text shows that mobility from one land to another is necessary to propel positive change in the originating nation (India). The incidents experienced by Gopal in the novel speak about the differences between America and India, and the necessity of globalization for India. The text further illustrates the anxiety of seeing a new 'global' India. The novel tries to portray towards the end that change is not about material advantages and benefits alone, but involves a psychological inclination amongst the immigrant for an improved home-nation as well.

Globalization is a continuous process, and according to Ravinder K. Jain, it is a 'socio-cultural' change. "Modernity in India is not constituted exclusively by western or…..of modern culture. The Indian modernity, as contrasted with 'modernization', has been a product of a symmetrical process of cultural change and adaptation" (*Nation, Diaspora, Trans-nation: Reflections from India*, Ravinder K. Jain, 2010). These cultural changes and adaptations are reflected in many of the literary texts written in the diaspora. Today's diasporas and their literatures are usually representations of culture, ethics, social, political and economic advancements in the world, but some key differences within these diasporas are also noted in select texts. Thus, Benyamin's *Goat Days* and Deepak Unnikrishnan's *Temporary People* de-romanticize the diaspora.

Diaspora Literature in Indian Languages

The term 'Indian diaspora' has often been used in academic discourse representing writers from the Indian subcontinent. While diasporic writing in English has drawn sufficient attention from critics, literature in Indian languages has not received its due recognition. There are a fair number of writers who write in their Indian languages. Language stands as an important vehicle for maintaining ethnic identity, distinguishing one group from another. Such a study is also important for Western people, as it would shed some light on the nature and dynamics of Indian society and culture (*Diasporic Indian Women Writers*, Sireesha Telugu, 2009). For a very long time, regional diaspora literature tried to be *a part* of mainstream literature but remained *apart* due to the dominance of literature in English.

Early migrants relied on their native tongues, and migrant oral narratives were narrated in their vernacular languages, but not in written narratives. Diaspora literature in Indian Languages has been present for some time now but has not acquired public visibility, and there has been a constant struggle of Indians to promote their works written in Indian languages. The diasporic writers writing in vernacular languages say that they have their own style with which they express their emotions and ideas freely. They seek to preserve their mother-languages in this hybridised cultural community. The diasporic writers writing in Indian languages hope that their language and literature reaches the

future generations. This group writes for immigrant people of their cultures only, and speaks only to the native readership in the diaspora. They confess that they are the writers, poets, audience, readers and critics. They write to cherish their community's past and a fear of loss of this past makes them want to preserve their language (*Diasporic Indian Women Writers*, Sireesha Telugu, 2009).

Initially, diasporic literature in native languages began as a space of expression. It was used as a vent for the emotional outflow for most of the migrants. As such, most of the diasporic writers who write in native languages do not belong to an academic background, unlike those who are writing in English. Most of them work as doctors, engineers or are simple homemakers, who chose to immigrate. Writing gave them an opportunity to maintain their languages which constructed the diasporic culture, without them needing to go back to India to do so.

More recently, there has been some critical reading for the diaspora literature produced in some of the Indian languages. Literary associations were formed in the diaspora, providing a platform for these writers to share their works. Publishing houses like the Vanguri Foundation in Houston started hosting the diaspora works written in Indian languages. Diaspora literature in Bengali, Marathi, Oriya, Tamil, Sindhi, Kannada, Gujarati, Hindi, and many more are traversing the global today. Vanguri Foundation in America has been publishing Telugu diasporic literature for the past 40 years that relates to the migrant experiences that the writers in English do. In order to promote Indian languages, many chose to express their concerns in their narratives.

"Building temples, celebrating festivals and rituals are thus seen as affirmations of cultural identity." (*Diasporic Indian Women Writers*, Sireesha Telugu, 2009) Literature in vernacular languages is an attempt to enhance the understanding of their private space, which further enriches their culture and heritage in novel ways.

Benyamin's *Aadujeevitham* (*Goat Days*, originally in Malayalam) is the best example from recent times to look at the *other* side of the diaspora, that is, into the fractured identities of the migrant Indians. The Malayalam version of the book has created a great change in the very idea of a 'diaspora'.

Conclusion

Diaspora literature of nearly two hundred years has made a difference in the very way a 'nation', in this case, India, is viewed. The modern-day Indian cinema similarly represents more of the Western world, making the diaspora a substitute for the homeland. Movies like *Kuch Kuch Hota Hai* (1998), *Namstey London* (2007) and *My Name is Khan* (2010) offer representations of the changed family and social systems due to immigration into a land with different values and cultures. The characters adapt to Western modernity, but are also balanced due to their "Indian" ways.

Indian diaspora writers have made their mark by winning literary prizes too. Spread across six continents and 125 countries, the Indian diaspora has created *homes* away from the homeland.

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Visit these Web Pages:

01] Diasporic Literature
https://oercommons.org/courseware/lesson/67710/overview#:~:text=A%20simple%20definition%20of%20diaspora,of%20where%20it%20was%20written

02] Diaspora, Home and New English Literatures
https://ebooks.inflibnet.ac.in/engp08/chapter/diaspora-home-and-new-english-literatures/

03] Diaspora Literature
https://sitemap.bibleodyssey.org/articles/diaspora-literature/

04] What is Diasporic Literature?

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-diasporic-literature-obehi-ewanfoh--p0a3f

05] Diaspora in Indian Writings in English: A Study
https://ijcrt.org/papers/IJCRT2303583.pdf

06] What is Diaspora & Diasporic Literature?
https://medium.com/@2022s-mulmpl-lit-012/what-is-diaspora-diasporic-literature-d610a326d35e







Global Diaspora

GLOBAL DIASPORA CONFEDERATION

CONNECTING THE WORLD'S DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS

Global Diaspora Week 2023

Open Ceremony

https://www.theglobaldiaspora.org/

https://www.iom.int/global-diaspora-summit-2022

Over the past decades, the engagement of diasporas in development issues such as poverty reduction or economic growth, humanitarian response or post-crisis recovery has generated an increasing interest among a variety of stakeholders and governments in particular. Accordingly, IOM organized in 2013 the first ever **International Diaspora Ministerial Conference** bringing together high-level government officials as well as representatives of academia, diaspora organizations, civil society, media, and private sector from around the world.

Since then, there have been constant developments in the field of multilateral migration governance and development such as the adoption of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development (SDGs) in 2015, and of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018. The latter, through its Objective 19, set the goal to "Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries."

On 1, 4 and 5 April 2022, IOM, as the lead international agency working on issues related to human mobility and as Coordinator of the UN Network on Migration, co-hosted a successful Global Diaspora Summit (GDS), in partnership with the Government of Ireland and other lead participating states. The Summit assisted States and partners in taking stock of achievements vis-à-vis Objective 19 as a contribution towards the quadrennial International Migration Review Forum happening in May 2022. The GDS convened governments, diaspora organizations, and other relevant actors to develop a collaborative vision, through meaningful and structured dialogue, towards actively engaging with

transnational communities as agents and accelerators of sustainable development.

The outcome of the GDS is **The Dublin Declaration**, a plan of action for diaspora organizations to institutionalize and operationalize diaspora capitals across policies, programmes, and partnerships in a coherent and consistent framework. It outlines a concise and visionary plan of action to support strategic engagement of diaspora organizations. Most importantly, the document reflects the need to nurture partnerships across sectors and different levels of government, the necessity to create sustainable opportunities and mechanisms to learn and contribute, and the relevance to keep fostering innovative solutions and programmes tailored to the interests and skills of diaspora members.

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GLOBAL DIASPORA CONFEDERATION

Who we are

We are a global community of diaspora organizations with diaspora leaders, partners and supporters who build the future of the global sector of Diaspora Organization.

https://www.theglobaldiaspora.org/who-we-are

We are a diaspora-led organization for Diaspora Organizations

The Global Diaspora Confederation is a non-governmental organization for Diaspora Organizations.

The GDC has four principal organs - **Council**, **Board of Trustees**, **Secretariat**, and **Fellows**. All are driven by four principles: **diasporic impact oriented**, **operational excellence**, **passion for innovation**, and **long-term thinking**.

We know very well that running a Diaspora Organization is not an easy journey and it often requires harnessing volunteerism, relying on frugality, and being at the forefront for the diasporas in need. For many centuries, far too many Diaspora Organizations' selfless

contributions to humanity were unnoticed with far too limited support and recognitions in them. And yet, there are even more diasporas needing help than Diaspora Organizations can assist. This shapes who we are and the Confederation is determined to make a positive change for all.

GDC four Principal Organs

Council:

The Council is the guardian of the spirit of the Global Diaspora Confederation and of its vision and long-term objectives. It acts as advisor to the Board and consists of first trustees and successive board chairs.

Board:

The Board of Trustees ensures GDC's prosperity by effectively governing, advancing and protecting the Membership Organization to achieve GDC's vision and missions set out in its founding constitution.

Fellows:

Fellowship consists of GDC 21, GDC 100, Senior and Ordinary Fellows, representing and contributing to GDC across six continents. GDC 21 are the most senior regional fellows championing GDC's vision.

Secretariat:

The GDC Secretariat, consisting of four departments with 22 teams of staff and volunteers working in global and six continental headquarters to carries out the day-to-day work of the Organization.

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The European Union Global Diaspora Facility (EUDiF)

https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/programmes/european-union-global-diaspora-facility-eudif_en

The EU Global Diaspora Facility (EUDiF) takes a global approach to consolidate efforts on diaspora engagement for development. The facility supports all actors in the diaspora-development ecosystem to engage and collaborate more effectively with each other.

Diaspora, which EUDiF defines as emigrants and their descendants who actively maintain links with their country of heritage, can be powerful

agents of development thanks to their unique transnational understanding and mobility. This potential has long been acknowledged, but until recently dialogue and collaboration between diaspora organisations, countries of origin and the EU and its member states have been fragmented, often focusing on bilateral cooperation.

Objectives

EUDiF's overall objective is to support governments of countries of origin worldwide and diaspora organisations in Europe to engage and collaborate more effectively with each other and with the EU.

Through a combination of research, dialogue, capacity building and mobilising diaspora expertise, the facility works to maximise the potential of diaspora for global sustainable development.

Projects activities serve to

- consolidate and build knowledge on diaspora-development policies, priorities and projects
- highlight opportunities, needs and challenges for diaspora-development cooperation
- enhance multi-stakeholder dialogue between and among diaspora organisations, countries of origin, EU Member States and the EU
- inform the global narrative on the potential of diaspora for development
- develop capacities of diaspora organisations in Europe and governments of partner countries
- support mainstreaming of diaspora expertise in development actions
- promote diaspora-led initiatives
- empower youth diaspora in policy making and programming

Results

Some of the achievements of the first four years of EUDiF are

- Mapping diaspora engagement policies, priorities and projects in 110 partner countries
- There are 439 institutions engaged in diaspora engagement
- 24 countries have a diaspora policy
- 400+ good practices identified
- Producing 5 case studies
- Implementation of the EU Talent Partnerships – What potential role for the diaspora?
- Youth entrepreneurship & heritage tourism: long-term thinking for diaspora engagement
- Mobilising the diaspora for the green transition
- Profiling diaspora skills
- Diaspora engagement in times of crisis

- Organising 6 diaspora consultations and 6 government roundtables
  - 15 diaspora recommendations
  - 6 regional overviews on trends and priorities
  - 6 themed collections of practices
- Facilitating EU Member States coordination meetings on diaspora engagement
- Building a portfolio of 16 technical-support actions which contribute to 11 SDGs
- Creating a diaspora youth internship programme and a youth diaspora alumni community
- Managing an expert roster
  - 300 experts, 65% are diaspora
- Holding 3 editions of the Future Forum, the EU's annual conference on diaspora engagement

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Global Diasporas and Development

Socioeconomic, Cultural, and Policy Perspectives

Overview

Editors:

- Sadananda Sahoo,
- B.K. Pattanaik

- Provides a comprehensive and comparative advantage in the understanding of diasporas
- Enriched with perspectives based on country-specific experiences
- No other book till date focuses on cultural and social aspects of diasporas linked to development

https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-81-322-1047-4

This volume discusses how diasporas have evolved and engaged in economic, social and cultural domains of their host and home countries across the globe. The volume is divided into six parts: Issues, Challenges and Development Experiences; Diaspora Finance and Economic Development; Knowledge Transfer and Diasporas; The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion; Gender and Diasporas; and Representation in Film, Theatre and Literature. It is truly a global representation of diasporic engagement. Its contributions come from experts in various disciplines across the globe, and the chapters cover socioeconomic, policy-related and cultural elements in countries as far apart as New Zealand and Zimbabwe. The contributors discuss major issues related to local communities' engagement with the diaspora and diaspora--home relations in Africa, West Asia, South and South-east Asia, Australia and New

Zealand, China, and the USA, providing a panoramic view of diasporic flows in the twenty-first century. The interdisciplinary thrust of the volume, together with its global focus, makes this volume useful to researchers, academics and experts from the social sciences, population sciences and development studies, as also to analysts and policymakers across the world.

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Also, visit the following Web Pages:

01] Global Diasporas: An Introduction
https://www.routledge.com/Global-Diasporas-An-Introduction/Cohen/p/book/9781032188454

02] Global Diaspora Summit 2022
https://medialib.iom.int/galleries/390/global-diaspora-summit-2022

03] Global Diaspora Week 2023
https://www.theglobaldiaspora.org/

04] Global Diasporas and Development
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-81-322-1047-4



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Quotes

on

Diaspora

"Profound lines by Diaspora Authors that will stir up our Nostalgia"

[01] Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.,

Home is not just a place where we reside in; it is a comfortable space where we belong. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., "Where we love is home, home that our feet may leave, but not our hearts." Ever thought how would it feel to leave this comfortable space and move to a foreign land?

[02] Salman Rushdie

Reflecting the fluidity of identity in a foreign land, Salman Rushdie carefully weaves fiction with his personal experiences as a British Indian writer. His yearning for a comfortable space called home is clearly visible in most of his writings. The characters of his short stories in "East, West" also mirror his nostalgia for a long-lost home.

[03] Rohinton Mistry

Rohinton Mistry's effort to strike a fine balance between his identity as an Indian and a Canadian is a major theme of most of his books. His personal struggle to adjust in a new place while holding on to the past nostalgias is identical to most of his characters.

[04] Vladimir Nabokov

Asserting his identity as a Russian-American novelist, Vladimir Nabokov shapes his characters in a way that they reflect the Russian way of life. His debut novel "Mary", although is a story of Mary and her idea of love but symbolically it also speaks of a yearning to return to the past.

[05] Jhumpa Lahiri

"In other words" is a beautiful nonfiction narrative by Jhumpa Lahiri that records her struggle as she tries to string words into meaningful sentences in Italian. It reflects shades of her character and her consistent longing to run back to her own known language.

[06] V.S. Naipaul

Born in Trinidad, V.S. Naipaul is a British writer constantly trying to reflect his roots in almost all of his works. His works reflect an idea of the past and how its memory frequently generates certain emotions in him.

[07] Anita Desai

Despite her parental background and stay in London, Anita Desai retains her identity as an Indian author. Almost all her works capture the essence of India and the plight of Indian women. Her collection of stories, "The Artist of Disappearance" presents characters that are held by their past and the memories of it.

[08] Khaled Hosseini

As an Afghan-born American novelist, Khaled Hosseini uses the diasporic liberty productively to present a dreadful picture of the war in Afghanistan. He beautifully portrays his reminiscences of the home back in Afghanistan and how even the war could not ruin the idea of it. Although his first novel, "The Kite Runner" is an emotional tale of friendship and unconditional love, it also reflects Hosseini's idea of a lost home.

[09] Vikram Seth



Closely connected with his homeland, Vikram Seth manages to retain the Indianness in his fictional works even after being settled in London. The duality of seeking isolation and a craving for home is as much relevant to him as to his characters.

[10] Jhumpa Lahiri

Describing the changes involved when moving from an accustomed setting to an unaccustomed one, Jhumpa Lahiri's "Namesake" is a narration of seeking acceptance in a foreign land. As an American author with Indian roots, Jhumpa Lahiri beautifully portrays the idea of belonging to the past in almost all of her works.

[11] Monica Ali



An essence of the cultural uniqueness of Bangladesh is integral to almost all the works of Monica Ali. Although she immigrated to England when she was three, she retains an idea of a home back there. "Brick Lane", her debut novel beautifully captures the apprehensions of moving to a foreign land.

Diaspora starts about a thousand years from now. Most of human civilisation has moved inside computers; essentially, a major branch of our descendants consists of conscious software.
<<< **Greg Egan**

Eliminate the Diaspora, or the Diaspora will surely eliminate you.
<<< **Ze'ev Jabotinsky**

Even today I am willing to volunteer to do the dirty work for Israel, to have everyone hate us, to pull the rug from underneath the feet of the Diaspora Jews, so that they will be forced to run to us crying. Even if it means blowing up one or two synagogues here and there, I don't care.
<<< **Ariel Sharon**

There's nothing truer in being a child of a diaspora, a child of immigrants. We're completely new to our parents. We're not something they can ever understand. And it's not as if we are ever going to be accepted. We're accepted as long as we conform to what we are expected to be, and I'm sure that's not any different for anyone else.
<<< **Junot Diaz**

The danger lies in forgetting what we had. The flow between generations becomes a trickle, grandchildren tape-recording grandparents' memories on special occasions perhaps-no casual storytelling jogged by daily life, there being no shared daily life what with migrations, exiles, diasporas, rendings, the search for work. Or there is a shared daily life riddled with holes of silence.
<<< **Adrienne Rich**

If you look at the India-US relationship for example, the role that the Indian diaspora has played in the relationship is extremely crucial. Yes, we share democratic values but there is also the great role that the Indian diaspora has played in strengthening the bond of friendship between India and the US, and of course in underscoring the democratic values between the two countries.
<<< **Narendra Modi**

The Indian diaspora is a wonderful place to write from and I am lucky to be part of it.
<<< **Kiran Desai**

Israel's economic and cultural progress is due to three things: the pioneering spirit that inspires the best of our immigrant and Israeli youth, who respond to the challenge of our resolute areas and the ingathering of the exiles; the feeling of Diaspora Jewry that they are partners in the enterprise of Israel's resurgence in the ancient homeland of the Jewish

people; and the power of science, and technology which Israel unceasingly, and not without success, tries to enhance.
<<< **David Ben-Gurion**

All three of my books, "Perfume Dreams: Reflections on the Vietnamese Diaspora," "East Eats West: Writing in Two Hemispheres," and "Birds of Paradise Lost," are immigrant narratives - their dreams, their traumas, their struggles - and I write them with the confidence that these stories, written from the heart, will belong, in time, to America.
<<< **Andrew Lam**

I consider that all Jews in the Diaspora, and thus it is true in France, should everywhere they can lend their support to Israel. This is why it is also important that Jews take political responsabilities. .... In sum, in my functions and in my everyday life, through the whole of my actions, I try to make so that my modest stone is brought to the construction of the land of Israel.
<<< **Dominique Strauss-Kahn**

Through centuries of struggle, Jews across the world have been witnesses not only against the crimes of men, but for faith in God and God alone. Theirs is a story of defiance and oppression, and patience in tribulation reaching back to the exodus and their exile. That story continued in the founding of the state of Israel. That story continues in the defense of the state of Israel.
<<< **George W. Bush**

The time has come to end the suffering and the plight of millions of Palestine refugees in the homeland and the Diaspora, to end their displacement and to realize their rights, some of them forced to take refuge more than once in different places of the world.
<<< **Mahmoud Abbas**





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